Location, Detection, and Reporting
The fire was first discovered by the resident manager while he was on his morning rounds delivering
newspapers, just before 0600. He heard a smoke detector sounding on the third floor in the west
wing area and gained access to the suspected Apartment 316. The smoke and heat forced him to
crawl on the floor. Just inside the apartment door he saw evidence of fire in the rear area in the
vicinity of the bedroom. The resident manager determined that there was no one in the apartment and
left (possibly leaving the apartment door to the walkway open) to place a 911 call from the rental
office. The time was then 0606. He returned to the apartment to attempt to fight the fire. The
process from his initial discovery of the fire to placing the 911 call took about six minutes. During
those few minutes, the fire rapidly grew in intensity and he was forced to retreat. A resident in
Apartment 315 also placed a 911 call and described the rapidly deteriorating conditions to the
dispatch center. The dispatcher directed her to the apartment balcony (where she was rescued via
ladder by Bremerton fire units just as the balcony flashed into open flame.) Bremerton fire units were
immediately dispatched and arrived on the scene shortly thereafter.
Alarm and Alert
Occupants were alerted by other occupants and firefighters knocking on doors. Some were
awakened by the odor of smoke and the noise of firefighting operations. At least one of the first
alarm units sounded their siren and air horn in a general alarm effort to awaken all tenants. In the
adjacent blocks on the north and east sides, many residents were still asleep well into the progress of
the fire. They had to be awakened and assisted out by firefighters.
Fire Spread
The fire spread rapidly from Apartment 316. The smoke darkened down and flashed out of the front
door. The overhanging fascia board from the walkway above served to trap heated gases and smoke
as they progressed out from the apartment. As the fire in the apartment grew in intensity, the heat
was trapped under the wooden exterior walkway. The trapped gases increased in temperature, preheated
the wooden walkway joists and framing, and flashed over. (The first responding lieutenant
clearly described the process of the smoke from the apartment as intensifying, darkening into
“flashover smoke,” and igniting into freeburning fire.) This allowed the fire to spread horizontally on
the third floor. Because of the wooden construction and the combustible barriers, the fire in the
walkway spread upward rapidly and continued the process on the fourth floor. As the fire originated
in an apartment near the juncture of west and south sides, this phenomenon allowed rapid fire spread
vertically and horizontally in the two wings on the interior courtyard side.
At the same time, the fire was progressing upward via interior openings in pipe chases and utility
shafts. These utility shafts serviced the bathroom and kitchen areas and provided channels for heat,
smoke, and gases vertically to the next floor and into the attic area. There was only one layer of
sheetrock (1-hour rating, 1/2-inch) on the ceiling of each unit; this also allowed fire to spread to the
fourth floor units. Once the fire entered the attic, it spread very rapidly. Fire stops were reported to
have been placed between every four units. These stops were of uncertain integrity and in any case
did not provide full firewall-type protection.
The fire was also progressing via exterior vertical flame spread on the outside wall. Once the window
broke in Apartment 316, fire rapidly shot out and moved up the combustible wood exterior to involve
the fourth floor and roof area.
In the later stages of the fire, as fire units sought to contain the spread by concentrating on the attic,
sparks and embers dropped down from the fourth floor and attic and ignited first and second floor
apartments on south and east sides.
At least 21 occupants were rescued via exterior ladders on the outside wall. All people escaped with
only the clothes on their backs.
Next » Response Operations
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