CSX Tunnel Fire (Baltimore, MD - July 18, 2001) » Key Issues

Issues	Comments
Tunnel Access	Access to the 1.7 mile Howard Street Tunnel proved daunting to the emergency crews responding to the incident. Built in 1895, the tunnel was only accessible from either end and via a manhole located on Howard Street in the middle of downtown Baltimore.
Hazardous Materials	According to the waybills supplied by the CSX train crew to Incident Command, many of the freight cars in the 60-car train were carrying wood pulp and large rolls of paper combustibles. As reported, nine cars were carrying chemicals including five acid tank cars. Two tanks held fluorosilicic acid, two carried hydrochloric acid, and one held glacial acetic acid. Other materials on the manifest were ethyl hexyl phthalate (a plasticizer reducing embrittlement in plastics), tripropylene (a detergent raw material), and propylene glycol (an antifreeze ingredient).
Shipment Delays Along Route	The accident blocked CSX Transportation's only direct route between the industrial Northeast and the South, and delayed freight and passenger transportation. The Tropicana "juice train," which carries Florida orange juice to the New York-New Jersey market and is one of CSX's most time-sensitive shipments, was forced to detour through Harrisburg, PA, on a Norfolk Southern line.
Difficulties Encountered by Firefighters	Firefighters attempted to advance water cannons from each end of the tunnel in an effort to extinguish a fire they could not see. The heavy black smoke totally obscured vision inside the tunnel. Portable lighting was nearly useless. Firefighters attempting to enter the tunnel lost all vision within 300 feet of the entrance as the smoke deposited a black film on face pieces and goggles. The use of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) was essential. Gas masks and Air-Purifying Respirators (APRs) were useless.
Environmental Monitoring	Hazardous materials experts from the Maryland Department of the Environment tested the atmosphere repeatedly during the incident at both ends of the tunnel. Their reports did not include detection of acid content or other compounds of concern, but did include detection of significant wood-ash content in the heavy smoke from the burning combustibles freight. The United States Coast Guard also responded to the incident and provided air and water monitoring for hazardous materials. The majority of the air and water monitoring was conducted by a firm contracted by CSX. The Coast Guard conducted tag alongs with the company to verify the firm’s air monitoring and water sampling results. The EPA conducted some air monitoring. Results for all air and water monitoring were unavailable at the time of this report, because of an ongoing investigation.
Heat Injuries	Two workers were treated for heat-related injuries from the fire that burned at almost 1,500 degrees Fahrenheit. They were released from the hospital after several hours.
Public Information and Media Accounts	Access to information was limited, because a public information officer (PIO) was not designated during the initial stages of the event, and also because CSX internal and external communications were problematic. Media accounts were sometimes vague and incorrect. This event demonstrated the importance of establishing a public information sector with a designated PIO as standard practice at all major events.
Delayed Notification	The time between the derailment at 3:07 p.m. and the time of the Baltimore Fire Department (BFD) notification allowed for the chemically heated fire to smolder, expand, and build up within the confined space of the tunnel. Delayed notification of the incident impacted the ability of the responders to gain access to the derailed cars and begin fire suppression activities and hazardous material assessment and containment. Delayed notification certainly impacted the financial cost of the incident to the City and CSX, as well as the number of personnel needed to respond to the incident. It is not known at this time whether delayed notification contributed to environmental impact, nor to what extent. Had there been immediate notification of the derailment, Fire Department personnel may have been able to contain the chemical spill and suppress the fire, thus reducing the arduous tasks and costs of a several-day response to the incident.

Next » Introduction