On Sunday, December 21, 1997, units from Monticello, Troutman, and West
Iredell Volunteer Fire Departments responded with six pumpers and two chief officers to
the manufacturing facility at 1475 Winston Avenue for a report of fire in a silo. The call
was dispatched at 0858 and the first unit responded at 0901. Weather conditions were
overcast with no precipitation and the temperature was in the high 30s to low 40s. There
was no appreciable wind.
The first unit on the scene (from Monticello), reported moderate smoke coming
from the top of the silo. The Chief of the Monticello VFD established command and
proceeded to investigate fire conditions. The fire was confined to the silo with no
extension to the manufacturing facility and no fire travel in the ductwork. Command
decided that the best course of attack would be a flooding operation, using handlines,
from the top of the silo. The strategy was to maintain the steady flow of an 1 3/4” attack
line set on 30-degree fog to penetrate and extinguish the burning wood material.
The decision also was made to utilize a water shuttle rather than to deploy a
supply line from the hydrant at the facility’s driveway entrance. The distance to the
hydrant was approximately 2,000 feet. (This decision limited the water flow potential in
terms of gallons per minute.) Teams of firefighters worked from the roof area of the silo,
directing the hose stream through openings in the silo roof to penetrate the burning
material. Personnel were fitted with Class III harnesses and anchored in with 2” webbing
to tie-off points on the silo’s catwalk railing.
The flooding operation continued for approximately 2 1/2 hours and flowed an
estimated 10,000 gallons of water into the silo. Support personnel responded with air
units, standby ambulances, and rehab supplies. Firefighters were rotated through working
assignments and break times.
The smoke had receded to a very light condition when the decision was made to
transition the operation from attack to overhaul and complete the extinguishment of any
remaining embers. Firefighters were to manually remove the contents rather than enter
the silo. Command decided to remove the two access plates on the bottom of the silo to
access the contents. One of these plates was approximately 2 feet x 2 feet; the other was
3 feet x 4 feet. All indications were that no hot spots remained, and the general exterior
silo area was cool.
The Chief had moved all but essential personnel from around the base of the silo
area as the crew commenced to remove the plates. As they worked on removing the last
bolt of the 3 x 4 plate, one of the firefighters at the plate area noticed water flowing out
along with burning ashes in the air space above. He then described a sucking and
gurgling sound that was followed by a loud, low order explosion. The firefighters on the
roof recalled the same type of inrush of air at their position followed by a dull thump and
the roar of the main explosion. (Photo #2 shows access plate in relation to silo, photo #3
is a closer view of the access plate area).
Eight firefighters were near the access plate area at the base of the silo. Several
were knocked off their feet and some were actually propelled through the air. Overall,
approximately thirty-five people (firefighters, EMTs and support personnel) were near
the silo. Several large pieces of machinery, structural members and roof sections fell to
the ground, narrowly missing several firefighters.
The three firefighters on the silo were propelled in different directions. Their life
belts were intact, but the webbing and the anchor points (the catwalk) were shredded.
One firefighter traveled straight up and landed back into the silo. Another was ejected
upward and outward traveling 32 feet landing on the roof of the trailer shed, crashing
through the shed roof and into an open top trailer of wood products. The third attack
crewman was trapped on the top of the silo by the metal cover of the cyclone that had
been a part of the roof-top wood distribution system and the ladder itself.
The incident commander immediately reported an explosion to Communications
and requested assistance in the form of medic units and a tower ladder. No other
“situation report” information was passed on from the scene for the duration of the
incident. Iredell County medic units and the aerial tower from the City of Statesville
were dispatched. At this point, because fireground units were operating on a different
frequency than were Communications and Statesville, and detailed information was not
passed on from the scene. Neither Communications nor assisting units had a clear picture
of the conditions at the scene. The two Communications personnel now became
overloaded due to the instaneous increase of radio traffic, dispatch duties and telephone
notifications.
The scene was transformed from one of a routine overhaul operation to one of
stunned confusion. What had been a mop-up and demobilization instantly became a
technical rescue with many unanswered questions as to the whereabouts and condition of
fellow firefighters. Unit 118, the Chief of the Troutman Rescue Squad, reported to
Command and worked with the IC to establish a course of action. Unit 118 was assigned
the Rescue Sector and he immediately placed the medevac helicopter system on standby.
Initial assessment from the ground indicated three firefighters immediately
affected by the explosion and little or no fire remaining in the silo. The roof had blown
into several large pieces and the cyclone collector housing at the roof of the silo rested
precariously over the trapped firefighter’s position.
The immediate priority was accounting for all personnel, locating any who were
missing, and assessing the number and severity of injuries. The next course of action was
the technical rescue as well as treatment and transport of the injured. The Rescue Sector
was assigned the coordination of this phase of the operation.
The first firefighter to be located, accessed, treated, and transported was the
member who had been blown into the trailer shed. He was immobilized, removed from
the trailer, and transported by ground to Iredell Memorial Hospital at 12:30 PM.
A firefighter was assigned to access the silo roof via the undamaged staircage for
a situation report. His investigation confirmed that one member was in the silo and one
firefighter was trapped by machinery at the roof line.
The rescue operation at this point was divided into a dual strategy; removing the
firefighter in the silo while protecting the other firefighter trapped at the top. The
firefighter in the silo was assigned immediate priority because of concern of his condition
and fear over the fire condition in the silo (e.g. the possibility of rekindle or subsequent
explosion). The firefighter at the roof was in stable condition with no major injuries, and
appeared to be only trapped in an enveloping fashion by the machinery.
The aerial tower device from the Statesville Fire Department responded and their
Captain was assigned responsibility for the physical rescue of the firefighters on and in
the silo. The vehicle set up in the immediate area, but had to reposition because of
obstructions at the silo base and the severe angle and reach required.
One member from Statesville Fire Department rappelled into the silo, assessed the
victim, and directed his removal by affixing a lifeline to the injured firefighter intact
rescue harness. A haul system was rigged to lift the injured firefighter out of the silo.
This effort took several tries due to a lack of standard evolutions and no previous inter–
departmental training on the part of the technical rescue personnel. The victim was
removed and transported at 1:00PM by air ambulance to North Carolina Baptist Hospital
Burn Unit in Winston Salem.
The County Fire Marshal had stopped at a nearby steel fabrication yard enroute to
the scene, and requested the services of a mobile heavy-duty construction crane. The
construction crane was placed in position to stabilize the structural debris and prevent it
from falling further onto the enveloped firefighter. As the damaged machinery was first
stabilized, the cyclone and its housing was slowly and carefully lifted to allow the
trapped firefighter to extricate himself from his turnout gear and out of his entrapment.
He was removed at 3:00 PM and transported to via helicopter to NC Baptist Hospital.
While these extrication actions were underway, the County Emergency Manager
had reported to the Incident Commander at 1300 hours. The Emergency Manager was
instrumental in coordinating non-fire/rescue resources and interacting with the various
media representatives. His assistance enabled more efficient use of available resources,
and allowed the fire/rescue commanders to concentrate on the extrication and treatment
activities.
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