On the morning of January 31, 1995 at about 10:11 a.m. the 911 Center was
informed that the fire alarm service company would be testing the sprinkler system
waterflow alarms. The 911 Center placed the system into a “do not respond” mode. A
second telephone call was received at about 1:16 p.m. indicating that the testing was
completed and to return the fire alarm to “service.” About two minutes later, the 911
Center received a request from the Milliken plant’s guard house to again place the fire
alarm into a “do not respond” mode. Reportedly repairs were being started on one of the
automatic sprinkler risers on the south side of the plant. This repair was described as a
replacement of a section of pipe for the water motor gong.
Shortly before 2 p.m. on January 31, 1995, a hot oil leak began at a 1-1/2 inch
diameter rotating coupling located on the second level of Laminating Range No. 6. The
rotating coupling connects the fixed hot oil supply and return piping to the heated
revolving rollers which compress the carpet and its backing together. Milliken reported a similar leak at another rotating coupling about a week before the fire and this leak was
controlled without an ignition of the hot oil. The first leaking coupling was said to be
located on the lower level of the range.
According to Milliken’s Dean Jackson, who responded to the hot oil leak report
from his office about 225 feet away, a massive white vapor cloud was spreading from
the leak’s location both upward and down to the floor. The base of this cloud was
described as about 2 to 3 feet in diameter and the top about 10 to 15 feet in diameter.
Emergency procedures direct operators to stop the hot oil circulation pumps within the
subloop when a leak occurs. It is believed that this was done. Before Jackson reached
the area, the vapor cloud ignited without a distinct noise from an undetermined ignition
source. Flames were initially observed from the second level coupling leak down to the
floor but they rapidly covered the area from the floor to the bottom of the roof deck.
Employees pulled racked fire hoses equipped with spray nozzles in an attempt
to control the fire before the automatic sprinklers operated. Two nearby hoses were
being used as automatic sprinklers began to operate. Dean Jackson indicated that a
propane fueled lift truck quickly became engulfed in the fire and employees evacuated
the area shortly thereafter.
The status of the main hot oil loop circulating pumps at the time of ignition and
after was unknown. It is not known at which point during the fire these pumps shut
down. No oil was recovered from the system after the fire.
The Troup County Emergency Communication Center (911 Center) records indicate
that the fire department was dispatched at 2:02:28 p.m. in response to a telephoned
fire report received from the Milliken plant’s shipping and supply area. The plant’s
guard house telephoned at 2:04:54, also reporting a fire at the plant. Taped records from
the 911 Center suggest that there was a plant fire alarm activation at about 1:51 p.m. but
no response was sent because there was a hold on the directly connected fire alarm system.
This suggests an 11-1/2-minute delay.
The Deputy Chief of Suppression was the Incident Commander (IC). He
responded to the Complex from the Swift Street side and his initial size-up came from the
intersection of Swift and Lindsey. He reported seeing heavy black smoke and flames pouring
from the northeast area of the building’s roof. The Swift Street plant entrance gate was
locked but it was opened by Milliken employees as the IC was turning around to enter the
complex. The first location of the Command Post was on the east side of the structure near the mid-point of the east wall. The LaGrange Fire Department assigns
sectors based upon the street address side being Sector A and working clockwise around
the structure. Therefore, the Command Post was initially in Sector D.
A second alarm was requested at 2:12 p.m. which brought the third LaGrange
engine to the scene and Troup County Fire Department units into LaGrange for standby.
The County’s response was believed to consist of two engine companies and a rescue
company. A third alarm was requested at 2:14 p.m. which brought a West Point, Georgia
(14 miles away) engine, two Troup County engines, a Troup County tanker and a
portable breathing air cascade to the scene. At 2:18 p.m., the two off-duty LaGrange
Fire Department battalions were recalled. At 2:28 p.m. another request was made for a
ladder-platform from Carrollton, Georgia (50 miles away) and a ladder truck from
Coweta County, Georgia (27 miles away). Records indicate that no alarms beyond the
third were formally requested. Other firefighters were rotated into the scene from the
involved fire departments to relieve the on-scene crews.
Arriving at the east side of the complex, the IC observed through the open loading
dock doors flames extending from the floor to as high as he could see inside the building.
He also reported that bright sparks, likely electrical, were falling from the ceiling area.
About 10 minutes after arrival, the IC indicated that the fire had traveled to the south
where flames were observed through windows at the top of the east wall over the maintenance
shop area. These windows would be slightly south of the middle of the east wall.
A police “dash camera” video tape indicates that the fire had already broken
through the roof in the northeast corner of the complex at the time of their arrival. The
column of dark black smoke was already about 150 feet in diameter and several hundred
feet in the air. Fire units also report being able to observe the smoke column as they
responded from Station 1. Weather at the time of the fire was sunny, temperature about
60oF, and the wind was out of the northwest at about 10 to 15 mph.
Engine 4 (1,500 gpm with 500 gallon water tank) was operating in place of
Engine 1. They entered the plant from Lukken Industrial Drive West (front side) and
were directed by plant employees to the truck loading dock at the building’s northeast
corner. A preconnected 1-3/4-inch line with spray nozzle was
stretched to a personnel entrance door at this point. The crew reported flames extending
from the floor up as high as they could see and 15 to 20 feet away from their position.
They entered no more than 20 feet into the building and stayed long enough to empty
the 500 gallon tank. As they were working, the engineer hand stretched a 3-inch supply line to a nearby yard hydrant and subsequently pulled a parallel 3-inch supply line. The
crew abandoned the handline and placed into operation a deluge gun equipped with a
500 gpm adjustable spray nozzle on the ground near the truck dock. The deluge was initially
directed onto the fire over the outside wall and then later used for exposure protection
of adjacent equipment and storage vessels on the east side of the plant. These items
included cooling system compressors, a large electrical transformer, small cooling
tower, and two vertical storage tanks containing “PrudiWater.”
Eventually this downwind position became untenable and Engine 4 was moved to
Swift Street. The ground deluge, which was being directed by the crew, was set to a fixed
position on exposed equipment and was disconnected from Engine 4 and attached directly
to the 5-inch supply hose. After the move, Engine 4 pumped to Engine 3 while the crew
concentrated on protecting the three dry bulk material storage silos at the northeast corner.
Because their primary vehicle was being serviced, the two member Rescue
Company was operating reserve Engine 5, a 1,000 gpm unit. From Station 1, they
responded from the east on the Swift Street side. On arrival, the crew observed that the
fire had penetrated the metal deck roof at the northeast corner and the fire was running
to the west against the wind along the northern edge of the roof.
Initially Engine 5 was positioned on Swift Street between O’Neal and Lindsey near a hydrant on the south
side of Swift. Before completing their setup to use the deluge gun on the top of the
engine, the fire had moved to the west past this position. The crew moved the engine to
the north side of Swift just to the west of Lindsey. Using parallel 3-inch supply lines
from the hydrant, they operated the 500 gpm spray nozzle equipped deluge from the top
of the engine at the second position. They were unable to reach the fire with an effective
stream from this position.
This attack was suspended when Engine 3 completed its reverse lay from
Engine 4 to the hydrant that was supplying Engine 5. As the Rescue Company’s officer
helped connect Engine 3 to the hydrant, Engine 5 was moved further to the west and
parked on Swift between Lindsey and Polk Streets. After assisting Engine 3 and while
waiting further assignment, “explosions” began to occur along the plant’s northern
wall. Brick and hollow concrete block from the top 5 to 8 feet of the north wall would
“explode” in 60 to 70 feet long sections with debris reaching the fence line about 60 to
75 feet away from the wall.
Subsequently, Engine 5 connected to a hydrant near Swift and
Polk Streets to supply a 3-inch line to Engine 3 and to use their deluge set which had
been changed from a spray nozzle to a 1-inch straight tip. There was insufficient water
available to supply both operations so they shut down the deluge set and continued to
relay pump to Engine 3 through the dual 3-inch supply lines (a second supply line had
been laid to Engine 3). This operation continued into the evening.
Engine 3, a 1,500 gpm unit, arrived about 20 minutes into the fire after completing
another assignment which was received at nearly the same time as the Milliken fire. This
engine was assigned to Sector C and entered the northeast corner of the plant from Swift
Street. They assisted Engine 4 with setting-up the deluge and reverse laid a 5-inch supply
line to a hydrant on Swift between O’Neal and Lindsey from Engine 4.
They pumped the supply line and also operated an engine mounted deluge onto a roof
mounted 500 gallon capacity hot oil expansion tank. The operation continued until Ladder
11 came to Sector C between 4:30 and 5:00 p.m. At that time, the engine was moved to
allow the ladder to set-up and then the engine supplied the ladder stream only.
Engine 2 entered the complex from the main entrance off of Lukken Industrial
Drive West and initially staged at the southeast corner. They observed a Milliken
employee stranded on the roof. While Ladder 11 attended to the rescue, Engine 2
reversed laid from the siamese connection on the underground loop main to a city
hydrant on Lukken and pumped into the siamese connection. The engine crew became
part of the interior sector operations which worked through personnel entrance doors
along the south side of the building. Later in the fire, the engine also supplied water for
other fire suppression operations in Sector A.
Ladder 11, a 100-feet rear mounted straight ladder, entered the complex from the
main entrance off Lukken and initially staged behind Engine 2 near the southeast corner.
Their first assignment was to rescue the employee stranded on the roof. The truck was
pulled facing into the building at a location near the complex’s southwest corner. The rescue was completed using the main ladder. The firefighter who
went to the roof to assist the employee down the ladder reported that heavy black smoke
and billowing flames were observed pouring from the roof at the northeast corner.
After the employee rescue, the ladder picked-up and stayed for a brief period at
the complex’s southwest corner before being assigned to a fly pipe operation in Sector A.
The truck was positioned facing into the building about 250 feet east of the southwest
corner with the rear of the unit nearly at the south curb line of the complex’s roadway.
The ladder was extended about 60 feet at an angle of about 70 degrees. The operation
initially started with an adjustable spray nozzle with a water supply from Engine 1
which had arrived later in the fire. This stream was barely reaching the building and the
spray nozzle was changed to a 1-1/4-inch solid stream nozzle. While this improved the
reach, the stream had little effect on the fire. This operation was subsequently discontinued
and the ladder given another assignment.
The ladder was ordered to Sector B to establish another fly pipe operation at the
north wall line of the 1968 original building. Several hundred feet of 5-inch supply line
was hand laid to extend the water supply from Sector A to the new position. This time
the ladder was backed into the building to a point just outside the collapse zone and the
unit operated the 1-1/4-inch solid stream nozzle along this fire separation wall.
Firefighters reported that the roof to the north of this wall had already partially collapsed
before this operation started. The ladder operated for 30 to 40 minutes before
being ordered to move due to an impending wall collapse. The ladder was still in preparation
for being moved when a partial west wall collapse occurred, missing the truck.
At about 4:30 p.m., Ladder 11 was ordered to Sector C on Swift Street near the
northeast corner of the complex. There they operated a fly pipe in this area until about 2
to 3 a.m. the next day when the operation was stopped for environmental sampling.
During the unit’s work at this location, the crew reported difficulty in extinguishing
flames in this corner that kept flaming up after being knocked down.
Engine 1 arrived later in the fire staffed with the off duty battalions. The unit
was initially positioned within Sector A (See Appendix E) and supplied Ladder 11 and
interior sector handlines. After interior sector operations stopped, the engine briefly
operated an engine mounted deluge from the complex’s roadway near the southwest corner.
Subsequently, the engine was ordered to Sector C to supply other units in the area.
The Interior Sector was under the command of a LaGrange Lieutenant from the
recalled off-shift battalion assisted by the Chief of the West Point Fire Department. His
initial assessment of the 1968 original building’s interior began shortly after his 2:30
p.m. arrival at the scene. At this time, smoke was reported high up under the roof with
clean air at floor level. A crew of about five to six firefighters was assembled from a
resource pool that numbered about 100 LaGrange, Troup County and other mutual aid
department members. Another Lieutenant was assigned to log firefighters in and out of
the building. A formal “passport” system was not being used.
The first hose line was described as a combination of 2-1/2 and 3-inch hose that
was supplying a 2-1/2-inch spray nozzle. They were also constructing a 3-inch supply
line to a portable deluge set which was equipped with a 500 gpm adjustable spray nozzle.
These were advanced into the structure, extended, and moved between open fire
doors in the north and east walls of the original 1968 building. At one time, the handline
was combined with the single hose line into the deluge set for two supply lines. Later,
the handline was broken off the deluge set and attached again to the 2-1/2 inch spray
nozzle. These two lines were moved between four to six large wall openings where fire
doors had failed to close. At each position, the line - either hand or deluge set - would
operate for a time to knock-down the fire entering the door opening before moving to
the next. Eventually, the Interior Sector Commander indicated that the flames coming
through these open doors became more intense and movement between doors became
more difficult as smoke banked down from the roof.
Movement of lines into the building and between the door openings was hampered
by the storage racks and by the full pallet loads of finished product stored in the aisles
between racks and at the end of rack structures. The Interior Sector Commander reported
having to crawl over these contents to reach some of the nozzle operating positions.
Interior Sector operations continued for about 1-1/2 hours before crews were
ordered from the building. Crews had been out of the building for only a few minutes
when the eastern sections of the 1968 building’s roof began collapsing. The fire had
established itself into the last section of the complex and, with essentially no water supply
for the automatic sprinklers, the total involvement proceeded rapidly.
Fire walls, with or without openings, are prearranged positions where the fire
department can take a defensive stand to stop a fire’s horizontal spread. Incident commanders
should not rely on a fire wall to stop a fire’s spread without some help from the
department. Preplans should always anticipate that fire companies with hose lines,
radios, and SCBA will need to be positioned along the unexposed side of a fire wall
inside the building. Companies should also take positions on the roof next to the fire
wall. Typically when fire walls are being relied upon, one or more fire protection systems
or features have already failed and a major fire is in progress.
Even in fire walls that do not contain door or conveyor openings, the Incident
Commander should anticipate penetrations of some form. In addition, fire walls can crack
from the fire exposure and temperature differential between the fire exposed side and the
unexposed side. These penetrations and cracks can allow flame and hot gases to ignite combustibles near the wall. Sometimes, heat conducted through the wall can ignite combustible
storage stacked tight to the wall. Fire companies in position along the fire wall
can observe these ignitions and take action to keep such fires small. They may also move
or prewet storage to keep any fires from becoming established on the unexposed side.
When firewalls have openings for moving goods, equipment, and people, a
potential path for fire travel exists. These openings may be protected by fire doors, fire
dampers, water curtains or deluge sprinkler systems. All of these protection methods
require regular maintenance and testing so they can be relied upon to work in an emergency.
NFPA Standard No. 80 on fire door installation provides guidelines and cautions
regarding the maintenance of the various fire door types. Some general precautions on
the maintenance and testing of water based extinguishing systems are available in NFPA
Standard No. 25. This can be helpful in preparing specific maintenance and testing programs
for deluge sprinklers and water curtain protection. These two types of fire wall
opening protection are highly dependent on having the water supply available at the
needed flow rate and pressure. Sometimes the fire conditions are such that the water
supply fails just when the opening protection is called upon to perform. This failure
mode occurred at a number of conveyor openings during this fire.
Incident Commanders should also remember that tested and listed fire doors can
pass flames and hot gases. NFPA Standard No. 252 on fire door testing, permits intermittent
six-inch long flames on the unexposed side of fire doors after 30 minutes of fire
exposure. These flames are permitted to be continuous during the last 15 minutes of the
test. Besides small flames, fire doors transmit more heat than do fire walls and could
ignite nearby combustible storage. In this incident, the fire door tracks were reportedly
damaged sufficiently that the rolling doors would not completely close. This provided
an even larger avenue for flames and hot gas spread.
Both diesel engine driven fire pumps stopped running during the early stages of
this fire. Reports indicate that the first pump failed in under 30 minutes and that both
pumps had stopped within 45 minutes of the fire’s ignition. Both failures are believed
due to a loss of cooling water to the diesel engines. There was no indication that either
suction tank had been completely emptied at the time that the fire pump failed. This
investigator was not permitted to check either diesel engine or to enter the pumphouses.
The exact failure mechanism had not been identified at the time of this investigation.
The loss of the diesel fire pumps reduced the fire protection water supply volume
by over 60% and the pressure by at least 50%. Without the pumps, the two city connections to the underground loop main provided all the water for fire protection. The
fire department supplemented the two connections by pumping into the siamese connection
at the front of the plant. This probably did not offset more than 20% of the water
supply that the two fire pumps provided.
In a facility with a fire pump, the owner often designates an employee to respond
to the pump during emergencies to make sure the pump is running. Usually, alarm and
running signals on the fire pump’s condition are also transmitted to the fire command
center. For diesel driven fire pumps, these signals often include temperature and oil pressure
information. As part of its preplan, the fire department should incorporate the facility’s
emergency procedures into its plan. With reduced firefighter staffing, facility
resources could be used in the effort to monitor vital fire protection equipment. If fire
department resources permit, the Incident Commander should designate a firefighter with
a radio to check on the fire pump because of its importance to fire suppression functions.
There was no indication that the two fire pumps were attended to during this incident.
The Milliken & Company plant was a large structure with a variety of fire hazards
consisting of high piled and rack storage, high temperature equipment, combustible
liquids, and hazardous chemicals. In addition, outdoor equipment, bulk raw materials
storage silos, and fuel storage on the east side of the building represented additional special
hazards. The combination of hazards overwhelmed the facility’s primary fire
defense in the area of origin, the automatic sprinkler systems. Problems with the fire
wall opening protection in combination with the fire department’s inability to mount
sufficient support at the walls, resulted in the extensive loss.
Some exterior fire attack continued at the north and south sides of the complex by
the use of two ladder streams and some deluge sets. At about 10 to 10:15 p.m., the two
connections to the city water mains feeding the plant’s looped fire main were shut-down.
This action essentially stopped the water flow from the 26 broken and collapsed sprinkler
risers. Before these actions were taken, a city utility official reported that the 15-inch
diameter sanitary sewer outflow from the east side of the complex was completely full.
Incident Command was passed off from the Deputy Chief of Suppression to one
of LaGrange’s Captains at about 7:00 p.m. After a short meeting, the Deputy Chief
assumed the duties of liaison between the fire department and Milliken officials
involved with air monitoring of the smoke. The Incident Command and Milliken liaison
changed again at about 7:00 a.m. the next morning. The fire was not declared under
control until after February 1, 1995. Heavy equipment was brought to the scene to knock down walls and excavate smoldering carpet rolls and piles of carpet squares. Fire
department units were operating at the scene around the clock for over a week, extinguishing
spot fire as materials were removed by outside contractors.
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