This fire presents an opportunity to learn lessons about several
significant issues, including building construction and exit design,
emergency response, incident command, communications, and human
behavior in fire emergencies.
Building Features
The noncombustible construction and relatively low fuel load from
interior finishes and furnishings kept fire damage to a minimum. Most of
the lethal fire and smoke production appeared to have resulted from
burning aviation fuel. Only north facing rooms, which were directly
exposed to the fire outside, sustained thermal fire damage. Smoke spread
was heavy only where doors were left open by occupants, such as the fourth
floor where the doors to rooms 416 and 422 were left open. Very little
smoke or fire damage was noted in corridors on the first through third
floors and none of the rooms on the south side of the building sustained
thermal fire damage. The automatic-closing fire doors at the west end of
the corridors worked in concert with the fire alarm system to prevent the
fire from spreading into the atrium, especially on the fourth floor where
open room doors permitted significant volumes of fire and smoke to enter
the corridor.
Notwithstanding these successes, this fire points out other areas
where building features, although code-conforming, may have contributed
to injuries and loss of life. For example, none of the nationally recognized
model codes would have required two exits from room 416. Nonetheless,
two remote means of egress from room 416 probably could have prevented
the loss of at least four lives.
Emergency Response
Unrequested mutual aid response from neighboring departments
and off-duty firefighters complicated incident command, and compromised
fireground accountability and security of the incident scene. With law
enforcement personnel assisting firefighters and attempting several risky
rescues without proper protective equipment, early fire scene security was
not established.
Fire department personnel cordoned-off the perimeter of the crash
site themselves approximately 30 minutes after the crash. As sufficient
firefighting and rescue personnel arrived on the scene, law enforcement
efforts were gradually redirected to monitoring scene access and controlling
traffic.
Without early control of the fire scene, effective personnel
accountability was nearly impossible. One Evansville police officer who
had engaged in rescue efforts prior to the arrival of additional firefighters
died on February 24 of injuries he sustained in the line of duty. A sheriffs
deputy and an emergency medical technician were also seriously injured
but later recovered from smoke inhalation and exposure to toxic products
of combustion sustained because they were not using appropriate
respiratory protection. Four other emergency responders sustained minor
injuries, including sprains, strains, and bruises.
Emergency Management
The participants in this incident generally agreed that the use of the
incident command system served them well in coordinating the emergency
response and ensuring a smooth transition to recovery operations.
The timely activation of the joint city/county Emergency Operations
Center aided in the smooth and effective management of this incident.
Incoming requests for information about the incident were effectively
managed while outgoing notifications and arrangements for assistance were
executed. This extended as far as coordinating the response of clergy and
counselors to assist victims’ families and emergency responders, which
helped expedite the recovery process.
By responding to the incident site, the Emergency Management
Director facilitated a smooth transition from emergency response to the
investigation and recovery phases.
By establishing good media relations, the Police, Fire, and
Emergency Management personnel were able to successfully manage the
intense public interest in this incident and prevent the public from
unwittingly exposing themselves to harm and creating a larger problem for
rescuers.
Communications
Evansville’s new 800-MHz trunked radio communication system
provided needed flexibility and enhanced communications effectiveness
during this very complex incident. Although call volume and radio traffic
far exceeded reasonably anticipated emergency demand levels,
communications personnel managed the situation admirably and gave much
of the credit to the new system and procedures.
Personnel at the fire scene were impressed by the extent to which
the trunked radio system allowed them to maintain good interagency
communication. The only negative comments about fire scene
communication among responders only served to highlight the value of the
new equipment: the agencies that were not part of the new system now
want to be added to the network.
Occupant Response
By the time firefighters arrived on the scene, the occupants of the
Drury Inn and Jojo’s Restaurant who survived the plane’s initial impact had
already fled the fire, were seeking refuge from it, or were attempting to
save others who were trapped. Firefighters and other emergency
responders encountered many of these people during their initial
operations. The three people who sought refuge together in room 405
were extricated using an aerial ladder 15 to 20 minutes after the crash.
The instructor who ran to the fourth floor balcony and became trapped
there was rescued about an hour after the crash. Other rescuers tried in
vain to reach the waitress and kitchen worker pinned in the structural
debris of the Jojo’s Restaurant.
Most of the survivors of the Drury Inn and Jojo’s Restaurant
evacuated without assistance. Those who were unable to escape were
generally overcome by the fire, pinned in debris, or cut off from their
means of escape. Although 11 people were killed in the hotel and
restaurant, many more lives could have been lost were if not for the
prompt, orderly evacuation of most of the occupants. Those who did not
evacuate stayed to help others who they felt were in greater need of
assistance than themselves, such as the two lobby occupants and the
kitchen workers at Jojo’s. Their actions demonstrate that people are far
more likely to respond adaptively and altruistically in the face of danger
than to panic.
Those who attempted to flee but did not successfully evacuate the
building illustrate a phenomenon which is common in multiple fatality fires.
Three occupants sought refuge in the bathroom in room 416 because they
could not reach an exit. Two others sought refuge with a third occupant
and protected that room until rescued. In one case, these actions were
successful; in the other they were not. In both cases, the occupants were
attempting to protect themselves by placing distance or a barrier or both
between them and the fire. In the absence of a better course of action or
a clear objective to evacuate the building, people will employ alternatives
which are less than optimal. This underscores the need for clear, simple,
direct means of egress and routine evacuation planning.
Means of Egress Signs and Lighting
Emergency means of egress lighting and internally illuminated exit
signs with backup power supplies were provided. However, their efficacy
could not be determined through analysis of the actions of the survivors.
The accounts of survivors shed no new light on the discussion of emergency
lighting and exit sign requirements in the model codes. The initial
responses of the individuals most directly affected by this fire seemed to be
more directly oriented toward escaping from the room and extinguishing
their burning clothing than evacuating the building per se. As such, their
actions were probably not focused on looking for exit signs or other
obvious indicators of the way to exits.
Many of the fourth floor survivors indicated that the corridor was
dark, probably due to the heavy smoke produced by the burning aviation
fuel not a failure of the emergency lighting. Emergency lighting is required
in corridors and means of egress to assist occupants in identifying the path
of travel and avoiding egress hazards. However, the lighting levels
specified in the model codes are relatively low and generally incapable of
overcoming the obscuration of dense smoke.
The merits of different methods of illuminating exit signs and their
location have been subjects of considerable debate in the code
development community through the years. Even internally illuminated
exit signs emit less light than emergency lighting units and are generally
installed at or near ceiling level which means that they can be easily
obscured by rising smoke.
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