The State Department of Labor and Industry reasoned that the building was built of non-combustible materials and that theatrical pyrotechnics and smoke used during performances could accidentally activate sprinkler systems, potentially causing water damage.

The automatic centrally-monitored alarm system included smoke and heat detectors. However, the smoke detectors on stage were often activated by theatrical smoke which set off needless alarms. This led to the conversion of smoke detectors to heat detectors and started the practice of disabling the system during performances, and using employees as a fire watch.

The lessons of the Sight and Sound fire are not new. This fire is very similar to other fires in history, examples are:

• 1967 Chicago Ill., McCormick Place exhibition hall fire where a non-sprinkled fire resistive protected steel constructed building collapsed. This fire was not occupied with patrons at the time of the fire. Maintenance crews tried unsuccessfully to control the fire and the notification to the fire dispatched was delayed. The fire protection water system maintained by the property owner was not in operation. The fire was fast burning and had high heat production which contributed to the steel failure and total collapse.

• 1985 Fairfax, VA., Wolftrap Farm Pavilion fire began in the stage at the prop storage area and resulted in total destruction. Recommendations for sprinkler protection were not heeded. This theater was set back off the main road and closed when the fire started. Late discovery allowed the fire to gain much headway before the fire units arrived.

• 1904 Chicago, Ill., Iroquois Theater fire. This theater was occupied when a fire occurred in the stage scenery. The fire rapidly extended from the stage to the auditorium. The death total was 602 people who could not get out before they were overcome from toxic smoke.

In the case of the Sight and Sound fire the following factors contributed to the loss:

1. Fire department notification was delayed because the alarm system did not activate. The alarm company received no signal for an alarm at the theater.

2. The two hour fire resistance-rated assembly in the storage area beneath the stage was damaged during the stage floor renovation, leaving the structural members unprotected from the ensuing fire.

3. Even though the importance of water supply was known by the property owners (lack of it was cited as a reason for not installing sprinklers), the pond initially provided to supply water for fire suppression was subsequently eliminated to make room for a large addition. The recommended access road to the alternate water supply pond was not built because the owner of that land would not allow the construction. With no access road to the off-site pond, fire apparatus became stuck in the mud and had to be towed. This also limited access for additional units trying to establish water supply.

4. The props assembly and maintenance buildings were connected to the backwall of the theater stage with a 40 foot by 40 foot hallway which had no fire separation door. The State Fire and Panic Code, Subsection 51.2 requires that when public assembly occupancies share a structure with other occupancies, the other structure will be separated with fire walls or be governed by the most restrictive limitations. The lack of sprinklers and fire separations contributed to fire extension and damage to the prop assembly and maintenance buildings.

5. The representatives from the State Department of Labor and Industry did not apparently understand how a two hour fire resistance rating should be applied per the particular features of a specific structure. The level of protection is variable depending upon many factors that affect the rate and extension of heat and flame. The two hour rating does not guarantee two hours of fire resistance for buildings. Rather, the rating relates to a laboratory test conducted using a controlled time temperature curve where an assembly is exposed to increasing heat levels until 1,850o F is reached at two hours.2 In real fire situations, fire temperatures can reach 1,850o F in minutes, not hours.

   Misunderstanding of the fire resistance rating resulted in a mistaken justification for waiving the required storage room sprinkler system. Storage rooms often have high fuel loads which when involved in fire produce enough heat to quickly overwhelm the fire resistant design intended to contain the fire within a compartmentalized area. The code recognizes storage areas in public assembly occupancies as potential fire hazard areas that require dynamic protection features to extinguish or contain a fire.

   The two hour fire resistance assembly test is consistent with the combustion of ordinary Class A materials capable of heat generation at 8000 BTU's per pound. The under stage storage area in the theater held props constructed of plastic resin glass fibers, polystyrene foam, and plastics that typically produce heat generation rates of 16,000 BTU's per pound, twice the rate of ordinary combustibles. In addition, the canvas, cloth, and wood used in the props had high surface area to mass ratios conducive to rapid flame spread. The heavy fuel load in this facility would be considered by most life safety and fire codes to be hazardous storage, thus requiring sprinkler protection.

6. The stage floor renovations contributed to the overstocked storage room and heavy fuel load. The theater routinely produced four separate seasonal productions throughout the year. Normally, three productions were in storage while one remained on stage. Due to the stage floor construction, the props and scenery for the fourth production also had to be crowded into the under stage storage area. This further increased the fuel load and impeded the advancement of hose lines by firefighters.

7. The inability to efficiently ventilate smoke from the theater further complicated the efforts of firefighters to find the vertical fire travel in the auditorium. The inability to effectively relieve the heat vertically through the roof allowed the intense thermal effects to travel horizontally across the underside of the roof causing more damage to the steel structure and the subsequent roof collapse. The automatic rooftop ventilation originally suggested would have mitigated the heat and smoke extension dramatically.

8. Although there were six civilians who suffered minor injuries, the fire suppression operation was conducted without firefighter injury. This fire presented a significant potential for firefighter injuries during the interior fire attack phase and from the subsequent roof collapse. The fireground command officers recognized the imminent potential for building collapse, and removed personnel from the structure. They then used defensive tactics and conducted operations from the exterior.

9. The theater auditorium was designed to allow for the evacuation of 1,400 occupants through the 26 exit doors without steps. The exiting rate of 60 people per minute, is based upon healthy, ambulatory people3. The Sight and Sound Theater productions were family programs targeting young children and elderly audiences. As much as 60 percent of the typical audiences consisted of elderly individuals or children who may have required exiting assistance. Many of the elderly who usually attended used wheel chairs. These circumstances almost certainly would have delayed exiting to a rate of fewer than 60 people per minute had the fire occurred while the theater was occupied. Also, smoke and the products of combustion probably would have communicated into the auditorium contributing to additional exiting problems.