Chesterfield’s 911 Emergency Center received a telephone report of the fire and,
at 0147 hours, dispatched an initial assignment from Stations 4 and 5. Two engines from
each station, Trucks 37 and 77 and the North Battalion Chief responded. Initial station
alerts also provide firefighter, officer and equipment resources staffed by responding volunteer members. Station 5, about 0.8 mile from the apartment complex, was the closest
station dispatched. Engine 53 with five firefighters was the first unit on the scene at
0153 hours, followed by Engine 54 with four firefighters.
On arrival, the officer of Engine 53 reported fire showing from the roof over at
least two third floor apartments adjacent to the core area and spreading rapidly horizontally
and vertically. Incident Command was established and sectors identified using their
standard procedure. The front (east) side of the building was designated as Sector A.
The designations then proceed clockwise around the building: Sector B on the south, C
on the west and D on the north. Each sector contained one side of two different wings
plus part of the core area.
Incident Command passed from Engine 53’s officer (career) to the Assistant
District Chief (volunteer) at 0156 hours and then to the area’s Battalion Chief, Battalion
3, (career) at 0200 hours. At the change in commands, Engine 53’s officer took charge of
the Interior Sector. The initial strategic plan begun by Engine 53’s officer to search for
and evacuate occupants and control fire spread was maintained throughout the incident.
Because of the time of night, it was expected that most residents were home and
asleep. Notification and evacuation of the occupants became the first priority of arriving
companies. Crews of the initial units were split into two teams; about half of each crew
was assigned to search and evacuation and the balance of each crew to fire suppression.
The suppression effort of the first two engine companies, Engines 53 and 54,
was to support the core section automatic sprinkler system and to operate a deluge set
on Sector A. The core sprinkler system was charged
through the siamese connection located at the pit in front of the building. There is no
indication that any of the four wing fire department connections to the sprinkler systems
were used.
At 0156 hours, the Incident Commander reported “water on the fire” and
directed incoming units to prepare for exterior master stream operations and to assist
with search efforts. The first truck company, Truck 37, was positioned on the north side
of Sector A to operate an elevated master stream. Engine 43 was directed to Sector D
and to place into operation a portable deluge set at this sector’s west end. Engine 44 was directed to assist Engine 43 with the deluge; both crews
were split into search and suppression elements. As additional Station 5 volunteers
arrived, they were primarily assigned to the search and evacuation of occupants. Truck 77 was positioned at the east end of Sector D for the second elevated master stream. At
this time, three master streams were operating and a fourth was being set up. Search and
evacuation operations were underway in Sectors A and D.
Around 0200 hours, the Incident Commander requested three additional engine
companies to the scene. Other engine and truck companies were also being relocated
from county fire stations away from the fire to cover nearby stations. These relocations
were coordinated by the third on-duty battalion chief whose district was furthest from
the fire. Special equipment such as the communications/command vehicle, air mask
unit, and lighting were also dispatched during this time.
At 0207 hours, the Interior Sector reported that the fire in the central core area
had dropped from the third floor to the second floor and about 4 minutes later, the crew
in Sector C reported fire now on all four floors and through the roof at the core. Search
of this section was deemed impossible due to the intensely burning fire in this area and
the beginning of structural collapse.
Engine 93 was assigned to Sector D to lay a line from Truck 77 to the area of
Engine 43 and to supply the line. Engine 102 was also assigned to this sector and connected
into the two supply lines to the deluge set at the west end. These parallel lines
exceeded 400 feet in length and Engine 102 relay pumped into the deluge. The crews
from 93 and 102 were initially assigned to completing the search operation and then
later to suppression operations in Sectors B and C.
Chesterfield Fire Department does not routinely use large diameter hose (LDH)
for water supply on its apparatus although it has several engines so equipped on an
experimental basis. No LDH was used during this incident. The department’s usual
water supply hose on engine companies is 3î diameter double jacket lined hose. Unless
specially noted, supply lines from hydrants to the fire ground were 3î diameter.
Engine 53 was moved from Sector A in front of the building to Sector B. It laid
parallel supply lines from Engine 54 to its position in Sector B. This crew and a number
of Station 5 volunteers operated a hand line on this side of the fire in addition to searching
the apartments for occupants.
Between 0200 hours and about 0225 hours, six engines, two trucks and the
Station 5 volunteers who had responded directly to the scene were operating four master
streams, two hand lines and were searching all of the building not presently involved.
The “All Clear” signal for the primary search for Sector B was given at 0225 hours and
for Sector D at 0232 hours. As the principal means of access to the apartments in all
four wings were located in these two Sectors, this was also the all clear for the building.
By about 0230 hours, the fire involved approximately 75% of the building’s entire
roof, all of the fourth floor in the center core, about 60% of the building’s third floor and
all of the first and second floors of the center core. Battalion B, Senior Battalion Chief,
assumed Incident Command at 0240 hours after touring around building. Battalion 3 was
designated as Operations Officer and the Assistant District Chief was designated the
Incident Safety Officer. With the primary search completed, the Incident Commander
directed all available resources to fire containment and suppression.
At this time effort was made to increase the water supply being delivered to the
fire ground. The two hydrants nearest the building were being fully utilized by apparatus
and the next available hydrants were each over 700 feet away. Engines 103 and 106 combined
together to lay a new supply line from Sector A to the hydrant at Buckingham
Station Drive and East Coal Hopper Lane (See Appendix H). Engine 103 pumped from
the hydrant to Engine 106 which supplied a line into Sector D. The crews initially operated
lines on the second floor of this Sector but this operation was later suspended because
of the elevated master streams working on both sides of the building’s wing in this area.
Engine 102 moved the portable deluge from Sector D into Sector C by extending
the lines. The crew stretched a supply line from the engine into Sector C where it was
wyed into two 1-3/4-inch handlines. These handlines were directed into this wing and
also used to protect the building at 13201 Boggie Road West which was being affected
by radiant heat.
Engine 112 laid a second supply line from Engine 103 to Engine 54 and then
into Sector B. Engine 112 directed used its mounted deluge, a 2-1/2-inch handline, and a
second master stream onto the fire in Sector B.
Engine 73 was also assigned to increase the water supply to Sector B. Two supply
lines were stretched from a hydrant at the rear of the Village Shopping Center to
Engine 53. The placement of these lines involved a 600 foot long hand stretch through
the woods. Once the lines were in place, the crew assisted with the placement and operation
of a deluge from the southwest corner of Sector C into the center of the building.
By 0330 hours, ten engines were supplying water to two elevated master
streams, seven additional master streams and six handlines of assorted diameters. By
counting the master stream appliances and the number of handlines, fire officials estimated
a peak fire flow of 5,500 gpm was being delivered to the fire. The spread of the
fire was halted and the heavily involved areas began to darken down. The master
streams continued to operate for the next 1-1/2 hours. During this time, crews were also
performing secondary searches of apartments. Special emphasis was placed on those
apartments where there was no account of the occupants’ location.
A severe thunderstorm moved through the area after 0400 hours. The elevated
master streams were shut down and the aerial apparatus lowered. Sector Officers were
ordered to shelter all personnel in safe locations. The portable deluge sets and engine
mounted deluges continued to operate unmanned during the storm. During the fire suppression
effort, the Incident Commander twice requested all Sector Officers to report on
Personnel Accountability. The first was at 0340 hours during the major assault on the
fire. The second occurred at 0450 hours after the severe thunderstorm had subsided and
crews were returning to the fire ground.
At 0453 hours the fire was declared under control. The Operations Officer met
with the Sector Officers to develop an overhaul plan. It was decided that only exterior
suppression operations would be permitted until day break, when a full safety assessment
of the building could be made. The Chesterfield County Building Officials Office
was contacted to assist with the building’s structural assessment. Sections of the building
were identified where it was considered structurally safe to overhaul.
Release of companies began at 0800 hours and a shift change for on scene companies
was conducted between 0800 and 0845 hours. Overhaul and salvage operations
continued all morning and into the evening. Five engines and two trucks remained on
the scene for most of the day.
An Occupant Services Sector under the command of a Department Captain was
established by the Incident Commander during the morning. It was responsible for the
coordination of resident access into their apartment to salvage and recover personal
items from sections of the building identified as being safe. Residents were escorted into
their units starting at about 1300 hours and access continued into the evening hours.
Injuries
The fire department reports indicate that there were no fatalities or injuries to
apartment occupants. Two firefighters became ill and were transported to the hospital
for observation; they were later released. There were no injuries to firefighters.
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