Sprinklered Records Storage Facility (Chicago, Illinois - October 29, 1996) » The Fire

A still alarm was dispatched at 1:50 p.m. on a report of a fire in the building. Two engines, two trucks, a squad company, and a battalion chief responded. The first unit on the scene was Engine 7 who reported extremely dense white smoke from both the north and south doorways on the west side (Knox Avenue) of the building. Engine 7 requested a box alarm at 1:56 p.m. bringing two more engines, a tower ladder, an ambulance, additional battalion chiefs, Deputy District 2 Chief, and a communications van.

Engine 7 led into the siamese connection near the center of the west side of the fire building with 4" and 2-1/2" lines and connected to a hydrant along Knox Avenue. The crew also attempted to advance a handline consisting of 2-1/2" hose with 100 feet of 1-1/2" hose as a finish into an entrance door at the north end. Progress of the crew was limited to an area just inside the doorway because of the very dense smoke and extreme heat. The crew encountered nearly 30 foot tall racks of cardboard boxes stored from the floor to near the ceiling, creating a potential for collapse and firefighter entrapment.

Battalion 7 established incident command on Knox Avenue which became Sector 1 in accordance with Chicago Fire Department practice1. Battalion 8 on arrival was assigned to Sector 3 and Battalion 10 was assigned as the Plans Chief, based in the communications van.

As Deputy District 2 Chief approached from the north, he reported difficulty reaching the fire scene because of the dense white smoke obscuring Knox Avenue. He actually got out of his car to help his aid guide the vehicle to the fire ground because of the smoke exiting the building and hugging the ground. Upon arrival, Deputy District 2 Chief assumed incident command.

Engine 91, the second engine on the still alarm, led out at the southwest corner. The crew took one 2-1/2" hand line into a doorway at the south end of the fire building and a second 2-1/2" hand line through the loading dock area of the adjoining building to the south. This second line was stretched to an opening in the wall between the two buildings. Neither line could make progress to the seat of the fire because of the same heavy smoke and storage racks being encountered by Engine 7’s crew.

The two still alarm truck companies, Trucks 35 and 58, both raised main ladders to the roof from Sector 1. The roof in the first building bay was concrete and could not be readily opened. The crews were able to open all four skylights in this roof but these openings were only about 4 feet square each. Their size and the low smoke buoyancy, did not improve the conditions inside the building sufficiently for engine crews to make progress.

Both the west and east walls of the building were windowless, making additional ventilation almost impossible. Companies were able to force open a large rolling truck door near the middle of the building. Dense white smoke poured from the opening, hugging the ground, as it moved to the north on Knox Avenue. Weather conditions were fair, with a temperature of about 45 degrees F and an intermittent wind from the south at roughly 5 mph. Even with the cool temperature, the smoke was not lifting much. This type of smoke is the result of automatic sprinklers operating and cooling the atmosphere. With these fire conditions, Deputy District 2 Chief requested a second alarm at 2:07 p.m.

As the balance of the box alarm companies arrived, Engine 68 was assigned to Sector 1, Engine 69 was assigned to Sector 3, Tower Ladder 23 was positioned in Sector 1 near the middle of the building. Engine 68 supplied a 4" line to the tower ladder and two 2-1/2" lines into a deluge set at the large rolling door that was forced open by the truck companies. In Sector 3, Engine 69 supplied two 2-1/2" lines into another building siamese as the crew stretched another 2-1/2" handline through a door near the northeast corner to the separation wall about 60 feet into the building.

A 30 feet wide driveway was situated between the building and a chain link fence on the rear of the building in Sector 3. Located on the other side of the fence was an elevated railway embankment. Hydrants spaced along this driveway were supplied from a 12 inch city water main. This main also supplied the building’s fire pump.

The second alarm provided four more engines, two trucks, a tower ladder, two additional battalion chiefs, District 2 Chief, air mask unit and additional senior officers. There was no interior progress from the Sector 1 side due to the fire conditions and the concern of the Incident Commander that firefighters may become lost in the smoke and maze of racks. Also of concern was the potential of personnel being struck by falling boxes or trapped by collapsing racks. On the Sector 3 side, companies were able to reach the masonry wall separating the front and rear of the building. Both 2-1/2" and 4" hose lines were stretched to the unprotected openings in this wall by some of the second alarm companies.

Engine 94, a second alarm engine, was assigned to Sector 3 and laid 2-1/2" lines into the siamese connection for the building to the south of the fire. The crew then advanced a 2-1/2" line to the third floor of the south building. This floor provided access to the second floor storage locker area over the fire. This company reported some “lazy fire” which was being contained and controlled by a few operating automatic sprinkler heads. When the firefighters attempted to enter the second floor area, the concrete floor was hot enough to melt their boots. They were ordered out of the second floor; closing the sliding fire door behind them. The hose line was left in place outside the fire door and crews were rotated to monitor conditions at the door.

There was no significant fire development in this storage area. Most of the damage to goods stored in this area was from the heat and water if they rested on the floor. Parts of the concrete floor were heaved and cracked but the area, several weeks after the fire, still contained some storage.

Engine 108 and Truck 13 from the second alarm were also assigned to Sector 3. The truck company raised its ladder to the roof and opened about six, 4 feet by 8 feet, skylights in the roof of the rear sector and checked for fire extension. Engine 108 extended additional hose lines to deluge sets at the two unprotected door openings. Eventually, each opening had a 4" hose line and at least one 2-1/2" hose line. The members of both companies rotated the manning of the deluge sets and checking for fire extension through the masonry wall.

Engines 76 and 117, Truck 53 and Tower Ladder 21, the other second alarm companies, were assigned to Sector 1. Another deluge set was set up outside the front of the building and the handline on the door opening between the fire building and south exposure was transferred into a deluge set and reinforced with a second line. The tower ladder was set up and in-line pumping operations improved the water supply to Sector 1. Tower, truck, and engine company members not involved with hose lines, worked to manually breach the front masonry wall near ground level.

Battalion 6, who responded on the Second Alarm, was assigned to check the interior of the north exposure in Sector 2. This one story masonry walled building with a metal trussed roof was occupied by a paper records destruction company and did not contain a lot of combustible contents. During the fire, the overhead steel trusses began to deform and the masonry wall between the fire building and the exposure was pushed to the north. This opened cracks in the wall and resulted in some crushed bricks.

The Assistant Deputy Fire Commissioner assumed incident command and requested a Third Alarm at 2:44 p.m., bringing four engines, two trucks, a tower ladder, and a second ambulance to the scene. Engine 56, a third alarm unit, led out with a line into the Sector 2 exposure. When the overhead steel trusses began to deform, the line was backed out to the large overhead door entrance on Knox Avenue. The fire conditions in the exposure were monitored from this position because of the concern for possible structural collapse. The fire did not penetrate the separation wall into this section during the incident.

Other third alarm companies provided rotation for the various crews operating lines and for those working to breach the front masonry wall. Special collapse and cutting/breaching equipment was called to the scene to assist with access to the fire. A second air mask service truck was requested to support the heavy use of SCBA by firefighters operating in this smoky fire. Battalion Chiefs operated as sector officers monitoring the fire spread conditions and supervising operations.

A fourth alarm was requested at 3:37 p.m. by the Fire Commissioner. This alarm brought four additional engines to the scene. These companies provided rotation for onscene personnel who had been working for nearly two hours. Command personnel felt that the fire was contained to the fire separation area, barring any significant structural collapse. Such a collapse was not expected as the conditions at the masonry separations did not appear to be deteriorating.

Progress in controlling and extinguishing the main body of fire was limited because of the risk to firefighters presented by an interior attack and the inability to place fire hose streams on the fire’s seat. Although numerous holes had been made near the ground in the masonry wall facing Knox Avenue, the storage racks partially blocking the holes, the small size of the holes and their location near ground level limited their smoke venting effectiveness. By early evening, cracks started to appear in this wall and all firefighters were ordered out of the collapse zone. A request for heavy wrecking equipment was issued and the fire apparatus on Knox Avenue in front of the building was repositioned to allow the wrecking equipment room to operate. The fourth alarm companies, along with those already on the fire ground, set up additional deluge guns and large handlines to flood the building as the wall was removed. Even with the large amount of water now able to reach much farther into the building, the deep seated fire in the collapsed boxes and racks would flare when ever a stream was moved or shut down. The fire was officially declared under control at 11:07 p.m. that night. However, it would be nine days before the last Chicago Fire Department equipment left the scene on November 7, 1996 at 5:00 p.m.

During the long overhaul phase, fire department operations were coordinated with private contractors who used heavy equipment to remove smoldering and burning records from the building onto Knox Avenue. A full box alarm assignment of fire companies was still at the scene some 24 hours after the start of the fire, washing down the exposed contents. Heavy equipment moved the records from inside the building and loaded the wet records into dump trucks. Inside the building, the fire continued to smolder and would sporadically flare up, hampering the overhaul process. Eventually, reserve apparatus was brought to the scene and companies rotated to operate the lines and equipment on an around the clock basis.

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