The University Police Chief, a retired FBI agent, described the investigation as a scientific inquiry rather than a criminal investigation. Shortly after the collapse, a consultant hired by the University stated that soil tests performed by his company after the accident found nothing unusual about the ground at the bonfire site. He further stated that a soil failure did not cause the collapse. Specializing in foundation evaluation and design, his company took four borings from near the spot where the center pole was sunk into the ground. In discussing the results of the tests, he compared the bonfire stack to a large grain silo, which typically is tall, heavy, but not too large in circumference.

More than 2,300 documents and photographs were released under the Texas Open Records Act, including photographs, which revealed the presence of beer cans and bottles at scene. One of the documents released was a December 9, 1999 memo from a professor of mechanical engineering appointed as the head of the A&M staff team to assist the commission in their inquiry. His memo stated that the bonfire stack, at the time of the collapse, was not forty feet as originally reported, but the four-tiered stack was already 59 feet high and had two more stacks to go before being completed.

The Texas Rangers offered the Department of Public Safety’s laboratory to assist with the inquiry, but indicated that the agency would not investigate the incident since it was not a criminal matter. OSHA, however, sent their regional investigators to examine the site. The agency is required by law to investigate accidents involving privately owned heavy equipment and there were several cranes at the scene, which were owned or leased by private companies.

In a related incident, the local newspaper (The Eagle 12-3-99) reported that a student with more than 200 hours of experience operating a crane was one of two drivers on-duty when the collapse occurred according to documents released by the University.

It is a violation of the student-written Bonfire Handbook, but not of A&M policy, for a student to operate heavy equipment at the site. The State of Texas, however, does not have a set of rules governing who can drive a crane, according to the National Commission on Certification of Crane Operators based in Fairfax, Virginia. OSHA also does not require a license for the type of crane that was being used by the student.

The use of alcohol was a theme discussed throughout the investigation in relationship to the bonfire collapse, particularly after the disclosure that empty containers were found and photographed at the scene of the collapse. Two of the students killed in the collapse were alleged to have been intoxicated at the time of their deaths according to toxicology tests released to the media. The revelation prompted the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC) to start its own investigation into the incident because one of the deceased was a minor. According to the TABC, the investigation was primarily intended to be a “source investigation” to determine where the minor acquired the alcohol.

The legal limit in Texas is .08. One of the deceased allegedly tested at .316, or almost four times the legal limit. The other deceased student allegedly tested at .161, or twice the legal limit. According to published reports, the tests disclosed that the former student killed in the collapse also has a small amount of alcohol in his system at the time of death. Eight of the deceased, however, did not have any traces of alcohol in their system and the test results on the twelfth victim were not available.

An article in the local paper on December 18th, however, reported that a second toxicology report found lower levels of alcohol in the two deceased students than the first test. The second tests were conducted by orders of the Justice of the Peace and were intended to confirm the results of the first tests. Private companies performed both tests, the first by a firm located in Irving, Texas and the second by a firm located in Pennsylvania. Officials declined to disclose the results of the second tests, but a family friend of one of the victims disclosed that the second test indicated a result of .09 rather than .316 as was alleged by the first test. The rescue workers reported smelling alcohol on both of the deceased students, which promoted the Justice of the Peace to order the tests. The toxicology reports were taken from vitreous fluid, a jellylike substance taken from the victim’s eyes, and not from the victims’ blood.

Only one of the twenty-seven students injured in the collapse had a blood test performed on them. This fact was discovered in response to TABC’s subpoenas served at the two hospitals. College Station Medical Center reported that the hospital did not perform any toxicology exams to determine alcohol content. State law does not require testing unless law enforcement officials request a test to be performed. A test was performed on a nineteen-year old student taken to St. Joseph’s. Test results indicated that there was a trace amount of alcohol present.

Bonfire night is typically one of the most active nights of the year for Brazos County Law Enforcement Agencies because of the large number of parties and activities associated with the event. Those who work on the bonfire are required to sign a pledge card promising that they will not drink and get on the stack, but there is a history of alcohol related problems. As early as 1985, students blamed drinking as a contributing factor for bonfire related injuries. Since the activity is a student function, university officials rely upon the students to enforce the rules.

Over the years, a number of injuries such as allergic reactions to the pine trees, crushed hands, teeth knocked loose, and cuts from mishandled axes have been reported. There have also been complaints about the way women are treated during the event, particularly during the 1987 and 1988 bonfires.

Following the collapse, the Justice of Peace ruled that the cause of death for all twelve victims of the bonfire collapse was accidental. Therefore, he did not order autopsies to be performed on the bodies of the deceased. With the exception of large metropolitan counties, most counties in Texas do not have a Medical Examiner or Corner. A Justice of the Peace, by law, performs the function of corner. Each county has a minimum of four JPs and their jurisdictions coincide with the boundaries of the county commissioners’ precincts. In more densely populated counties, however, the number of JP’s may be increased to a maximum of eight.

On May 2, 2000 the Special Commission on the 1999 Texas A&M Bonfire released its final report. Compiled at a cost of approximately $2 million, the report revealed that:

The 1999 Bonfire collapsed due to a number of both physical and organizational factors. Structurally, the collapse was driven by a containment failure in the first stack of logs. Two primary factors caused this failure: the first was excessive internal stresses driven primarily by aggressive wedging of second stack logs into the first stack. The second was inadequate containment strength. The wiring used to tie the logs together provided insufficient binding strength. Also, steel cables, which in recent years had been wrapped around the first stack, were not used in 1999, further reducing containment strength. These two factors - excessive internal stresses and weakened containment strength - combined to cause the collapse.

The physical failure and causal factors were driven by an organizational failure. This failure, which had its roots in decisions and actions by both students and University officials over many years, created an environment in which a complex and dangerous structure was allowed to be built without adequate physical or engineering controls.

This organizational failure is complex but includes such things as the absence of an appropriate written design or design process, cultural bias impeding risk identification, and the lack of a proactive risk management approach.

The Commission’s report determined that the weather was not a contributing factor in the collapse. It had not rained in the days leading up to the collapse and the sky that morning was clear and the temperature fluctuated between 40 and 50( F. The wind direction was from the south/southeast with a speed of five to seven miles per hour with no gusts. The report also ruled out sabotage or any criminal activity.

Two investigations were on going at the time this report was prepared. The Texas Board of Professional Engineers, a nine-member board based in Austin, continues to research two issues. First, the Board intends to determine whether or not administrators and the University violated the law by their failure to involve professional engineers in the project. Second, the Board is considering whether engineers on the faculty ignored their ethical duty by failing over the years to raise concerns about the bonfire structure.

The College Station Police Department is also continuing its investigation of the collapse, which is a matter of course following an unnatural death. Police are charged with determining whether any criminal activity was involved and they are seeking to determine if any crimes were committed related to negligence. In addition, police wish to determine if there was any violation of the Texas Engineering Practice Act of 1937. The Act was created to protect public safety by regulating the design and construction of buildings and other structures. Provisions of the Act require that any public work costing more than $8,000.00 be designed and supervised by a licensed professional engineer. The exact amount expended on the construction of the 1999 bonfire has yet to be determined.