Live Oak/Milstar Complex and Carpet Service Center Fire - (LaGrange, Georgia - January 31, 1995) » Key Issues

Issues	Comments
BUILDING FIRE PROTECTION	The automatic sprinkler system was overwhelmed by the fire’s size and fuel supply. Early failure of two large risers/supply mains diverted water from sprinklers over the fire. Failed automatic sprinkler systems were not promptly shut down to direct the water to viable systems.
WATER SUPPLY	The large on-site stored water supply was lost early in the fire due to failure of the diesel engine driven fire pumps. The city water system flowed directly into the plant’s system and was taxed by flow from over ten 8-inch collapsed automatic sprinkler risers early in the fire.
PROCESS CONTROLS	Heat transfer system controls and emergency procedures may not have been sufficient to prevent the combustible heat transfer fluid from continuing to feed the fire.
FIRE DOOR MAINTENANCE	Many rolling steel fire doors installed in masonry walls between additions to the Complex reportedly failed to close automatically or manually. The principle failure mechanism was identified by fire department and insurance company representatives as pinched together guide tracks at the edges of these doors. These sources also indicated that fire door and other maintenance deficiencies had been discussed with the plant management prior to the fire.
DELAYED ALARM	The direct fire alarm connection to the county 911 emergency center was placed out-of-service by the plant. The purpose of doing this was to perform maintenance on a sprinkler system riser that was in a section of the plant away from the point of fire origin. The first telephone report of the fire to the 911 emergency center was from an in-plant location near the loading dock. This was followed several minutes later by a telephoned report from the plant security office. This demonstrated a lack of coordination between plant security and maintenance functions which should have determined that the initial water flow alarm was not from the sprinkler riser being repaired.
CONVEYOR OPENINGS	Several large conveyor openings through fire separation walls were protected by deluge sprinklers. The loss of water supply to these sprinklers early in the fire rendered this protection inoperative. Smoke, hot gases and eventually the fire were able to travel through these openings because of the lack of water spray and fire doors.
PRE-INCIDENT PLANNING	The fire department reported visiting the plant in early 1994 as a new carpet manufacturing process was starting- up and that the Fire Prevention Bureau was well equipped with drawings, blueprints and pre-fire plans. Company familiarization tours and comprehensive fire prevention visits probably had not been conducted since that time. Plant knowledge and familiarization is a continuous undertaking for all fire department members. At a senior level, planning should also include an analysis of what might occur if a fire protection feature, such as the automatic sprinklers, fails.
MULTIPLE ALARMS	The Milliken fire was a third alarm incident that included recall of off-duty LaGrange firefighters and mutual aid from other towns and county resources. The LaGrange Fire Department has procedural guidelines for equipment responses to confirmed structure fires through the third alarm which would provide a total of 12 engines, 4 trucks and 3 squads. However, the guidelines do not identify the source and units of mutual aid equipment responding on the various alarms. Based upon interviews, the number of fire apparatus that were operating at the scene was less than the preplanned response.

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