On the morning of August 12, 2002, the Danvers Fire Department was operating
at a minimum manning level with only 10 firefighters on duty. At 02:44 hours, dispatch
put out a first alarm for a report of flames coming from a building at 14 School Street.
The assignment consisted of Engine 1, a 100' quint with two firefighters; Engine 3, a
pumper with a senior firefighter as officer and two firefighters; and Rescue 1 with a
Lieutenant and one firefighter. The Lieutenant was filling in as shift commander for the
vacationing Captain.
Upon arrival three minutes later, they found a 30 yard construction dumpster well
involved. It was near a structure, but flames were contained within the dumpster.
A 1-3/4" hand line from Engine 1 was initially used to attack the fire, but the
dumpster was packed with debris making extinguishment difficult. The waste company
which owned the container was notified at 03:05, and a roll-off truck was requested to
move the dumpster to a location where it could be emptied. While waiting, firefighters
secured a hydrant, committed the quint, and charged the ladder pipe which was elevated
over the fire to soak its contents. The fire was of suspicious origin.
At approximately 03:00 hours, a fire started on the exterior of The Danvers
Butchery. The area of origin was in a fenced enclosure next to a large air conditioning
unit on the B/C corner of the Barn. (See Appendix C for details) The material first ignited
is believed to have been a plastic bag filled with garbage. Sufficient combustibles were
present to allow the fire to grow. Flames ignited the vinyl siding, tar paper, and sheathing.
In several places flames ate through the sheathing and entered joist spaces. As flames
impinged on the second floor window above, the glass failed. The fire entered the second
floor and traveled through the open attic rafters once the suspended ceiling collapsed. It
became visible to an awakened neighbor when the wood sheathing and vinyl siding on
the C side were free burning. The property was shielded by a tree line which may have
blocked earlier observations if any neighbors had, in fact, heard anything.
At 03:28 hours, the alarm company for the Danvers Butchery received a fire
alarm for the attic. At 03:29 another fire alarm on the second floor initiated. It was a
smoke detector at the top of the stairs outside Office G. (See Appendix B for 2nd floor
plan) Seconds later, the motion detector in Office G activated. The alarm company
notified the Fire Department and the building owners. The motion detector could have
activated due to falling debris or a short circuit from the heat.
At 03:30 hours, dispatch received two nearly simultaneous reports of a fire at the
Danvers Butchery at “10” Donegal Lane. The alarm company reported an activated fire
alarm and a resident at 1 Elerton Lane reported flames showing. Engine 2 was dispatched
at 03:31 as a first floor fire alarm activated at the Butchery and Engine 3 cleared the
dumpster fire at School Street. The shift commander, C13, ordered Engine 3 to report
conditions upon arrival, but a Danvers Police Sergeant arrived in the interim and reported
a building heavily involved. C13 boarded Rescue 1 and responded with one other firefighter.
Engine 1 remained at the dumpster with two men. The two fires were approximately
one mile apart.
Engine 3 arrived at 03:33 and took a position on the A side of the building. The
truck parked across the street at a hydrant, and the driver connected a short length of 4" hose. Engine 2 got to the scene less than a minute later, passed Engine 3 and proceeded to
the east driveway entrance. The acting officer and a firefighter from Engine 3 began
pulling a 2-1/2" line down the west driveway. As Rescue 1 turned from Route 35 onto
Donegal Lane, C13 observed the intense fire conditions and requested a second alarm.
Flames were coming from the A side window at the attic level and had breached the
entire roof ridge of the Barn. The entire exterior C wall was burning and the fire had
already consumed the roof gable on this side. (See Appendix D for photographs) C13,
now the incident commander, knew the establishment well and realized no one would be
in the building at this hour. Consequently, no interior searches were done. He was also
familiar with the layout and contents.
Mutual Aid was started on the second alarm. Middleton and Topsfield each sent
an engine to the fire. Danvers Headquarters station was covered by a ladder from Beverly
and engines from Salem and Wenham. A call back of Danvers firefighters was begun, and
12 off-duty firefighters came in to assist. The Chief, Deputy, and Fire Inspector/Investigator
were all notified to respond to the scene. The lead dispatcher was called to report to
the dispatch center.
Engine 2, a 75' quint with a Lieutenant and two firefighters, did not pass a hydrant
and did not lay in a supply line. They took a position on the C side of the complex about
50 feet east of the Barn. Normal procedure would have dictated this action, but, unlike
most fires, no apparatus was immediately available to lay in a supply. The building’s
electrical service line had broken away from the drip loop and was arcing in the driveway
outside the C/D corner. The electric company was notified, but the presence of the live
wires precluded setting up a supply line from Engine 3 to the quint.
Engine 3’s 2-1/2" was charged and directed at the attic and upper section of the
D side. Because of the live wire, Engine 3 could not pass the C/D corner but was able to
wash down the C wall from the D side. A 1-3/4" preconnect was pulled from Engine 2
and charged with tank water to attack the C side and to prevent extension into the abutting
compressor shed. The initial suppression effort was being addressed by eight
firefighters.
The Incident Commander walked around the complex to assess conditions. When
he got to the rear, he observed Engine 2 without a supply and running low on tank water.
Mutual aid companies were still five or ten minutes away since neither Topsfield nor
Middleton has personnel on duty at night. Anticipating an extended exterior attack, C13
ordered Engine 2 to lay in their own supply line to the nearest hydrant and prepare for ladder pipe operations. Engine 2 shut down and disconnected the hand line. The crew
wrapped a hydrant in front of 1 Elerton Lane and left one firefighter to charge the hose.
About 500 feet of 4" supply line was laid back to the fire, and the quint was positioned on
the C side once again. While opening the hydrant, which was found to be defective, the
stem broke off rendering it useless.
Engine 2 had no water supply, and an incoming mutual aid company was ordered
to continue the supply line to the next hydrant. During this time period, a unit radioed
Danvers Dispatch and requested a hydrant location. Dispatch had no additional hydrants
in their database.
Suppression with the 2-1/2" was very effective. The fire on the C wall was minimized,
and the attic fire was knocked down. Firefighters observed flames inside the
Barn’s first floor at the C/D corner. Rather than continuing the exterior attack and pushing
the fire further into the building, an interior attack was started. The store’s front door
(D1) was forced open, and two firefighters advanced a 1-3/4" line into the structure from
Engine 3. Smoke and heat conditions were severe and visibility was less than a foot. The
crew fought their way about 80 feet to the C side and extinguished all fire found on the
first floor. During their entry time they radioed Command with reports of their progress.
The Department Chief, C1, arrived and was briefed by C13. He ordered C13 to
remain in command and provided assistance. The interior crew reported fire rolling above
them but out of sight. C13 knew the fire was still burning on the second and attic levels and
had observed several sections of the roof sliding off the rafters. Since the ridge beam was
also weakened, he ordered everyone out of the building and initiated an exterior attack.
A mutual aid Engine passed the broken hydrant and proceeded down Elerton Lane
in search of a new water source. The only other hydrant is located where the road terminates
at a cul-de-sac. They laid 500' of 4" supply line into Engine 2’s hose at the dead
hydrant and secured a water source for Engine 2. While a water supply was now present,
it was not run through a pump, and the resulting pressure and flows were insufficient to
sustain an effective master stream from Engine 2’s ladder pipe. The total length of the lay
was over 1000 feet. Engine 2 did flow water through their pipe, and they also kept a 1-3/
4" in use. Due to Engine 2’s position and the orientation of the Barn’s roof, they could
only access the east side for ventilation or suppression.
The 2-1/2" from Engine 3 remained active on the C and D sides of the Barn.
Engine 3 utilized a deck gun from its position on the A side to complete the master stream attack. The 1-3/4" hose used for the interior attack was now used from the
exterior. Engine 3’s 1250 gpm pump, supplied by a strong hydrant, had no trouble
keeping up with the flow. This effort was maintained for about 1-1/2 hours. Danver’s
reserve, Engine 4, was staffed by off duty personnel and responded. Engine 1 was
relieved at School St. by Salem and Wenham engines and proceeded to Donegal Lane
for aerial operations on the west side of the Barn roof. Hamilton and North Reading
sent engines to cover Danver’s Headquarters.
The State Fire Marshal’s Office was notified at 04:29 hours, and a State Trooper
assigned to the fire arrived at 05:14. The fire was regarded as suspicious. When the
majority of the visible fire was suppressed, hand lines were once again deployed to
complete the task. A Positive Pressure Ventilator was set up at the front door, and crews
entered the building to overhaul at about 05:30 hours. Multiple sections of the roof were
opened to access pockets of fire that could not be safely reached from the interior.
The overhaul became a significant activity due to the complexity of the building.
The Barn’s use for cold storage in the mid 1900’s had resulted in a mixture of insulation
materials. Firefighters had to open many walls to search out smoldering materials which
included hay stuffed into joist spaces. The Department’s thermal imaging camera was
used to detect hot spots during overhaul. The Building Inspector and Health Inspector
were both called in at 06:13. All food products in the retail portion of the store had to be
disposed of. At 06:35 mutual aid companies at the scene were released, and at 07:21
Danver’s crews began rotating out to bring in the fresh day shift.
One or two pieces of apparatus were at the scene for the next five hours to complete
overhaul and wet down hot spots. At 14:00, a section of the roof collapsed. The
building inspector had previously ordered that the remaining portion be demolished and
removed once suppression was complete. Firefighters returned to the scene once in the
afternoon at 15:42 to do a final wet down.
In the end, only the Barn sustained actual fire damage, but the entire complex
experienced significant smoke damage. Even in the Barn, the extent of fire damage was
varied. Rooms on the second floor that lacked a resistant barrier to the attic, a partial wood
floor above the suspended ceiling, were heavily damaged while others had only moderate
heat, smoke, and water damage. Only the rear portion of the first floor had fire damage.
The calculated loss was about $800,000, but the aggressive exterior and interior
attacks by the Danvers Fire Department saved not only two thirds of the building, but many of the coolers, display cases, and kitchen equipment. Additionally, over $40,000 in
stored meat products were salvaged from the coolers at the east end since their heavy
doors resisted smoke penetration. These refrigeration units alone were worth over
$15,000. Circumstances would have been much different if the fire had consumed more of
the first floor. There were no injuries to civilians or firefighters.
Recall was sounded at 16:24 hours. Investigators determined that the cause was
arson, and a suspect was arrested. He is currently awaiting trial.
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