Fire Department Dispatch
The first alarm was placed at 0608 for a fire at 1717 Sheridan Road in Apartment 316. Bremerton
Engines 3, 1, and 2 Puget Sound Shipyard Engine 15 (Telesquirt), and Medic 3 were dispatched.
Engine 3 requested a second alarm as they marked on the scene with heavy smoke showing. Travel
time was approximately 1 minute and 10 seconds.
Initial Operations; Rescue and Attack
Engine 3, consisting of the driver and lieutenant, proceeded directly into the complex via the parking
lot on the west side. Consulting the pre-plan en route, they took a vantage point at the closest access
breezeway to the interior courtyard. The lieutenant stretched a 1 ¾-inch attack line to the center courtyard with the idea of cutting off the fire spread and providing water stream protection and cover
for escaping residents. As the line was being charged, the windows in the rear blew out and visible
fire was reported from the front and rear. Heavy fire developed in the third and fourth floor on the
courtyard side.
The operator of Engine 3 reported occupants appearing at many windows in the rear surrounded by
heavy smoke coming from inside their apartments. She immediately broadcast a situation report of a
severe rescue problem and requested help on the west side. All efforts were directed to deployment
of ground ladders for rescue of the trapped occupants. As more units arrived they were directed to
the exterior of the west and south sides to assist in the rescue effort. Engine 1 assumed command as
per BFD procedure and established the command post on the address front at the corner of the north
and west sides. The operator stretched a 5-inch supply line to the hydrant and deployed a stationary
deluge gun from the engine over the front roof (side A) into the court yard. The goal was to provide
water cover for the occupants and firefighters in the courtyard. For the first ten minutes of the fire,
no other water was flowed except the 1¾-inch line from Engine 3 to the interior courtyard and
Engine 1’s deck gun.
As Engine 3’s booster tank was depleted, the lieutenant’s position in the courtyard became untenable.
He requested a supply line for Engine 3 to cover rescues. Engine 2 was directed to stretch a supply
line to Engine 3. This proved difficult because of the close clearance in the parking area in the rear,
as well as the fact that residents were attempting to leave in their vehicles. At the same time the third
and fourth floor partially collapsed at the intersection of the west and south sides, carrying the body
of one of the fire victims into the parking lot and showering fire personnel with debris. Deteriorating
conditions due to the radiant heat and potential for further collapse caused Engine 3 to relocate to the
rear of the south side. This also complicated efforts by Engine 2 to establish a supply for Engine 3.
The Bremerton Fire Chief responded from home and assumed command at approximately 0625. All
efforts continued to focus on rescue until about 0640.
Second Phase of Operations
About 20 minutes after arrival of the first units, the fire strategy was shifted from the rescue phase to
containing the fire. A more extensive command structure was established and passport accountability
was implemented. The fire chief designated an operations officer, safety officer, and interior division.
Command officers from mutual aid departments were also assigned liaison functions by the incident
commander. The strategy was to hold the fire to the south and west blocks and cut off the spread at
the SE and NW corners. Hand lines were deployed to the interior. At first these were 2 ½-inch fog
nozzles, but the need for the reach and penetration of solid streams was quickly recognized and
implemented. At least two portable monitor devices were placed in service in the courtyard and used
to good effect. The ladder pipe of Truck 51 was instrumental in cutting off the spread on the SW
corner. The combination of water penetration by exterior master streams and the mobility of hand
lines halted the spread of the fire. However, fire was dropping from the attic and fourth floor into
lower floors.
Third Phase
The third phase of operations consisted of extinguishing efforts after fire spread had been checked.
Though the rapid spread of fire was stopped, extensive firefighting continued as individual rooms and
apartments became involved in fire. Tedious room-to-room attack, extinguishing, and overhaul
operations continued for several hours.
Early in the incident, crews were dispatched to mark the exterior sides according to BFD incident
command protocol. This served to provide consistency in nomenclature as to building sides. As
operations progressed, the paint was used to designate the areas that had been cleared of occupants
by primary and secondary searches.
Units on the initial three alarms were supplemented by two engine strike forces (three four-person
engines with a command officer) and one ladder strike force (three ladder units with a command
officer). These resources were utilized by command to rotate, reassign, and relieve personnel. In the
second and third phase, the tactical objective was to place two attack crews on each floor with a fourengine
rapid intervention force available at all times.
Sprayed–on asbestos in the kitchens and garages was discovered during the early overhaul phase.
Notification was made to PSAPCA and the storm drain intakes were sealed with plastic sheeting.
Environmental authorities took samples to test for asbestos levels. Residual water in the storm drain
sumps was pumped out by properly equipped vacuum trucks. All responding companies were
notified of the presence of asbestos and directed to properly decontaminate all gear, clothing, and
equipment. The asbestos also complicated efforts of residents to reoccupy their apartments and
retrieve their belongings. This became more than an inconvenience, because prescription medicine,
cash, and valuable items had been left in the apartments.
The Bremerton/Kitsap County mutual aid area also is served by a Public Information Officers Task
Force. This group consists of PIOs from the area departments who respond to large incidents in
neighboring jurisdictions to assist the home jurisdiction. This Task Force proved to be quite valuable
in the Kona Village fire, because the need for PIO services was far greater than the BFD could handle
alone.
The on-duty shift was relieved at 0930 on the fire ground. All first alarm units were invited to a
Critical Incident Stress Debriefing the next morning. Nationally recognized protocols for CISD were
in effect. Separate debriefings were conducted as appropriate, as were after-action critiques.
The south block was totally destroyed by fire, the west block was 60% destroyed, and the east block
was about 30% destroyed. Overhaul continued for several days concurrent with the search for
victims. The cause and origin investigation continued as well.
Logistics
All requests for logistics were channeled from the command post, either invoking pre-planned
procedures through Central Communications or from City of Bremerton officials. Support in the
form of food, rehabilitation units, portable comfort stations, breathing air, lights, and power
generators was required. Kitsap Transit provided a bus at 0700 for shelter and transport of victims.
The nearby church opened its doors for a relief and relocation shelter. Red Cross, Bremerton City,
and Kitsap County emergency management officials set up a shelter at that location.
Interagency coordination
Pre-determined procedures and good working relationships made interagency cooperation excellent.
One reason for this was that in June 1997, the management staff of the City of Bremerton, Kitsap
County, and four other area cities attended the disaster preparedness training session for city officials
at the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) at the National Emergency Training Center at
Emmitsburg, MD. The fire chief directly credited this class as having a positive effect on the outcome
of the level of emergency coordination at the Kona Village fire.
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