The investigation as to the cause of the fire and subsequent explosion commenced
immediately after the scene was released to the Fire Marshal’s office. The scene was
deemed to be unsafe for immediate, detailed, investigation due to the structural damage
and the heavy structural material around the top of the silo. This damaged material was
removed by a contractor in the presence of the investigating fire marshal and the site was
then rendered safe for preliminary investigation efforts. Due to worsening weather
conditions, the in-depth investigation was deferred and the effort confined to the
perimeter area.
The removal of the remaining product in the silo was required before investigators
could enter the silo and proceed with the comprehensive investigation. A contractor used
an industrial vacuum and removed the remaining product in the silo on the following
Monday. The condition of the remaining sawdust and the burn level in the silo was
observed. The scene was photographed and the site was documented by drawings.
During the first several days after the explosion, the investigation was hampered adverse
weather conditions: ice, snow, and cold temperatures.
The observation indicated a large void area (approximately 12-foot x16 foot x 10
foot) at the bottom of the silo radiating from the screw auger area. One of the "fingers"
(Photo #4) of burned material ran to the direction of the access panel that was the focal
point of the explosion. The direction of the burned void indicated fire travel in the
direction of the screw auger to the compromised areas of the silo shell: the access panels.
(Photos #5 and #6). Despite the application of several thousand gallons of water,
apparently no water penetrated to sufficient depth to reach the burning wood
material.
The fire marshal determined that the fire started when the gear box seized --
burning the belt of the drive unit. The actual fire origin was deemed to have come from
the plant side rather than from inside the silo. The day of fire origin was estimated to
have been Tuesday or Wednesday. It was surmised that the fire burned void areas out of
the sawdust over the auger. The fire also burned from the center toward the bolt holes in
the access plates. (Photo #7).
The explosion occurred when the 3'x4' side panel was removed, thus allowing
oxygen to enter the burning area. (Photo #8). Because of the compromise of the
integrity of the shell by the bolts and access plate, a minute source of oxygen-bearing air
permitted the fire to burn in finger-like fashion from the source in the gearbox to the silo
wall. This was an area of deep-seated, incomplete combustion, which needed only a
source of oxygen to ignite explosively. This is consistent with backdraft-like explosions
that have occurred in agricultural product silos. The sawdust also entrained dust to
combine with the rapid oxidation of the backdraft to produce the energy sufficient to
damage the silo and injure the firefighters. The water applied in the extinguishment
attempts apparently either ran off the surface or was absorbed and acted as a tamper over
the burned out voids in the wood waste.
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