$15 Million Sight and Sound Theater Fire and Building Collapse - (Lancaster County, Pennsylvania - January 1997) » Fireground Organization

Strasburg Chief Wentz arrived immediately after the Strasburg units and called for a multiple alarm. He directed units to establish a water supply relay using 5-inch hose laid from a pond a quarter mile away behind a nursery (visible in aerial view two). The Chief ordered the responding ladder trucks to attempt to ventilate the theater roof, and had additional attack lines advanced into the auditorium near the stage.

The Lancaster County Fire Chiefs Association has adopted a standard operating procedure for incident command. The incident command procedure identifies each side of the building by number and establishes the responsibilities of the incident commander and sector officers. (For additional details see Appendix A.) Chief Wentz established incident command at his vehicle and made the following assignments:

COMMAND OFFICER ASSIGNMENT

Chief 4-1 Water supply sector
Deputy Chief 5-4 Side One sector (front of building)
Deputy Chief 6-3 Side Two sector (west side)
Chief 5-5 Side Three sector (rear of building)
Deputy Chief 5-1 Side Four sector (east side)

Public Information Officer functions were assigned to the Lancaster County Fire Coordinator.

Much of the staffing and resources were directed toward establishing a water supply. This required three engines drafting from the pond, with additional engines pumping in-line to complete the lengthy 5-inch hose relay. Tankers were also used to shuttle water to the theater parking lot.

The demand on fire department resources required a third alarm. Apparatus staging was managed in the parking lot and a firefighter rehabilitation area was established. Tactical radio frequencies were assigned to water supply, EMS operations, ladder truck operations, and general fireground operations.

The firefighters advanced a 1-1/2 inch line with a fog nozzle to the rear of the building at the storage room passage door. Firefighters were unable to advance into the room because the entranceway was blocked by storage props, sets, and other large items. The firefighters then entered through the overhead door and advanced into thick black smoke (see Diagram 3.) They advanced into the storage room but were unable to see the fire and were reluctant to apply water onto smoke without visible flame. As the operation progressed, the initial attack crew in the storage room was relieved by another crew when their SCBA became depleted. The crew on the attack line in the auditorium encountered untenable heat and zero visibility. Also of concern was a large stationary liquid nitrogen tank at the outside wall of the storage room. A hose line was dedicated to keeping the tank cooled to prevent overheating.

Once the heat of the fire caused the structural steel to fail in the storage area (aided by the damage to the sprayed-on fire protection during renovation), interior firefighting became too hazardous to continue. The truck crews ventilating the roof noted metal discoloration and buckling steel. The sector officer for that area noted exterior heat discoloration extending in the auditorium and the prop assembly building, and the order was given to evacuate the building and discontinue interior operations. As a result, the fire department adopted defensive tactics and re-positioned units for an exterior attack. Only after the roof collapsed and water from exterior streams could reach the fire did the fire department begin to make progress at extinguishing the blaze.

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