Kona Village Apartments Fire (Bremerton, WA - November 13, 1997) » Incident Narrative

Early on Thursday morning, November 13, 1997, Bremerton fire units responded to a serious vehicle accident that required helicopter transport of the injured. The crew of Engine 3 had performed standby duty for the medevac helicopter and had reported at 0557 that they were leaving the scene and returning to their station. Their usual route of travel took them past the Kona Village apartment building, where they noticed nothing unusual. This large square-shaped structure of interconnected apartment wings and an open interior courtyard was well known to Bremerton firefighters because of its status as a target hazard. It was a large wood-frame building housing almost 200 people, many of them elderly living on the upper floors. The building was a closed square shape with apartment entrances facing an interior courtyard with no vehicular access to the courtyard.

As the crew of Engine 3 was fueling the vehicle at the station, an alarm was dispatched for Kona Village Apartments at 1717 Sheridan Road reporting fire in Apartment 316. The time of dispatch was 0608.

When Engine 3’s crew made the one-minute-and-ten-second response, they reported on the scene with heavy smoke showing and quickly requested a second alarm. They reported to the west side of the building and used the closest access walkway to Apartment 316.

As the lieutenant of Engine 3 stretched a 1 ¾” pre-connected line to the center court, the smoke increased in intensity and flashed into visible flames from the third and fourth floor. Simultaneously, the driver of Engine 3 witnessed fire flash out of the windows on the exterior of the courtyard. Silhouetted by heavy smoke, occupants immediately appeared from windows of the apartments screaming for help. The lieutenant requested a third alarm. The pump operator gave a quick situation report of people trapped and reported help needed for rescue. (Bremerton staffing is two people each for engine and medic units).

The lieutenant of Engine 3 operated his preconnected line to attempt to protect the escape of occupants from the interior walkway and stairs. Residents were rousing other residents by knocking on doors, and escaped by helping each other through the smoke. Other Bremerton engines and medic units arrived , as did second alarm units from nearby departments. For the first 20 minutes all efforts were directed toward the rescue of occupants. The line to the interior courtyard went dry as Engine 3’s booster tank was depleted, leaving firefighting crews operating in the interior courtyard without cover. On the outside of the complex, the efforts of four engines and one ladder truck were focused on the deployment of ladders and removal of tenants. The age and infirmity of many the occupants compounded the rescue effort.

Incident command procedures were implemented and efforts transitioned from rescue to fire containment with secondary search and rescue. Exterior master streams were deployed, including at least two portable monitors in the courtyard as well as numerous 2½” handlines. Master streams, including a ladder pipe, were deployed at the southeast corner of the building in an attempt to cut off the spread of fire. This was generally successful, but embers dropping down from above caused some fire extension on the east side.

Control of the fire was established at approximately 0745 with extensive overhaul continuing for several days. Bremerton fire investigators were assisted by an ATF task force consisting of more than 30 people who worked on site for three days.

The rapid spread of the fire was mainly due to the extensive wood frame construction and substandard fire stopping. This included not only the attic space, but also wooden interior walkways that trapped superheated gases from burning apartments and channeled them horizontally. Vertical openings in the interior of the apartment in the form of pipe channels and wiring shafts were also a factor. The buildings were neither sprinkled nor equipped with an interconnected alarm system. Firefighters were also hampered by the lack of access to the interior courtyard, insufficient clearances for vehicles on the outside of the building, insufficient hydrants in the complex, obstructed hydrant access, and poor available water flow.

Next » Key Issues