Four of the six firefighters involved in this explosion, including both company officers, had received some exposure to hazardous material training through National Fire Academy field courses. Four had completed the NFA course, "Recognizing and Identifying Hazardous Materials."
The stated scope of this course is "to develop the basic skills with which to identify hazardous materials problem in their communities, to recognize hazardous materials presence, and to identify the specific hazardous material(s) and associated hazard characteristics."
The course stresses firefighter safety in hazardous material incidents. The acronym "D.E.C.I.D.E." is used repeatedly throughout the course text to guide the student through the emergency intervention process and to minimize personal risk. It stands for "Detect hazardous material presence; Estimate likely harm (without intervention); Choose response objectives; Identify action options; Do the best option; and Evaluate process." There are protective measures discussed throughout the course, all advising to continually exercise caution.
Much material in this course deals with problems encountered with transportation, such as accidents or leakage problems from vessels or tankers. In most of these instances, the hazardous materials are identified through DOT placards. The first chapter of the course addresses the many types of hazardous materials that can be expected. In the slide/tape script section, on slide #1036, blasting agents are described as being "so stable that there is little chance of an accidental explosion." While this may be taken to mean explosion from physical handling, the possibility of explosion from a fire needs to be added in view of this incident. This and the DOT Guidebook's reference material need to be brought into agreement with the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) information (discussed further below).
One of the two company officers and one firefighter who had taken the Identification course also had taken a second National Academy field course, "Hazardous Material Incident Analysis." The basic outline of this course parallels the previously mentioned course but goes into greater
detail regarding detection, intervention, and hazardous material
behavior. Throughout the course, safety is emphasized. The second chapter
poses the question, "What is the mission of your organization?" The
suggested response is to protect life and property and do this safely.
This theme is repeated throughout the text.
However, on page I-10, slide #24 description, ammonium nitrate/fuel oil mixture is described as "so insensitive that there is very little probability of accidental explosion." But six pages later, page I-16, slide #82, ironically depicts a scenario in which an unmarked trailer containing 26,000 pounds of blasting agent exploded in a fire, killing six firefighters and destroying their apparatus -- similar in several aspects to the Kansas City incident. Both hazardous material courses downplay the potential explosiveness of the type of blasting agent involved in this incident. This impression needs to be corrected.
Both courses primarily address situations where hazardous materials are being transported and the materials are placarded or identified through bills of lading. The matter of shipping/transporting hazardous materials is indeed a major area of concern and an appropriate focus; but the dangers presented by lack of information on storage sites also need to be discussed in the classes, especially in light of the Kansas City incident. There were no indications that a means of identification such as fencing or signs was present at the Kansas City incident. Lack of such warning multiplies the potential danger associated with fire response involving blasting material.
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