Alarm Sequence
Table 2 below shows a breakdown of the alarm sequence as received by the Baltimore Fire Department and their dispatch. The documentation of times and the subsequent striking of additional alarms are according to the official BFD dispatch record of this incident and were provided by Donald Heinbuch of the BFD. It should be noted that the first response was a tactical box alarm with Battalion Chief (less than a full box assignment), which would consist of four engines, two trucks, and a Battalion Chief. The tactical box is a standard response to a “report of smoke,” the type of call as reported.
At 4:15 p.m., an alarm was sounded for smoke coming from the train tunnel at the Mount Royal Station. Engine Company 13, seven blocks away, had responded to the Mount Royal Station on many previous occasions for reports of smoke in the vicinity. Usually someone mistook the diesel engine smoke exiting the tunnel for a fire. However, the Captain of Engine 13 knew from the volume of black smoke emanating from the tunnel that this time the situation was different. At 4:23 p.m., after conferring with the CSX engineer and conductor over the waybill, the first due engine company officer requested that the HazMat team respond. Hearing E13 reporting a potential hazardous materials incident, BC6 ordered dispatch to deploy a full HazMat Box. With BC2 in command, additional alarms were requested to augment specialized resources, such as The Maryland Department of the Environment and the U.S. Coast Guard, filling out the resources at either end of the tunnel.
Tactical Response
The first arriving companies and command staff instituted the incident command system as prescribed by the Fire Department’s standard operating procedures. Based on the initial size-up and information regarding the train and its hazardous cargo, a plan of action was adopted. To ascertain the condition, extent, and progress of the fire, the Engine 13 Captain and approximately a half-dozen firefighters wearing standard turnout gear went to the southern end of the tunnel through smoke and intense heat with hoses, trying to reach the train that was sitting about three-quarters of a mile to the north. The team got within about 300 yards of the cars, but had to retreat because of intense heat and heavy smoke.
The initial attack to control the burning cars in the tunnel was futile. Approximately three hours after the derailment, at 6:25 p.m., a report of a water main break on Howard Street above the tunnel was received. A cooperative decision between Incident Command (IC) and the Baltimore Public Works Department (DPW) was made to allow the water to flow from the forty-inch ruptured main into the tunnel for approximately two hours. With no firefighter access to the derailed cars, the potential for a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) was reduced by allowing the water to flow. A Public Work’s official explained that approximately 60 million gallons of water flowed from the City’s water supply during the two-hour time period. The smoke dramatically changed in color–from dense black to light gray then to white–indicating that the flowing water helped extinguish the fire.
The Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) and HazMat teams tested the smoke exiting the tunnel, and indications were that the smoke consisted of 95 percent steam and 5 percent ordinary products of combustion, indicating that the broken water main was indeed having a positive effect. The MDE determined that air tested within the affected outside areas near the tunnel portals was not toxic. Testing did reveal the presence of wood ash within the smoke, possibly caused by burning crossties as a byproduct of the fire.
Temperatures in the tunnel reportedly reached approximately 1,500 degrees Fahrenheit causing the freight cars to glow like steel in a blast furnace. Because of the conditions, firefighters were unable to predict when they would control and extinguish the fire, let alone remove the cars and the hazardous cargo from the tunnel. Unable to reach or extinguish the fire from either end of the tunnel, an alternative firefighting plan was initiated by noon of the second day. The decision was made to enter the only other known portal, a manhole entrance at Howard and Lombard Streets. At this point a five-inch diameter hose was lowered into the manhole and firefighters simultaneously entered the southern entrance of the tunnel to find and connect their hose lines to the five-inch water supply. Over the next several hours, firefighters were able to significantly lower the temperature in the tunnel and help bring the fire under control.
With this tactic in place, firefighters could approach the still-burning cars and investigators could begin their investigation at close range. By 0900 hours Thursday, five cars from the end of the train were removed after many hours of struggle. The fifth car of this group contained a load of pulp board, which required several hours to extinguish with the help of a backhoe.
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