Broward Marine Fire - (Fort Lauderdale, Florida - September 5, 1996) » Lessons Learned

1. It is critical to provide a sufficient number of staff officers to allow full implementation of the Incident Command System.

   Although it is sometimes necessary to double-up tasks on one staff officer early in an incident, such as sector officer and safety officer, it is imperative that assignments be split when additional staff becomes available. Because the safety officer must be free to survey the fire scene so as to relay information back to the incident commander, it is very difficult for this officer to also function as a sector officer.

2. Establishing a perimeter can minimize the spread of fire and help direct resources as they arrive on the scene.

   The facility was spread over such a large area and presented such varied risks that establishing a perimeter became a priority. Fire units were deployed to make an ini - tial attack on buildings and exposures on the east side of the perimeter while assuring that incoming units were supplied and positioned to support the perimeter. The perime - ter was in constant risk of being overrun by radiant heat and large firebrands carried aloft by the firestorm.

3. Dispatch procedures should address the availability of specialized equipment.

   Fort Lauderdale is a city with miles of waterways and various risks on the shores of these waterways. There was a delay in getting the fireboat on site because the crew was initially dispatched as a ladder company and had to return to quarters to respond with the boat. Specialized equipment available from mutual aid departments, such as fireboats, should also be identified in dispatch procedures and alerted early on.

4. Pre-incident planning should incorporate information gathered through regularly scheduled fire prevention inspections.

   The location of the second entrance to the complex and the recent construction of the intended fire wall between Buildings A and Buildings B and C were factors not immediately known to the incident commander. Ongoing fire inspections may have identified the potential problem of scaffolding surrounding yachts under construction, and information regarding how this scaffolding might perform under fire conditions could have been obtained prior to an actual incident.

5. Water supply evaluation is an important component of pre-incident planning

   The failure of aged supply mains and decreased flow rates are a potential critical risk. Review of water supply capabilities should be ongoing. Procedures should address drafting operations, as waterways are an obvious asset and man made obstructions can cause problems regarding access.

6. Delayed reporting can greatly increase the potential for property damage

   With no fire detection or alarm systems installed in the building of origin, the fire progressed to full building involvement before the arrival of the first engine. The first calls to 911 described a substantial fire underway; the roof of Building A had already collapsed when Engine 3 arrived. This delay between ignition and fire depart - ment arrival may have been significantly shortened if a fire detection or alarm system had been installed and operative.

7. Coordinated efforts between investigative authorities support an efficient and prompt investigation.

   Representatives from five separate local, state and federal authorities worked together to conduct this investigation. Despite the split responsibility of investigation and enforcement, all team members worked together to gather information from wit - nesses and to conduct the investigation. A prompt investigation serves to reduce specu - lation from the public and permits the department to assess post fire conditions in an informed manner.