Santana Row Development Fire (San Jose, California - August 2002) » The Incident

On Monday August 19, 2002, a 911 operator answered a call at 15:36 hours reporting a fire at the Santana Row development construction site located at the southeast corner of Stevens Creek Boulevard and Winchester Street. The caller, located in a nearby high-rise building, stated that he could see flames and smoke billowing from the complex. At 15:37 hours, Communications dispatched Engines 10, 4, and 7; Trucks 4 and 14; and Battalions 10 and 1 to Incident #8972, a reported structure fire at 377 Santana Row.

While enroute, Engine 10’s crew could see a heavy column of black smoke rising from the vicinity of the reported fire and requested a second alarm at 15:39 hours. Fire crews had routinely visited the construction site and were well aware of the many hazards present at the site, including the fact that this was the largest wood-frame building in the City. Almost immediately thereafter (15:40 hours), Battalion 10 upgraded the response to a third alarm assignment before arriving at the scene.

Engine 10 was the first company to arrive (15:41 hours), and reported a working fire on the upper level of the structure. Upon their arrival, firefighters were greeted by the scene of the construction workers, who had previously been preparing to leave for day, scrambling down the scaffolding ahead of the intense flames. Engine 10 attempted to access the vehicle ramp that led to the interior of the complex, but the size and intensity of the fire made it unsafe for apparatus and personnel to enter the area.

Battalion 10, the initial Incident Commander, established a command post at the northwest corner of Olin and Winchester. At 13:42 hours, Command declared the incident to be a defensive operation and ordered master streams to be placed in service to protect exposures and to attempt to knock down the flames. Command requested a fourth alarm at 15:49 hours and a fifth alarm at 15:52 hours. The fourth alarm companies were all mutual aid companies because the fire was located in the western edge of the City and were much closer than the next due City companies.

When Engine 4 arrived, they positioned their apparatus on the south side of the fire to protect the main office building for the project, which was the primary exposure. Engine 7’s crew also set up a master stream device on the southeast corner to protect exposures. Truck 14 placed their a ladder pipe into service on the southwest corner and Truck 4 set up a ladder pipe near the Belmont Village High-Rise, but was later reassigned. Battalion 1 assumed command of the Operations Section and the multiple alarm companies were pressed into service as they arrived to augment water supply and to place additional master streams into service.

It should be noted that all of the command officers on the initial alarm were working in an “acting” capacity because the chief officers were attending a staff meeting downtown at departmental headquarters. As multiple alarms began to be dispatched, the meeting was quickly adjourned and the chiefs and senior command staff responded to the scene, arriving with the companies on the fifth alarm.

The building was completely surrounded by scaffolding, which was in direct contact with the flames. Fearing a collapse, Command ordered the establishment of collapse zones around the perimeter of the building, which were taped off. Even though ordered to stay out of these zones, some firefighters ignored the dangers and walked into the potential collapse areas. A number of collapses did occur, but no one was injured as a result. Flying embers and radiant heat ignited vehicles, forklifts, portable toilets, and dumpsters. The main office building for the project, located at 400 South Winchester, also sustained fire damage.

The water utility boosted water pressure to the area to the distribution system’s maximum capacity. So much water was pumped onto the fire that the runoff flooded the underground parking garage, damaging approximately 160 vehicles.

The fire was held to five alarms and required the efforts of 119 personnel (eleven chief officers, 103 firefighters, and five dispatchers) and thirty-one pieces of apparatus to bring under control. The ICS system was used to manage the incident. Two branch level command groups were established under the Operations Section and four divisions were established under the two branches. A Plans Section was also established. Division A was established on the West side on Winchester, Division B on the North Side on Olin, Division C on the East side on Santana Row, and Division D was located on the south Side on Olin.

Weather was not a factor when the original incident was dispatched, but traffic was. The incident occurred just as the afternoon rush hour was beginning. Heavy congestion resulted, which impeded the arrival of multiple alarm companies. The San Jose Police Department established a perimeter and managed the traffic control efforts. The temperature was approximately 75(F, skies were mostly clear, and the winds were moderate to calm. The fire, however, created its own weather, principally high winds. These winds carried burning embers into the air and began to ignite exposures south of the Santana Row fire.

At 15:53 hours, one minute after the fifth alarm companies were dispatched to Santana Row, a 911 call was received reporting roof fires approximately one-half mile south of the fire. Communications advised the Santana Road IC that they had received numerous calls of possible structure fires on Moorpark Avenue. The IC instructed Communications to dispatch a separate assignment to that location. At 15:59 hours, Communications dispatched Engines 9 and 17, Truck 2, and Battalion 13 to Incident #8985, a report of a fire in a single-family residence at 2879 Huff Avenue. The actual address proved to be 2966 Moorpark Avenue, which is in the Moorpark Garden Apartment complex.

While enroute, Battalion 13 requested a second alarm (16:06 hours). Having anticipated this request, Communications had already dispatched a second alarm (16:01 hours). Engine 9 was the first company on location and reported a two-story apartment building with flames through the roof. They set up a master stream to protect exposures and deployed hand lines to attack the fire. A primary search was also conducted to evacuate the occupants. Battalion 13 arrived at 16:11 hours, assumed command and declared the incident to be a defensive operation.

Flying embers, some as large as two-by-fours, continued to ignite buildings in the area, including several townhouses at the Moorpark Village complex. At 16:08 hours, Moorpark Command requested two Strike Teams from the County (third and fourth alarms), which consisted of ten engines, two battalion chiefs, and thirty-two personnel. At 16:17 hours, an out of County Strike Team was ordered (the fifth alarm). A sixth alarm was requested at 16:56 hours. The incident was held to six alarms and required the efforts of 102 personnel (93 firefighters and nine chiefs) and thirty-four pieces of apparatus to bring under control. There were no deaths or serious injuries to either firefighters or civilians.

Four divisions were established to manage the fire. Division A was set up on the south side of Moorpark Gardens. Division B was established on the east side on Baywood Avenue. Division C was established within the interior of Moorpark Gardens and Division D covered the Moorpark Village complex.

The City’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is not normally activated for a fire. Given the magnitude of the overall commitment of resources to both fires, a decision was made to open the EOC. It is believed that had the EOC been opened during the early stages of the event, that command officials would not have gotten as far behind as they did because existing mutual aid agreements were not adequate for the size of the incident. The EOC had food, portable toilets; and rehab assistance sent to the scene.

During the event, the department continued to respond to other incidents. There were twelve medical calls and four fire alarms, including burning embers on the roof of the high-rise near Santana Row. When the fire was reported at the high-rise, there were no chief officers left in the City at that point and by 17:00 hours, there were only fourteen companies left in the City. The minimum reserve level is ideally sixteen companies. Mutual aid companies are not used to fill City stations. Some off-duty firefighters selfdispatched and staffed reserve companies, which added to the complexity of accounting for everyone working the incident.

San Jose has a combined communications center, which dispatches both fire and police. The police department serves as the primary public safety access point and their call takers answer the 911 calls and then transfers fire calls to the fire department’s dispatchers. EMS calls are transferred to the County, which dispatches AMR. The County Dispatch also handles the dispatch of mutual aid companies, which are not included as a part of the City’s CAD system. Mutual aid must be requested manually through the County, which increases their response time.

For working fires, Communications designates a command and a tactical channel. Tactical channels are not monitored or recorded, however. As a matter of routine all companies above a second alarm respond on the dispatch channel and then switch to the designated tactical channel.

When the fire at Santana Row was reported, there were five dispatchers, one supervisor and two trainees on duty. During the first hour of the incident, call-takers were handling a call each minute. Off-duty personnel were called in to assist during the event. Six incident dispatchers and the Battalion Chief in charge of communications responded to the fire scene and a supervisor was assigned to the EOC. The Department’s mobile command van responded to the fire at Santana Row and the dispatchers assigned to the fire at Moorpark worked out of the command vehicle.

There were no deaths or civilian injuries during the event. Twenty firefighters suffered assorted minor injuries. The fire loss at the Santana Row complex was approximately $90 million. No estimate was available as to the dollar loss at the second fire. Damage, however, was extensive. Three condos at Moorpark Village sustained fire damage to their roofs and interior. Five buildings at Moorpark Gardens sustained total structural and content loss. Two additional buildings had fire damage to their wood shake roofs and experienced interior water damage to contents. In total, thirtyfour housing units suffered extensive enough damage to displace residents for more than one week. Two of the condos and twenty-two rental units had to be rebuilt and one condo and nine rental units required significant repairs. An additional forty-three dwelling units suffered minor damage.

The incident was not large enough to qualify for a State or Federal disaster declaration even though the fire displaced thirty-four families. The Red Cross opened a shelter at Prospect High School, but no one took advantage of the shelter. All of the victims stayed in hotels or with friends and relatives. The following day, the shelter site was moved to the Sherman Oaks Community Center. Donations for the victims were collected by the Salvation Army and the Red Cross assisted families with finding other accommodations. The City’s Housing Department provided rental assistance to twentythree families at a cost of $45,000 and an additional seventy-one victims received some form of assistance from the Department.

The event attracted a lot of media attention, especially immediately following the incident when it was alleged that the City expended more effort in trying to extinguish the fires than it did in providing assistance to those persons impacted by the fire. The fire department fielded a lot of media inquiries from both English and Spanish speaking media outlets. San Jose has a large Spanish speaking population. At least three television helicopters and seven satellite trucks responded to the scene to gather information about the fires.

A fire watch was maintained at Santana Row for two days and firefighters continued to pour water on the pre-stressed concrete podium in an effort to cool the structure and prevent damage. A fire watch was also maintained for an additional day in the Huff/ Moorpark area in case there was a rekindle.

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