At the time the CSX train L41216 derailed in the Howard Street Tunnel, it was moving at 17 mph (eight miles under the posted speed limit of 25 mph.)1 The train was halted by the emergency break, which was automatically applied. According to a representative of CSX Transportation, whenever a train’s air brake system loses pressure, the brakes react automatically. The engineer cannot restart the train until the air sensor on the last car in the train acknowledges that it detects sufficient pressure.
The initial cause of the emergency break activation is still under investigation by the NTSB. However, it appears that the main air break hose, which runs the entire distance of the train, was either severed or disconnected. This can happen as the result of a malfunction, a decoupling, or a derailment. The train was stopped about a half mile from the north end of the tunnel.
CSX requires a two-person crew to operate a freight train. The engineer operates the controls of the diesel engine while the conductor watches for signals and is responsible for carrying the waybill – an inventory of the cargo carried on board. When the train came to a stop, the engineer attempted to contact a CSX Transportation dispatcher by radio, but was unable to because the antenna would not transmit deep inside the tunnel. Unable to reach the CSX Transportation Dispatch Center at 3:15 p.m., the engineer used his cell phone to contact an official at the CSX Transportation dispatch center in Jacksonville, Florida. According to CSX Transportation, the protocol for response when the emergency brake activates is for the crew to dismount the locomotive and walk the length of the train in an attempt to locate the problem.
While in the tunnel, the crew did dismount the locomotives and began to walk, but they were met by heavy black smoke, no visibility, and conditions that made it difficult to breathe. The conductor and engineer were unable to find the derailed cars, and because of the untenable conditions, were forced back inside the train. The crew followed their HazMat training and emergency protocols, shutting down the leading two locomotives, then uncoupling the third from the train cars so they could drive out of the tunnel and get away from the fumes and black smoke. According to the NTSB, sensors show the engines left the tunnel at 3:27 p.m.2 Once outside the tunnel, the crew immediately radioed to their CSX employer, as required, and described the nature of the emergency as they understood it (heavy smoke and uncoupled train) and the steps they had taken.
Shortly after 4:00 p.m., the general public was beginning to notice a heavy black cloud pouring out of the tunnels and up through manholes. Calls started coming into the City of Baltimore Fire Department dispatch, reporting smoke. According to CSX Transportation officials, at 4:04 p.m., the train crew contacted the CSX Transportation dispatcher in Jacksonville and Baltimore’s 911 Center, reporting the emergency to each. While the public was notifying the Baltimore Fire Department (BFD), CSX Transportation dispatchers were still trying to get the exact location of the derailment pinpointed. A period of over one hour elapsed before CSX Transportation notified the BFD of the incident, thus confirming the call that was made earlier by the train crew.
The Baltimore City Fire Department responded to the Howard Street Tunnel and upon arrival at 4:18 p.m., the Freight Conductor supplied the “Rail Waybill,” including the “HazMat Chart,” to the on-scene Incident Commander. The waybill identified all the cars numbered in order from car one (immediately behind the last locomotive) to the last car in the train, allowing emergency responders to know the exact location of each car and what it was carrying. Between the rail waybills and the HazMat Charts, the Incident Commander had a computer printout providing full details of all the cars and identifying those that contained hazardous materials.
According to the Waybill, 31 cars were loaded and 29 cars were empty. A line-order and location of cars and their contents are as follows: three locomotives, four cars of pulp board, 17 empty cars, one car of pulp board, one empty car, one tank car of propylene glycol, one tank car of glacial acetic acid, one car of flat steel, two empty cars, two tank cars of fluorosilicic acid, one empty car, one car of bricks, four tank cars of soy oil, four empty cars, eleven cars loaded with paper, one tank car of tripropylene, two tank cars of hydrochloric acid, one tank car of ethyl hexyl phthalate, one car of pulp board, and four empty cars. Hazardous materials present in the cars are described below in Table 1 as reported by CSX Transportation officials.
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