The location of the fire caused numerous logistical problems. It was
in the southeast comer of the City, far from most units. (See Appendix F
for map of Seattle station locations.) It took a long time to build up the
army of firefighters needed to handle the situation. Most cities would face
a similar problem. Higher fire alarms were called in more rapid succession
than was usual to provide adequate staffing and relief. But the delay in
getting adequate forces on the scene undoubtedly caused some apartments
to be lost that could have been saved had more manpower been available.
To add manpower, three task forces of five units each were called
under mutual aid agreements from neighboring jurisdictions on the north,
east, and south of Seattle. Two were used at the scene and one to fill in
for units at the scene.
The total force used at the fire included three-quarters of all Seattle
units plus the three task forces. (See Appendix D.) The firefighting
involved: 20 engine companies, six ladder companies, five battalion chiefs,
over 125 firefighters. Counting relief units and returns of second shifts of
the same unit, there were many more.
In reviewing logistics after the fire it is important to know when
each unit had arrived. A number of units at this incident did not
immediately report in their arrival to dispatchers. In some cases the
dispatchers had to infer units had arrived from radio traffic. This had no
impact on operations in this incident but it could have, and it did make the
post-mortem analysis more difficult.
The Seattle Police had to call out a tactical response to provide
officers to deal with the several hundred people who fled the fire or came
to help or to watch. The crowds impeded access of vehicles on the narrow,
dead-end streets.
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