Strategic decision making at this point focused on several factors:
1. Plant employees believed that the leak was isolated and would stop
as soon as the residual chlorine had escaped from the piping system. The
plant’s chlorine production had been shut down and the valve between the
storage tanks and the leaking valve was closed. This would leave only the
liquid that was already in the piping system that could leak out. They
believed that the corrosive liquid was eating away at the elbow, but that
not more than 1,000 lbs. of chlorine could escape. Based on this
information, there was no point in risking personnel to take additional leak
control actions.
2. The population immediately at risk included only the adjacent
industrial facilities, most of which were shut down and evacuated. One
facility could not be shut down and a minimal crew was left to operate it,
while wearing self-contained breathing apparatus. These employees were
trained in hazmat procedures.
3. The use of water fog to accelerate vaporization or to absorb the
vapors would have required the commitment of personnel and equipment
in a hazardous area. Long hose lines would have been required to place
master stream appliances in positions where they might be effective, and
the acid produced by the combination of water and chlorine could have
caused a grater damage to plant facilities and equipment.
At this point the situation appeared to be stable. Based on the
strategic considerations, a cautious ‘“wait and see” approach was taken and
all personnel were kept out of the immediate area of the leak. HazMat
Group members with monitoring devices were deployed in an attempt to
define the location and track the progress of the gas cloud. City of
Henderson officials assembled at the Command Post and maintained an
immediate awareness of the situation. Additional resources were staged and precautions were taken, in case the situation changed and evacuation
became necessary.
Next » Expanding Gas Cloud
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