1. The extreme hazard of molten sodium must be recognized.
Molten sodium is an extremely hazardous material, reactive to water
and most other extinguishing agents. Previous experience, pre-fire
planning, and information provided by plant employees caused firefighters
to believe they could handle the burning sodium without excessive risk.
2. The best action plan would have been No Action.
A full evaluation of the risks and potential consequences of this
incident, after the fact, leads to the conclusion that the safe plan would
have been to take no action.
3. Structural protective clothing is not designed for molten metal.
Structural protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus
are not designed to provide adequate protection for exposure to molten
metal.
4. The way protective clothing was worn decreased its effectiveness.
Members involved in the incident would have been considerably
better protected if they had been wearing full protective clothing ensembles
that meet current standards, including protective trousers (turnout pants)
instead of 3/4 length boots. They would have had better protection if they
had used the chin straps on their helmets, pulled up 3/4 length boots, and
(in one case) not worn a turnout coat without the liner.
5. Extinguishing agent choice has limitations.
Sodium chloride is effective as an extinguishing agent for small
quantities of burning sodium, but it is ineffective on molten sodium.
Sodium chloride may be dangerous if it is not completely dry. Other
agents offer higher degrees of safety for small sodium fires.
6. The number of injuries reflects the fact that the hazard was not
recognized.
Because the hazard was not recognized, three companies of
firefighters were in the immediate area assisting in the extinguishment
efforts. All of the personnel in the area were burned when the explosion
occurred.
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