Broward Marine Fire - (Fort Lauderdale, Florida - September 5, 1996) » Second Entrance to Facility Located

The crew from Engine 2 discovered an access road on the extreme far east side of the property. This gated road, located near the staging area, had once been used to drive heavy equipment into the marina but had not been used in some time. Trees and heavy foliage had effectively hid the entrance from view. Upon entering through the gate, firefighters noted the hazard of two gasoline tanker trucks, and numerous spot fires in the area. Three dumpsters were reported burning further down the access road. A warehouse located at the far northeast corner of the property, between the fire and the New River, was threatened. Engine 49 was ordered to the area to protect this exposure.

Engine 29 reported that the elevated stream was allowing them to make good headway against the fire on the west side of Building A. Receiving verification from Engine 29 that they could hold their area, Command committed all remaining crews to the east side of the fire. The safety officer, also functioning as North sector command, called that they did not have enough water in Building B and the west side yacht was now burning. The need now was for a line between the two yachts to try to save the yacht in the east bay of Building B.

Engine 49 was trying to get to the north side location near the fireboat since the boat was now set up to supply water on the north side. Engine 49 set up with two lines to protect the yacht in the east bay of the assembly building; Engine 47's crew hand laid an attack line down the drive to the north side using 1000 feet of 3" hose with a high rise pack. The fireboat was ordered to shut down their deck gun and divert supply to hand lines.

An emergency call went out to Q2 to shut down the deluge gun due to a burst length of hose at approximately 1:52 a.m. A fourth alarm was called at 1:53 a.m. Two engines, Engine 46 and Engine 13, responded on the fourth alarm.

Ladder 35 staged at Riverbend Marina just to the east of the fire; several spot fires were burning in the marina.

The dust collector was ignited by radiant heat early in the fire. When the fire was initially observed there was concern that the fire might endanger the electrical distribution station located to the immediate southeast or weaken the steel structure of the dust collector itself, but this was determined not to be a concern after evaluation. Some water was applied to the dust collector but it was not a focus of attack, as the fire was smoldering and contained.

Fort Lauderdale's fireboat was supplying four hand lines for the attack on the yachts located inside Building B, which was still intact.

Access to the yachts in Building B was hampered due to the scaffolding erected around the yachts. Walkways laid across the scaffolding blocked the flow of water to the west end of the far most yacht, and flames were spreading.

A foam educator was set up on the wyed line supplied from Fort Lauderdale's fire boat (FB 49); firefighters used two 1-3/4" foam lines on the burning yacht in an attempt to stop the spread of flames.

At one hour and fifteen minutes into the incident, command reported very heavy fire with five master streams in operation and at least four hand lines in operation. On the north side, Fort Lauderdale's fire boat was supplying a 3" line that crews were using to divide the fire east and west, and was also supplying two hand lines for use on the burning yacht in the west bay of Building B.

Drafting from remote positions was ruled out because of the need to cross fences with hand laid lines and the demand on manpower that would be required as well as the risk of being trapped if the fire should jump lines.

The Coast Guard fire boat on the north perimeter supplied one 3" line used to extinguish spot fires to the west of Building A. The Port Everglades fire boat (FB 6) arrived on scene and directed their deck gun on the west end of Building B.

As water was applied to the yachts in Building B, there was a concern that the scaffolding would not be capable of supporting the weight of both a yacht and the fire - fighting water the vessel could collect. The Safety Officer directed crews away from the yacht located in the west bay to reduce the risk from a potential collapse. Facility repre - sentatives were unable to provide definitive information regarding the weight that the support jacks and scaffolding could support. It was decided to move the master stream off the area; two 1-3/4" handlines were then used to protect the yachts. At this time, the fire on the southwest perimeter had been knocked down, and the elevated stream was relocated to the southeast corner of Building C.

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