At about the same time the search was completed, security personnel advised the
Deputy Chief of a fire on the west side of the Monomac Building and the officer in
charge of Engine 3 requested an engine to come to the northwest corner of the building.
When the Deputy Chief went around the south end of the building to observe conditions
on the west side, he observed fire around the loading dock and extending above the
boiler room that housed the oil heaters. The flames were two to three stories high and 20
to 30 feet wide and a 40 mph wind was pushing the heat, flames and smoke into the
building on at least three floors. The seat of the fire was behind several forty-foot long
trailers and at least two of the trailers were already involved.
The magnitude of the situation was evident and the Deputy Chief quickly initiated
the first of numerous requests for mutual aid to the Haverhill Communications
Center. Access to the west side of the building was extremely limited, as most of the
open area between the building and the river was occupied by more parked trailers. This
left very little room to maneuver apparatus or to establish safe operating positions in the
area where the fire was discovered. The strong winds, temperatures under 10 degrees F
and a covering of snow added to the problems.
Engine 6 had stopped at the central fire station to pick-up the Methuen Fire
Department’s second ambulance and was arriving at the scene at about 8:20 p.m., as the
fire was reported to C-2. Moving around the south end of the building to the west side,
Engine 6 was able to get close enough to initiate an attack on the fire with a 1 3/4" preconnected
line, but did not have a supply line from a hydrant. Engine 5 was directed by
C-2 to locate a hydrant and to lay parallel 3" supply lines to Engine 6 for master stream
operations. Engine 5 laid the lines across a small bridge to a hydrant on the opposite
side of the river, however the hydrant was frozen and inoperable.
At this point the Chief of the Methuen Fire Department (C-1) arrived, followed
closely by Engine 7 and Ladder 5 of the Lawrence Fire Department. The 1 ¾" line was
having no affect on the fire and Engine 6 was running out of tank water. Witnesses said
the fire was moving across the west face of the building as fast as a man could walk.
The Fire Chief ordered Lawrence Ladder 5 take the place of Engine 6 and to set-up a
heavy elevated stream to the fire in an attempt to keep the fire from spreading.
Lawrence Engine 7 located a yard hydrant, about 200 feet south of the building, but
some of the trailers had to be moved to reach it. A 4" line was eventually connected to
this hydrant to allow a master stream device to be placed in service.
The Fire Chief then went to the northwest corner of the Monomac Building
where he met the crews that had completed the interior search. He ordered Engine 3 and
Ladder 1 to set up a ladder pipe operation to protect the Acadia Mills Building, 50 feet
to the north. Two 3" lines were stretched 200 feet from Engine 3 to a yard hydrant in the
alley between the two buildings. Water pressure was good as this operation was established,
but the fire was already pushing out of the Monomac Buildings into the alley and
involving the enclosed passageway that spanned the alley between the two buildings.
The ladder pipe had been in operation only a short time when the passageway collapsed
across the supply lines. This occurred at about 8:45 p.m.
After all personnel in the area were accounted for, Ladder 1 was repositioned
outside the collapse zone. The Monomac Building was now heavily involved in fire.
Engine 3 was repositioned close to the river and the crew chopped through the thick ice,
but their apparatus was unable to draft. Engine 4 was then moved into position to draft
and was able to restore the water supply to Ladder 1. Engine 6, which had been moved
to make room for Lawrence Ladder 5, breached the ice on the east side of the river and
also attempted to draft.
Due to the rapidly expanding size of the incident and the limited resources, the
Fire Chief took responsibility of the north side along Chase Street, while the Deputy Chief
directed operations on the south side, along Stafford Street. They were attempting to find
some way to surround the fire and contain it before it reached the boundaries of the complex.
Both officers determined that additional assets were necessary immediately if they
were to make any progress in stopping the fire and requested additional mutual aid.
Explosions from inside the Monomac Building broke through the west wall,
showering debris in the area where Engine 6 was attempting to set-up a drafting operation.
The decision was made to withdraw Lawrence Ladder 5, which was not yet in operation, to the south end of the building. Engine 6 was relocated outside the collapse
zone, where a second hole was made in the ice. Engine 6 made several attempts to draft
from this opening, but ice build-up on the hard suction hose made this impossible.
Engine 5 was then moved into position and drafted from this opening to supply a master
stream and a hand line. Lawrence Engine 7 was also moved away from the building and
joined Engine 5 across the bridge.
By 8:45 p.m. the wind was also pushing the flames from the Monomac Building
across the alley on the east side and the fire was threatening to spread to the Process
Building. Lawrence Ladder 5 was positioned to attempt to keep the fire from spreading
across the alley, but did not have an adequate water supply to protect the exposure.
Efforts were made to set up additional master streams as the wind pushed the flames
directly toward the Process Building, however there was not enough space between the
buildings and not enough time or water to stop the progress of the fire.
The four sprinkler systems in the Monomac Building were overwhelmed and the
water supply in the on-site system, which also provided the water for the yard hydrants,
was severely compromised. The valves to shut down the sprinklers in the Monomac
Building were in the alley that was severely exposed to the fire. The Mill’s fire protection
personnel tried to close section valves to isolate the compromised areas, but met
with little success. The electricity for the complex was disconnected at about 8:50 p.m.,
disabling the electric fire pump, which reduced the water supply for the sprinklers and
yard hydrants by about 50 percent.
By about 9:00 p.m. the fire had extended into the Process Building. As the
Monomac Building began to collapse, the 40 mile per hour winds blew huge embers up
to one and one half miles away. Mill security personnel had evacuated the buildings to
the east in the path of the fire, while police officers were evacuating families and businesses
between the mill complex and Broadway Street.
Several crews entered the Main Mill Building and attempted to use the standpipes
to keep the fire from extending into this structure, but there was not enough pressure
present to fill their hoses. With no fire department connections to augment the
water supply, the interior crews had to evacuate as radiant heat from the advancing fire
was causing window frames to ignite. The fire quickly spread into and through this
building, then extended east into the Dye Building and the New Building.
Next » Containment
Save to del.icio.us
