Exit Paths -- Exterior covered walkways running the length of each building provided access to each apartment unit. The walkways connected between buildings. There were five stair towers: one in the northeast comer of the complex, one in the northwest comer, and three evenly spaced across the south building (C). There were also two passenger elevators on either end of the south wing, adjacent to the covered parking areas. A small, short hallway stub led from the walkway to each pair of apartments. Most of the apartments also had a balcony facing the interior side of the complex. Occupants thus had three potential ways to escape: 1) Through their front door down the short hallway, then along the exterior walkways in either direction to a staircase; 2) through a bedroom window directly to the walkway and 3) from their rear balcony or rear window.

The ceiling of the exterior walkways on Floors l-3 was an exposed tongue-and-groove cedar surface supported by 4” x 8” cantilevered wood beams. The walkways consisted of concrete covered by outdoor carpet. Fire doors had been retrofitted at intervals along the walkways.

The exterior facades of the walkways on the fronts of the buildings were 4-story high decorative lattices comprised of 2” x 6” vertical cedar boards approximately on 9-inch centers. (The space between the vertical cedar boards was about seven inches.) The lattices had lo-foot widths separated by 5-foot brick fascia. These lattices were both for aesthetics and security. The wood had been covered with oil-based stain. The wood had dried out in the approximately 30 days without rain prior to the fire.

In other words, the exit paths on Floors l-3 were encased in highly combustible wood on three sides.

Construction -- The apartment complex was of ordinary wood construction, with no special hazards. It had a flat, hot tar roof over dimensional lumber which helped slow the spread of fire on the top floor; the roof did not have trusses. The siding was beveled cedar over water-board (like plasterboard), which helped slow the fire penetration but not the lateral spread. The water-board helped save the two north buildings (A and E) from penetration of the exposure.

Windows on the units were single pane glass, which quickly broke in the fire. Interior walls had plasterboard, which held up quite well.

Fire Protection Systems -- There were no sprinklers in the apartment complex A manual pull alarm was retrofitted in 1981. It was interconnected throughout the 5-building complex, with the added feature of having an alarm bell in every unit. Pulling any alarm handle set off the alarms in the whole complex. In the building of origin, there were 10 manual pull stations. An alarm panel was in the office adjacent to the main entrance on the east side of the complex.

Every apartment unit also had a battery-operated smoke detector furnished by the owner. It was the responsibility of the tenants to maintain them. The detectors were not interconnected. The building of origin had 17 rate of rise detectors.

There were dry standpipes in every stairway, but no hoselines for tenants to use. Fire extinguishers were hung in appropriate places as required by code.

Codes -- Seattle uses their own modified versions of the Uniform Building Code and the Uniform Fire Code. They are called the Seattle Building Code (SBC) and the Seattle Fire Code (SFC). The Villa Plaza Apartments were built in 1968, according to the 1956 SBC then in effect. Table 1 contrasts the current code requirements to those used in the building. If built in 1991 the complex would have had some key safety features that almost certainly would have made a major difference in the outcome of the fire: the residential units would have been sprinklered, and the complex would have a central station automatic alarm linked to the Fire Department. The sprinkler operations would have caused a signal to be sent to the Fire Department and led to earlier Fire Department response. The fire damage most likely would have been contained to the apartment of origin if the complex were built to current code.

Inspections/violations -- The building complex had had five minor maintenance violations since 1990, and they were not thought to matter in the fire. The building was inspected annually, with additional cursory reviews every two weeks or so. The fire alarm system was certified annually, and worked.

Occupancy -- At the time of the fire there were approximately 260 people living in the complex, in 96 units, 18 on the first floor and 26 each on the higher floors.

Social Environment -- Most of the residents were from low income households, some on welfare. Many were immigrants. The apartment complex had been a known haven for drug dealers and users. There had been many police calls to the complex. The apartment complex had a new manager who had made good progress in evicting problem tenants and reducing the drug trade, but had not been totally successful.

Security -- The residents had hired a security guard who was going to move in the week after the fire. He was to patrol the halls at night, and could have made a difference in both detection and evacuation.