As noted earlier, we will never know the entire picture regarding what the crews on the scene knew and thought about the hazard they faced. We do know from the dispatch tapes that they were aware of explosives on the site. We also know that the guards did not tell the dispatcher what materials were stored, nor where they were stored, and the dispatcher never asked them for this information. While it is clear from the tapes that they thought there might be explosives in the trailer, we can only speculate about their decision to fight the fire.
The two trailers were less than 100 feet apart. If either captain was familiar with distancing tables as set out in the ATF regulations, he may have assumed the contents were standard construction materials, as the distance requirements for explosives were not met. The lack of placarding or any special markings on the trailers may have added to the notion that they did not contain explosives.
Pumper 30, the second company to arrive at the construction site, was assigned to the area where the explosive material was stored. After notifying dispatch of their arrival, there was an almost five minute gap before their next transmission. This was enough time for Pumper 30 to have crossed into the construction area, driven on the back access road, seen the bright yellow high and low explosive magazines, and returned to the equipment fire. Both companies may have assumed they had located and isolated the explosives and felt safe in suppressing the equipment and trailer fires. But to repeat, this is speculation.
The body of the driver for Pumper 30 was found southeast of the explosion. A hand radio was found nearby. It is the driver's normal duty to stay with the equipment to operate the pumper. For him to be away from his normal duty position in the direction of the high explosive magazines and carrying a radio may also suggest he was further scouting the area for hazardous material. But again, this is speculation.
It is known that both captains had many years of firefighting experience
and both had completed the field course from the National Fire Academy for "Recognizing and Identifying Hazardous Materials." Additionally, the captain and driver on Pumper 30 had taken the "Hazardous Materials Incident Analysis" course. The theory advanced by some after this fire that the problem was that not enough firefighters have hazardous material training would not seem to apply here. The two captains had been trained in recognizing hazardous materials.
All information here points to the conclusion that they did not know what was in the trailers. And if they did know, based on either knowledge of local blasting operations or even a placard, they may still not have appreciated the great hazard they faced. Their courses, the information contained in the DOT Guidebook, and the information available to them about the site together still may not have been sufficient to allow them to recognize the magnitude of the hazard.
Next » Emergency Response Guidebook (DOT P 5800.4) and Material Safety Data Sheets
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