Live Oak/Milstar Complex and Carpet Service Center Fire - (LaGrange, Georgia - January 31, 1995) » Overview

An afternoon fire on Tuesday, January 31, 1995 destroyed Milliken & Company’s Live Oak/Milstar Complex and Carpet Service Center. This was an approximately 600,000 square feet, fully sprinklered carpet manufacturing, warehousing, cutting and distribution facility. The fire began shortly before 2:00 p.m. in the northeast corner of the primarily single story structure in the carpet manufacturing area. The fire initially involved a laminating machine, which attaches carpet to different types of backing. The fire quickly overtaxed the wet pipe automatic sprinkler protection resulting in collapse of the roof and major structural elements within 10 to 20 minutes of the fire’s start. The direct dollar loss to building and contents has been estimated at over $190 million and the total loss at over $400 million.

The complex started as a carpet warehouse and distribution center in 1968 and was expanded in several major stages through 1973. After 1973, interior revisions to production and processing machinery continued with a major production renovation in the area of fire origin reportedly completed in 1991. The cause of this fire is attributed to a rotating coupling failure that released combustible hot oil from a closed loop heat transfer system. This combustible liquid ignited, resulting in an intense, three-dimensional fire. A three-dimensional fire includes the liquid burning in the two-dimensional spill pool on the floor plus the burning liquid falling from the coupling above the pool.

Two 8-inch automatic sprinkler risers were located near the point of origin. These risers supplied automatic sprinklers located below the roof in the area of fire origin and an area immediately adjacent. These automatic sprinkler risers or the large, horizontal supply mains connected to them were likely destroyed by the roof collapse early in the fire, interrupting the water supply to the sprinklers and resulting in additional structural collapse. The failed risers also drained water from other sprinkler systems around the area of origin. Fire protection water supplies are usually not designed for multiple sprinkler systems operating at the same time. Water flowed from broken automatic sprinkler mains and risers for over seven hours during the fire suppression efforts, severely taxing the municipal water system in the area surrounding the plant.

As new buildings were added to the complex, the former masonry exterior walls were used as interior fire separations. Rolling type fire doors were installed in the large openings created in these walls to connect the buildings. Several large conveyor openings were identified as being protected by deluge sprinklers or spray nozzles. Water supplies for this deluge protection came from the same water supply system that supplied the automatic sprinklers and which was destroyed early in the fire. Reports from interior sector officers and firefighters indicated that nearly all of the fire doors failed to close automatically and could not be closed manually. Fire door maintenance deficiencies reportedly had been brought to the attention of plant management before the fire.

The initial fire in this highly protected risk (HPR) property involved a fuel that is difficult to extinguish with water. The failure to control the fire resulted in an early structural collapse which destroyed large automatic sprinkler mains and risers, which overwhelmed the plant’s fire protection water supply and the municipal water system. Delayed alarm, sparse preincident planning, and alleged deficient fire door maintenance also contributed to the total loss of the complex. Due to restricted site access and the limited ability to confirm the details given by others, this report is based upon the best information available.

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