$15 Million Sight and Sound Theater Fire and Building Collapse - (Lancaster County, Pennsylvania - January 1997) » Lessons Learned

1. Local governments have the responsibility and fire departments need the authority to ensure that local fire protection capabilities can cope with a fire of any structure, especially a high occupancy public assembly such as the Sight and Sound Theater.

Unfortunately, many volunteer fire companies across the country are not provided a formal voice into the building plan process. Where this is the case, there are several actions that fire departments might otherwise take if faced with new fire protection demands that exceed the staffing, equipment, and training resources of the department, especially when built-in protection requirements appear to be compromised:

A. Develop a process whereby the fire department is apprised of building permit requests and plans.

B. Notify the local government if the proposed construction places excessive demands for fire and life safety protection. Provide formal recommendations, in writing, for built-in fire protection and water supply requirements as appropriate.

C. When waivers are requested which would adversely impact fire protection coverage, fire department concerns should be communicated in writing to the appropriate local and State agencies.

D. If structures are built without adequate fire protection features and are beyond the resources of the local fire service to protect, the local fire service organization could notify the property owners, local government, and the property’s insurance carrier that major property loss will likely occur beyond what would be expected had the structure been built code compliant. The fire department could also point out that the planned construction poses a potential life safety risk to both the firefighters and general public.

E. The local fire service organization could work toward the adoption of appropriate local building and fire codes with local authorities.

2. Pre-construction meetings should be conducted with property managers and contractors, so that fire service representatives can provide important insight for fire safety design and fire protection measures.

On complex buildings and public assembly occupancies, pre-construction meetings allow the fire department representative to review the site and building plans and make fire protection recommendations. The plans review process normally allows the fire department to offer valuable information to the property owners and contractors, and enables the department to become familiar with how the planned construction could affect fire protection systems and influence fireground operations. Such conferences should be also held prior to any major additions or repairs to existing structures.

If a meeting had been held with the local fire department before work proceeded on the stage floor at the Sight and Sound Theater, the fire department representative would likely have recognized the potential hazard of welding over the storage area, and could have suggested fire prevention measures, such as a fire watch during welding operations, and removing or protecting the combustibles below the work area.

3. Government and fire code officials must recognize that building safety/fire code requirements are usually based on past tragedies. Waivers and trade offs of code provisions must be granted sparingly and only with adequate, comparable fire protection coverage through other means. Otherwise, the safety of citizens and firefighters is jeopardized.

Public assembly occupancies warrant more stringent requirements because of the high potential for multiple casualties and large dollar losses. Claims of economic hardship caused by complying with codes rarely overshadow the cost of the fire that otherwise might have been prevented or suppressed in the incipient stage. This fire is a perfect example. The cost of the fire is estimated at $15 million dollar loss to the structure, $55 million dollars lost to the tourist industry, thousands of dollars in response costs expended by the fire departments, and the loss of jobs for 62 theater employees. The cost associated with the fire protection features that were $225,000 pales in comparison to the subsequent loss.

Fire protection is a service provided by people from the community and should be supported by the community. This support should include responsible construction of buildings which meet life and safety codes and do not exceed the capability of local resources.

4. Buildings constructed of steel should, in effect, be considered unprotected and capable of collapse from fire in as few as ten minutes.

Fire resistant coatings sprayed onto structural steel are susceptible to damage from construction work. As a result of the delayed call to 911, the lack of a sprinkler system in the storage area, and the failure of the alarm system, the fire in the storage room beneath the stage was probably already unsafe for an interior attack when the 911 call was made.

Building construction training is especially important for line fire officers. Basic fire training does not generally cover building construction or pre-fire planning. All fire officers need to be familiar with the specific hazards of building construction. Understanding the risks associated with building collapse will increase safety of fire fighting operations.

5. The impact of fire and heat on structural steel members warrant extreme caution by firefighters.

For a fire of this magnitude the interior attack should be at least two 2-1/2 inch hose lines -- one 2-1/2 inch hose line for fire attack and the second as a back-up line to direct water on the structural overhead. For reach and penetration at least one line should have been equipped with a smooth bore nozzle. Water directed on heat-buckled or sagging steel members generally will prevent further distortion of the steel, provided the fire is being extinguished. Although the first arriving engine did not run out of tank water before the 5-inch hose relay was complete, the use of four 2-1/2 inch lines would have required approximately 1000 GPM.

6. The general firefighting rule of using water only on visible fire (not on smoke) is not applicable to structural steel construction.

Unless the steel members are cooled with high-volume hose streams, the fire’s heat can rapidly cause steel to lose its strength and contribute to building collapse. Therefore, interior fire attack in steel construction should include the timely use of sufficiently sized handlines to cool the structural steel, with additional lines deployed to attack the fire.

7. A personnel accountability system should be implemented and strictly applied by a designated safety or accountability officer, on every incident and particularly at working structure fires.

While there were no significant injuries, a safety officer should have been appointed by the incident commander. An incident this large with the potential for firefighter injuries warrants a personnel accountability/safety manager. This position is needed to coordinate the overall safety of fireground operations and to ensure personnel accountability.

The establishment of effective accountability systems for all personnel operating at the scene of fires, has become a standard safety practice in the fire service. This type of system can greatly reduce the risk of overlooking personnel during the evacuation of the fire building. It also reduces the possibility that personnel may become trapped or incapacitated without the Incident Commander being aware of their presence. Although many fire departments have accountability procedures in place, it is important that they be implemented routinely.

8. Once incident command is established, it is valuable to assess whether sectors should be assigned by geographic position or by tactical function .

With the exception of water supply, sectors were assigned geographically based on building sides. Consideration should be given to tactical areas of responsibility such as ventilation, exposure protection, planning, safety, etc. Tactical sectors are often more effective on fires of this magnitude because the sector commanders can better coordinate specific functions for the entire incident. The ventilation of the structure was critical because of the limited openings and the difficulty in locating the fire. If the large overhead doors at the prop assembly building could have been opened, it would have relieved the heat at exposure number three. A hose crew was employed on the liquid nitrogen tank at the storage room entrance. The planning sector, if utilized, could have concentrated on how to open the overhead doors, and the best way to handle the nitrogen tank hazard.

9. Effective incident command of a major incident like this fire would benefit from a specialized command vehicle to support incident management functions.

On large scale fires, a command unit with space for command officers to meet and have adequate communications capabilities is very important. The Lancaster County Fire Service has approximately 100 fire departments that could utilize a command vehicle for more efficient operations at major incidents. A critique of this incident held by the Strasburg VFD identified the need for a command bus on all multiple alarm incidents in the County.

10. Codes pertaining to exiting in public assembly occupancies do not account for public assembly occupancies frequented by a high percentage of elderly and children.

The code requirements on building evacuations generally are established on the basis of healthy ambulatory people. Code provisions do not routinely consider the exiting impact of those needing assistance, such as elderly and handicapped people, and very young children. What are normal and acceptable exiting rates change when occupants are less ambulatory, especially when fire protection systems are waived.

For the fire safety of public assembly occupants it is necessary that exits are adequate for timely evacuation, and that fire protection systems control the fire until evacuation is complete. A fire protection sprinkler system and a reliable alarm system are essential for ensuring the necessary evacuation time. This theater attracted large audiences which would have needed assistance during emergency exiting, and therefore, more time to evacuate the auditorium. Waiving required fire safety systems further increased the risks for fire and panic-related injuries had the theater been occupied when the fire occurred.