| Issues | Comments |
| Recognition of oxygen-limiting silos | Oxygen limiting silos pose explosive hazards regardless of their use and application. In agricultural settings, the recommended action for fires of this type is to close off the silo and allow fire to burn itself out.
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| Risk Assessment | Incident commanders should very carefully evaluate whether direct attack or defensive tactics are appropriate to the risk involved. If the decision is made to attack, operations should be conducted from the top using remote devices or penetrating nozzles. |
| Accountability | All personnel should be subject to an accountability system with the safety officers monitoring the activites and whereabouts of all personnel on site. |
| Communications | Little information was relayed to Communications after the explosion. Separate radio channels were used by different jurisdictions and organizations, all of which contributed to confusion and complicated response. |
| Use of aerial device |
Elevated streams such as ladder pipes, tower ladders, or telesquirts could have been utilized to safely apply water instead of placing firefighters at risk.
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| Use of protective clothing | The use of full turnout gear prevented more serious injury. |
| Use of harnesses | The deployment of Class III harnesses on the attack crews facilitated rescue after the explosion and eliminated the need for affixing additional knots or belts to rescue the injured firefighters. The anchor points were the weak links, however. |
| Technical rescue training | Technical rescue crews had a good basic skill level. However, this incident highlighted the need for the technical rescue trained personnel to train together as a unit, regardless of departmental affiliation. |
| Water Supply | Tanker shuttles are adequate for handlines; sustained flow of master streams for flooding operations indicates large diameter supply lines from hydrants. |
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