1. Dispatchers need to seek and transmit the type, location, and amount of hazardous materials present as early as possible.
The importance of obtaining details on the hazardous materials known to be present at the time an alarm is called in cannot be overstated. This was addressed in the Kansas City Hazardous Material SOP, item #5. The dispatcher needs to query the caller and ask for specifics. In this incident the dispatcher did ask what was burning, but did not receive a complete answer. It was not determined whether the night guards had any further details, but callers should be probed further in such a situation when feasible.
Guards and any other personnel likely to be first to report a fire should be informed about hazardous material they are guarding and instructed to volunteer that information to the fire department in an emergency. This guidance should be passed on to local industry.
2. Incident command procedures to be used in the face of unknown risks should be spelled out, especially for situations where there is no threat to civilian lives.
The evaluation of the scene and the actions taken by the first officer at a fire or hazardous material incident are critical. The Kansas City Hazardous Material SOP, item #6, covers this. Emphasis should be placed on responses to industrial or construction sites where any type of enclosed structure is involved. Simply stated, if a container or building is on fire at these sites and the contents are not known, and there is no immediate threat to life or significant property, consideration should be given to evacuating the area. Emergency personnel should be drawn back to a safe distance, out of the line of sight and upwind.
Pre-fire plans can provide a great deal of information about the risks at hand during an incident. Many departments relay this information to responding units via the dispatcher or in-vehicle telemetry. Ironically, Kansas City was one of the first and best known communities to have a computerized file listing unusual risks in occupancies throughout the city. Unfortunately, enclaves render such a system useless.
3. Local means of improving identification of parked or stored blasting agents should be considered.
The current ATF Explosives Law and Regulation handbook does not address the issue of outside container i dentification. While awaiting potential changes in federal guidelines from DOT, ATF or other agencies, local governments should consider what they might do in the interim. One simp le solution would be to require placard ing of magaz ines on site.If there is local concern about having placards affixed to the magazines (to keep contents confidential and reduce possibility of theft or vandalism), there are other alternatives. One alternative is to provide a numerical code or symbol that is less obvious.
Another approach is to encourage or require installation of chain link fences around the mobile/portable magazines. The Type 5 mobile magazines involved in this explosion were, in essence, freight trailers that had been hauled to the user site. A chain link fence with gates at two ends of a four-sided parking area would allow vehicles to pull through.
Kansas City has already made changes on its own, and now requires the City Engineer's office to advise the Fire Marshal's office of any application for blasting. They have deve loped a document that identif ies the quantity and type of explosive material, the type of storage facil ity, and requires a copy of the MSDS sheet. Kansas City additionally has the applicant prepare a plot diagram showing hazardous material locations. These documents are to be made a part of the material in the responding fire companies' handbooks.
4. Fire departments should review local procedures for regulating hazardous materials.
Kansas City was already aware of the jurisdictional problems involving State/Federal enclaves within their City limits. The City had to make changes in local administrative procedures to gain information about explosive materials on all types of sites. If these problems existed in Kansas City, no doubt they exist elsewhere.
5. Users of blasting materials should consider reducing amounts of explosives and blasting agents kept on site.
The Kansas City construction site was only about one hour's drive from the manufacturer of the blasting agent, yet a three to five day supply of blasting agent was kept on site. Tradeoffs among frequency of resupply, road exposure, site exposure and costs should be considered to arrive at an optimum method of supply for a project.
6. The NFPA Technical Committee on Explosives should review its requirements
regardinq marking of magazines.
The firefighters in this incident knew there were explosives on the site. NFPA 495 would have required the site to have a sign saying "Explosives --Keep Off" and to have notified the Fire Department about the location of explosives, but not to have the magazines marked. Reconsideration
is needed of the dangers of more explicit marking of contents and location versus the hazard to firefighters.
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