Search and Rescue Operations in Georgia During Major Floods » Macon Bibb Fire Department - Chiefs Hinson and J.P. Hartley

With more than 120,000 people the City of Macon and environs sit on the Ohomagee River, alongside Interstate 75, the main north-south freeway in Georgia, and 60 miles further south from Griffin.

The Ohomagee River also rose and receded quickly, although the aftereffects were more profound. Experts rated this rise of the Ohomagee as a 500-year flood. Local officials knew they were going to have a flood, however no one realized it was going to be so destructive.

The initial flooding on July 6 forced the evacuation of a Best Western Motel and a Days Inn. It also forced the closure of I-75, which resulted in traffic being backed up for miles in both directions. Several housing projects were cut off by this closure, and the City of Macon’s Emergency Operations Center was activated. The city also requested assistance from Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA), and, on declaration of the federal disaster, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as well.

Potentially, the most profound problem was the flooding of the city’s water treatment plant, located in the high water channel of the river. Though planning had been underway to move it for several years, it was still located in this exposed spot. The flooding of the plant cut off drinking water to the entire population, and eliminated the city’s ability to treat sewage.

For the next 21 days Macon residents were without fresh water. Residents had to drink water brought in by contracted water tankers to several distribution points. The city also requested 1300 portable toilets, which were distributed and serviced by other contractors. All of these facilities were ordered through GEMA or FEMA. Operations to distribute the water, monitor disease control, and manage the field toilets required the majority of the fire department’s time during the next three weeks. However, due to the quick “up and down” nature of the flooding, after the first two days it was not necessary to call in off-duty personnel.

Fortunately, during this time there were no major fires, and only one haz-mat incident occurred, which involved an overturned diesel tanker truck. The fire department was able to keep the hydrant system intact, maintaining some two million gallons of fresh water in above-ground reservoirs as a last-ditch back-up for firefighting and consumption.

Officials indicated that GEMA and FEMA acted quickly on the city’s behalf. They sent in National Guard military police to help in traffic control, 134 officers and some boats from the Georgia Fishery Commission, and the already mentioned fleet of tanker trucks, and portable toilets. Helicopters were used to patrol for possible levee failures, particularly south of the city. During the emergency period tanker trucks were also used to transport water to the local telephone facilities, which required large amounts of fresh water to maintain their fiber-optics operations.

During the height of the emergency, the fire department moved its operations out of the city E.O.C. Since elected officials do not often participate in disaster drills, the noise and confusion of the E.O.C. was eliminated by this relocation. While this move did lead to some duplication of effort and orders for materials, resulting emergencies were handled more effectively. The telephone company supplied cellular phones and service to the emergency services-which was a tremendous aid in communications.

In Macon, tactical operations were declared complete when the fresh water plant finally restored its service. New equipment was brought in by railroad flatcars, including new motors and filters. Three hundred thousand gallons of fresh water had to be trucked in to clean each of 22 filters-a major task. While local residents did not have any idea the water would rise as high as it did, plans to relocate the water facility were not accelerated.

“Rescues” for the Macon area consisted only of evacuation of low lying structures. There were very few stuck vehicles and none of those were trapped in fast moving water.

The only exciting incident involved a “self-dispatched” person who had a Hovercraft available to him. While demonstrating it to two firefighters on board, it turned over, putting all three into the water only a few miles upstream of a bridge under which there was virtually no clearance. All three made it successfully under the bridge and were rescued downstream. However, the Hovercraft was a total loss.

In Albany, Fire Chief and EMA Director Henry Fields had plenty of warning that the water was on its way, and were aware of the problems occurring upstream along the Flint River, which divides Albany. Initial warnings were that the river would rise to 28 feet - seven feet over flood stage. Accordingly, local officials prepared for a flooding potential of 37 feet. During this event the water actually rose to 44 feet.

Department heads were notified early on July 5th that the EOC was going to be activated later that evening. Following pre-plans, flyers were distributed to areas that were going to be potentially inundated, the media was informed to start making public service announcements, and off-duty personnel were notified.

At 6:00 p.m. the EOC was activated in a classroom at the fire station. At 1:30 p.m. on July 6th, mutual aid was requested from nearby Lee County for two boys trapped in a tree by rising water. No aid was sent because almost simultaneously, Albany’s Lovers Home Road started to flood. This resulted in the high school and an immediate care center being ordered to evacuate.

The EOC quickly became an inadequate working area. With all department heads talking independently to GEMA, duplicate ordering of resources started to occur. Further confusion ensued as all materials were delivered to the fire station. Because the city and county were on different radio systems, dispatching confusion occurred. The EOC phone system was quickly jammed and cellular phones with priority over-rides were ordered. While standard report forms were in the EOC, the volume of calls resulted in the forms not being used uniformly by all departments.

The flooding of the Flint River cut the City of Albany in half and street flooding created further islands. There were five fatalities, none due to lack of notification, but to refusal to leave when ordered. Several vehicles drove around barricades and were also trapped. Local officials had no enforcement powers and were unable to cite the drivers and residents. Law enforcement made 15 to 20 arrests for looting. Several people were also arrested for violating an enforced 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. curfew. National Guard and police units patrolled using boats and HumVees.

In Albany, Chief Fields was able to call on 170 sworn personnel in 10 stations, and nearly 60 EMA volunteers. Local and mutual aid personnel made approximately 4,000 rescues and assists.

One early and substantial problem involved the inundation of local cemeteries. Several hundred caskets in various stages of deterioration started popping out of the ground. Disintegrating caskets put their remains into the river. Using information from similar situations during the Missouri flooding, officials from the coroner’s office and the Georgia Bureau of Investigation organized a field morgue, bringing in refrigeration trucks to hold the remains for identification. Due to this situation and general contamination, all personnel received tetanus shots early in the operations. As of December 1994, several dozen sets of remains were still not identified.

By Friday, July 7, a Presidential Disaster Declaration had been made, and by Sunday July 9, FEMA had set up three disaster assistance offices. While requested support from GEMA arrived timely, FEMA’s help with federal assets was generally slower.

Available flood plain maps quickly became useless as the water continued to rise. Since both bridges across the Flint River were under water, getting from one side to the other resulted in a 100-mile drive. A separate command post for the east side of the city was set up and officials and workers were shuttled back and forth using State of Georgia helicopters.

Operations remained at a steady level for several days until flood waters started to recede. Two nursing homes were evacuated. Levees were reinforced near the local community college on the east side of the river. Twenty-eight shelters were opened for evacuees in schools and churches. Portable pumps to empty buildings were ordered, received, and used. The two “john” boats used by the fire department proved inadequate, both because of their small size and the repeated loss of propellers in shallow waters. Propane tanks kept breaking loose, and utility repairs were a constant problem. The city water supply, however, was never contaminated.

Actions after the flooding included imposing a local 1% sales tax to create a new radio system, and expand and modernize the EOC. Instead of a critique of operations, a four-hour class on the Incident Command System was held for all elected officials. Since the last major flood in 1979 only covered half the affected area, new flood plain maps will reflect a potential 50-foot rise. As it was, the affected area stretched two miles from the river in places, with standing water four to five feet deep.

Finally, local discussions of property condemnations affecting 900 residences and 1500 other structures in flood-prone areas were being conducted in December 1994. Such condemned property areas provide land for floods to inundate without further property loss.

Americus and Sumter Counties were perhaps the hardest hit areas despite being located about 15 miles west of the Flint River. The area has three main drainages that dump into the Muhalee River, which in turn meets the Flint near Albany. There are about 11 significant earthen dams in the immediate area, most holding water for farming and irrigation purposes.

Fire Chief Moreno assists the director of the Sumter County Emergency Management Agency, Sheriff Randy Howard. The tire department in Americus provides contract services to a large area around Americus and is staffed with a total of 43 personnel in two stations.

On July 5, the rain reached a crescendo, inundating the area with 24 inches of rainfall in just 24 hours. Earthen dams started to collapse, causing flash floods that traveled down the drainages and across roads. There was no time or warning to deploy barricades, stop traffic, or evacuate potential problem sites.

There were 15 fatalities. Of these, 13 victims washed away in their cars, and two more victims were trapped in a house on the uphill side of a railroad grade. (The grade that ended up acting as a dam.)

A portion of the problem was caused by dam failures sending walls of water downstream to the next darn, and so forth-causing increasing devastation downstream.

Early in operations firefighters almost lost an engine to rising waters. Radios and phones ceased working at 2:00 a.m. on July 6 for several hours.

Despite these problems, rescuers were able to make 43 successful rescues, mostly using ropes to reach vehicles and structures. This despite the lack of any specific training in swift water rescue. The fire department received 70 calls for assistance between 11:00 p.m. and 6:30 a.m. on July 6. In order to make sure that all personnel were wearing lifejackets, emergency purchase orders were taken to local sporting goods stores.

Unlike previously mentioned areas, there were at least three working fires in the area, including a major factory fire in the nearby town of Ogelthorpe that firefighters could not reach due to surrounding water. Health dangers for rescuers were created by hazardous materials, including raw sewage and several propane tanks which had been torn loose. As a preventative measure, firefighters received tetanus boosters and began a hepatitis series. Additionally, stringent decontamination procedures were implemented for returning workers - consisting of unclothing and repeatedly washing, soaping and rinsing themselves off in the equipment bays. Despite these efforts, several firefighters had health problems in the months following, particularly skin problems and flu-like symptoms.

Again, in contrast to other areas, Chief Moreno reported that the GEMA flood maps were very helpful. However, it took some effort to secure them. While he commented that operations in general went much smoother than those after Hurricane Andrew, there was still a several day delay between ordering resources and receiving them.

In addition, local officials did not have a clear idea of their role at the EOC. Police officers, including Georgia State Troopers, were not clear about their responsibilities either, occasionally becoming simple bystanders to events. In Jones County, EMA Director Alan Greene had 100 fire department and 45 rescue squad personnel - all volunteer - available to help the 25,000 mostly rural residents of the county. Although just immediately north and east of Macon, and downstream of other problem areas, here the weather predictions were not receiving adequate attention.

By Tuesday afternoon, problems were starting to occur in the northern (more rural) part of the county. Three families were evacuated from their houses by boat. Personnel were also asked to assist a Monroe County search for two canoeists who were in turn looking for two men who had washed away in a car.

The Agency’s “john” boat was quickly determined to be too small, though there were enough lifejackets available for personnel. Requests were made for assistance to the sheriffs office for patrol units, and to the Georgia State Troopers for a helicopter to patrol the river. One area of concern was some local earthen dams (now under survey by the U.S. Soil Conservation Service) and two Georgia Power dams on the Owugee River.

As in other areas of the state, there were communications problems. The previous April a statewide paging system was activated at a tower to the west. Pages constantly interfered with communications during the next 36 hours. Ham radio operators were able to help out substantially.

Fortunately there were no further water rescues. With only a 12-foot “john” boat and four lifejackets, rescuers were inadequately equipped. Further, standard GEMA rescue squad certification training covers water rescue only briefly, and no advance training was available.

A major effort was devoted to providing mutual aid to Macon County in the form of fresh water. Jones County provided nine trucks to transport water to Macon. The Georgia State Forestry Commission shops modified fittings on the water trucks to allow them to deliver the water, While no fires occurred, some structures, including two mobile homes and one frame house, were lost to rising waters. The EOC in Jones County was not activated at all during the emergency.

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