The second alarm assignment of Engine 11, Engine 2, Truck 2, Medic 72 and Battalion 1 had been dispatched at 4:17 a.m. All Stockton Fire Department administrative staff officers were also alerted on the second alarm.
Engine 2 arrived at 4:22 a.m., followed by Truck 2 and Battalion 1 at 4:23 a.m. While Truck 2 proceeded to ladder and check for extension to the houses east and west of the initial fire, the E2 Captain made his way to the rear yard of the east exposure. From this location he observed that the rear of the burning house was fully involved in flames, however
there was so much fire at the rear of the house that he did not identify that there was a second floor.
Engine 2 and Battalion 1 were directed to evaluate conditions on the south side of the fire. They positioned Engine 2 in front of 25 West Mariposa Avenue and determined that they would need hose lines to protect the exposures bordering the rear of the involved structure. There was no hydrant on the block and they requested another engine company from Incident Command to lay a supply line to Engine 2. Engine 11, which had been directed to approach from the west, because West Mendocino Avenue was heavily congested east of the fire, was redirected to provide the water supply for Engine 2. E4’s engineer was also directed to take the apparatus to the south side and assist with the water supply.
The crew of Engine 2 advanced a 2-1/2 inch line and a 1-3/4 inch line to the rear yard of 25 West Mariposa, to the rear of the structure, and directed a stream onto the garage and the rear of the burning house, as well as a burning power pole. A concrete block fence and arcing power lines prevented their access to the back yard of 26 West Mendocino. Engine 11 advanced a second 2-1/2 inch line to the same area, but the line was not put into operation.
By 4:29 a.m., Battalion 1 had advised the Incident Commander (Battalion Chief 2) that the 2-1/2 inch line at the rear could hit the fire on the second floor through a window. Support 2 also advised that they could hit the fire on the second floor with their 2-1/2 inch line from their position on the east side. The Incident Commander approved these actions, warning the exterior crews that there were crews operating in the front part of the house. At 4:31 a.m., Battalion 1 advised the command that they were getting the fire in the rear of thehouse knocked down and the Incident Commander noted that the fire appeared to be almost under control.
Operator 1, at the command post, reminded the Incident Commander that the “safety engine” had been committed and there was no rapid intervention team assigned. At 4:32 a.m., Battalion 1 released Engine 11 to report to the command post as a relief company. The engineers
from Engine 6 and Engine 11 were ordered to report to the front of the house as a rapid intervention team, while the remainder of Engine 11’s crew prepared to enter and relieve one of the interior crews. The Incident Commander directed Engine 11 to relieve the crew from Engine 9, who had been operating inside the house for almost 15 minutes.
At 4:34 a.m., Battalion 1 informed the Incident Commander that flames were again beginning to build up in the rear of the building. The hose stream was again directed into the second floor window, darkening down the flames. Two minutes later, Battalion 1 reported that there was still an active fire on the second floor.
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