In keeping with a ninety-year old tradition, fifty-eight people were working to
construct the fourth tier of the 1999 bonfire stack on the campus of Texas A&M University
during the early morning hours of November 18, 1999. The bonfire is ignited every
year on the eve of football game between Texas A&M and its arch rival the University of
Texas at Austin. The forty-foot stack, consisting of approximately 5,000 logs, collapsed
killing eleven people and sending twenty-eight to area hospitals. One of the injured
would later die, bringing the total number killed in the incident to twelve.
There were emergency medical personnel from the University’s Emergency
Medical Service at the scene when the collapse occurred. EMS personnel immediately
began to triage the injured bonfire workers and to assist with the rescue effort.
The first call to 911 was received by the City of College Station’s Emergency
Communications Center at 02:43 hours. The caller reported that the bonfire stack had
collapsed on campus and as many as thirty people may be trapped. An engine company
and an ALS ambulance from the College Station Fire Department were dispatched and
arrived on the scene within four and one half minutes.
The first firefighters to arrive at the incident were confronted with a scene eerily
reminiscent of the children’s game of pick-up-sticks. Command was established and
additional resources were ordered immediately upon realization of the magnitude of the
event. The rescue and recovery effort lasted almost twenty-four hours and involved over
3,200 individuals from over fifty different agencies.
The magnitude and unique nature of the incident quickly attracted national attention.
At the height of the incident, approximately fifty satellite television trucks were
broadcasting from the scene, including a number of regional television stations that
broadcast live from the scene throughout the event. Several of the news agencies were
from Spanish language only media organizations.
There were three distinct phases of operations during the event. The first phase,
involved the triage and rapid transport of the majority of the victims. Twenty-seven of
the twenty-eight victims who required transport to a medical facility were transported
within the first hour. A twenty-eighth victim was severely pinned within the stack and
could not be transported until he had been extricated. Phase Two of the incident involved
the prolonged and tedious process of extracting victims who were still alive from the
stack. The final phase encompassed the removal of the bodies of the deceased and the
complete dismantling of the bonfire stack.
Texas A&M University is a close-knit community and the tragic event had a
significant impact not only on the student body, but the local community as well. The
out-pouring of assistance and support from the citizens of the area as well as from other
universities throughout the state was overwhelming.
Shortly after the incident, the President of the University appointed an independent
commission of inquiry to determine the cause of the collapse. The commission was assisted in their inquiry by a number of experts as well as staff from the University. On
May 2, 2000, the Commission released their much-anticipated findings.
Their inquiry concluded that the 1999 bonfire collapsed due to a number of both
physical and organizational factors. According to the Report’s Summary of Findings, the
structural collapse of the bonfire stack was driven by a containment failure in the first
stack of logs. Two primary factors caused this failure: the first was excessive internal
stresses driven primarily by aggressive wedging of second stack logs into the first stack.
The second was inadequate containment strength around the first stack, which resulted in
structural failure.
Hoop stress results from outward pressure in a cylindrical structure, like a barrel,
that is due to internal lateral forces. Design, shape, or even gravity can drive these forces.
Hoop strength is the ability of a cylindrical structure to contain hoop stress. Hoop
strength is normally provided by some containing mechanism; the metal hoops on a
barrel for example. The lack of metal cables on the first tier reduced the hoop strength on
the first tier and contributed to the structural collapse.
Organizational factors resulted in an environment in which a complex and dangerous
structure was allowed to be built without adequate physical or engineering controls.
Organizational failure included the absence of an appropriate written design or design
process; a cultural bias, which impedes risk identification; and the lack of a proactive risk
management approach.
In addition to the special bonfire commission, OSHA and the Texas Alcoholic
Beverage Commission conducted inquiries into the collapse in order to determine if any
of their regulations were violated by any of the participants of the bonfire. Neither
agency uncovered any act or violation, which warranted any further action.
Next » Key Issues