Fire in a Tire Recycling Facility (Nebraska City, Nebraska - January 23 to February 3, 2001) » The Incident

Upon receipt of a 911 call, the Nebraska City Volunteer Fire Department and the Rescue Squad were dispatched at 02:54 hours on the morning of Wednesday January 23, 2002 to a report of a chimney fire at the Riverside Terrace Building, a six story residential housing unit for the elderly. The County Sheriff’s Office answers all 911 calls and dispatches for the fire department and rescue squad. A base station radio is maintained at the fire station and in the event of a working fire, a firefighter operates the station radio and handles all of the radio traffic generated by the incident.

A standard first alarm assignment consisting of two engines, a truck, a heavy rescue, and an ambulance responded to the incident staffed by twenty-seven firefighters and two emergency medical technicians. The first engine company on the scene determined that the fire was actually at the EnTire Recycling Plant, located several blocks east of Riverside Terrace.

Other responding companies were diverted and upon arrival discovered fire burning in the four tall silos, on the ground between the silos, and in the south production building. Firefighters also observed that the southwest silo was listing to the east. They became immediately concerned about the potential for collapse because the silos were constructed of unprotected steel and it was unclear how long the fire had actually been burning prior to their arrival.

A second alarm was dispatched, which summoned another Nebraska City engine to the scene as well as two engines each from Dunbar, Plattsmouth, and Syracuse. Plattsmouth also responded with a truck company.

Approximately fifty-five firefighters began to extinguish the exterior fire between the silos and in the south production building. Their efforts took one and one-half hours, but they elected to wait until daylight before attempting to extinguish the fire in the silos because of limited visibility and the potential for collapse. Given the magnitude of the incident, officials made a decision at 03:15 hours to shut down the rail traffic on the Union Pacific mainline, which was located immediately adjacent to the plant to the west.

At the time of the alarm, the temperature was below freezing. Temperatures on the January 23rd ranged from a low of 26°F to a high of 50°F, wind chill was 11°F, and winds were from the northwest at 11 to 19 mph with gusts to 26 mph. There were scattered clouds, but no precipitation.

By approximately 10:45 hours, mutual aid companies were released as well as all the majority of the Nebraska City companies. An engine company, a rescue squad, an ambulance, and twenty-five firefighters remained at the scene, primarily performing overhaul operations. No aggressive fire suppression effort was attempted, as command personnel tried to determine how best to extinguish the deep-seated fire in the silos.

After consultation with the State Fire Marshal’s Office, nitrogen was applied in an attempt to extinguish the fire by depriving it of oxygen, a technique that had been used successfully at grain elevator fires within the state. The nitrogen was obtained from two tanks located at the facility. At 12:30 hours, firefighters noted that the southwest silo had begun to lean into the southeast silo and that the head house located on top of the four silos had begun to shift to the south.

At 13:13 hours, while the nitrogen was still being applied an explosion occurred and injured thirteen firefighters. Fortunately, the injuries proved not to be life threatening. The cool weather had resulted in the firefighters remaining full bunkered out and personnel engaged in firefighting activities were wearing SCBAs. Reports from the scene indicate that the fire blew out twice from the silo like a torch just prior to the explosion. An evacuation order had been given and the explosion occurred as firefighters were beginning to leave the area.

The explosion expelled chunks of rubber that were approximately two to four inches in diameter. Debris was hurled 300 to 400 feet away, damaging and destroying apparatus and equipment as well as injuring the thirteen firefighters.

After the explosion, Command immediately requested additional EMS units. When dispatched, the EMS units were notified that there were causalities. Responding crews erroneously believed that there were fatalities involved, which was unsettling since Nebraska City is a small, tight-knit community. They also were unaware of exactly what had exploded, which magnified their apprehensions since they did not know what they would encounter at the incident site.

The Rescue Squad’s Captain assumed command of EMS operations and established a command post on the south side of the fire. An EMS staging area was established on the north side and soon seventeen ambulances were in queue in response to a radio broadcast for all available ambulances to respond. Three ambulances were placed in the primary staging area and two units were maintained in a secondary staging point, while others transported the injured firefighters to the hospital. A medical transport helicopter was also dispatched to the scene from Lincoln in case injures proved to be of a serious nature.

EMS crews immediately triaged all the firefighters at scene. The thirteen with injuries were transported to St. Mary’s Hospital, including eleven by the local rescue squad. The three most severely injured were transported by the ambulance that was on standby at the scene when the explosion occurred. One had a broken leg and two were completely coated in heavy black residue. Three of the victims were admitted to the local hospital and one patient was transferred to BryanLGH West Medical Center in Lincoln.

Injuries included one compound fracture of the left leg; one fracture of the right ankle; one left ankle injury; numerous contusions, scraps, shrapnel wounds, smoke inhalation, respiratory injuries, and cuts. There were no burn injures. Fire Department officials estimated that the cost of medical treatment was approximately $13,406.

In a third wave of triage, EMS personnel found three firefighters that needed to take their medications, which had been ignored as a result of the fire. They were relieved of duty until they had been properly medicated.

St. Mary’s, the local hospital, instituted its emergency plan, which included the recall of off-duty physicians and prepared to treat the victims. Omaha Methodist Hospital contacted St. Mary’s and told them they were on standby in the event that they were need.

As previously noted, the Nebraska City Fire Department and the Rescue Squad are both dispatched by the Otoe County Sheriff’s Department. During an incident, a firefighter reports to the fire station and assumes the communications duties for the incident using a base station located in the watch office. A single, low-band VHF frequency is used for this purpose. The Department also monitors fire traffic in Iowa, which is just across the Missouri River from the City.

However, Iowa departments operate on high band and cannot directly communicate with units in Nebraska.

During the height of the activity surrounding the explosion, a microphone got stuck in the open position and disrupted all radio communications. For all practical purposes, this left companies at the scene without any communications other than by cellular telephone.

Following the explosion, the Nebraska City apparatus previously released were recalled to the scene. Two staging areas were established, one at the fire station and another in the residential area near the incident. Including mutual aid resources, a total of nine engines, two trucks, two tankers, three rescues, and twelve ambulances were used throughout the suppression effort and subsequent operations.

The initial tactical objective was to keep the silos cool with hose lines and portable deluge sets. At one point firefighters had just walked out from the center of silos when fire and debris fell from the top and landed on the spot that they had been just moments before. The owner removed some of the materials with a skid loader as had been done at prior calls at the facility.

Following the explosion, a command post was established in the municipal power plant located 600 feet north of the fire. The facility offered a safe; climate controlled environment as well as an unobstructed view of the incident site. An outer perimeter was established to limit access to the site and public works and parks personnel set up barricades.

At 11:30 hours on January 25th, fire spread from the conveyor to the north building when the wind direction changed, requiring firefighters to evacuate the building. A rumbling sound was heard, prompting the fear of a potential backdraft explosion. The wind also caused smoke to drift into a populated area of the city, which included several schools and the Riverside Terrace facility. As a precaution, Command ordered an evacuation of a 30-block area west of the fire. Residents were allowed to return to their homes at 15:30 hours when the fear of the explosion had subsided and the wind once again changed directions.

Mutual aid was called a second time at 11:43 hours on January 27th when fire erupted again in the north production building. Companies from Dumbar, Syracuse, Hamburg, and Sidney responded. A second evacuation order was issued, but was rescinded when the fire was contained by mid-afternoon.

A Public Information Officer operated from the fire station and gave periodic updates throughout the duration of the incident. All of the major television networks contacted the Department as well as the local television stations from Lincoln and Omaha. Radio stations and newspapers in a four state radius also contacted the Department as well as Firehouse Magazine.

Firefighters estimate that eleven (11) million gallons of water were used to extinguish the fire. Water supply was adequate throughout the entire incident, in part because personnel from the utilities department responded early in the incident and ran pumps as needed and kept water storage facilities full. The City’s water supply system has a capacity of seven million gallons a day and is totally supplied from wells.

High-tension electric lines were located immediately east of the plant. Firefighters were concerned that the fire might damage the wires or that a collapse would bring the wires down further complicating matters. The power was shut off and an attempt was made to relocate the lines. The effort was abandoned on 26 January due to a further shift of the silos to the east. The risk to the linemen working in bucket trucks was deemed to be too great.

Local law enforcement personnel established a perimeter and were used to handle traffic and to keep unnecessary people out of the area. They also assisted with the two evacuation efforts on the 25th and 27th of January. The local radio station assisted with evacuation efforts and provided citizens with periodic updates throughout the incident.

The prolonged extinguishment effort necessitated the establishment of a rotating work schedule. At night, most operations were suspended a fire watch was maintained to insure that the fire did not gain headway and spread to nearby exposures. Mutual aid department assisted in this effort. See Appendix B for a copy of the rotation schedule.

The City experiences another working structure fire on January 30th while the incident was still on-going. At 07:26 hours, a fire was dispatched at the Wurtele building, southwest of town. The fire was declared under control at 08:26 hours. Thirty-seven firefighters from nineteen different communities responded to the incident with three engines, one truck, twenty-one tankers, one rescue squad, and an ambulance. The water supply is very poor in that part of the community, thus the large number of tankers that responded.

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