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Rescue » Technical Reports

Amtrak Train Derailment - (Nodaway, IA - September 2002) » The Derailment

At 11:40 PM on the night of Saturday March 17, 2001, the dispatcher on duty at the Adams County Sheriff’s Office in Corning, Iowa received a telephone call from the Fort Worth, Texas based dispatcher of the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway (BNSF) advising her that Amtrak’s California Zephyr passenger train traveling westbound on the BNSF’s mainline had derailed between Brooks and Nodaway, Iowa. The BNSF dispatcher had been contacted by the train’s engineer via their radio system, but was unable to provide any additional details concerning the incident.

The Sheriff’s Office serves as the 911 answering point for all of Adams County and dispatches for all of the public safety agencies within the County. The dispatcher immediately notified the volunteer fire departments, the County EMS Service, and all available deputies. Given the potential magnitude of the incident, the dispatchers also began to recall the off-duty deputies.

Only one dispatcher was on duty at the time the call was received, but it was time for a shift change and the relief dispatcher was already present. The off-going dispatcher remained in the dispatch center through the duration of the incident to help and as soon as the incident was dispatched offers of assistance from other agencies began to be received and all were accepted. Upon hearing the call being dispatched, an off-duty senior reserve officer and the Corning Police Chief responded to the Communications Center and assisted throughout the incident. The five in-coming 911 lines and the five in-coming telephone lines were immediately flooded and remained busy throughout the incident. A total of 519 calls were processed by the dispatch center.


March 17th is also Saint Patrick’s Day and the Corning VFD was hosting its annual fund raising event, a Firemen’s Ball, at the local National Guard Armory. After the Ball, attendees were scheduled to adjourn to the fire hall for breakfast and some of the members had already retired to the fire hall to help prepare for the breakfast when the incident occurred. Since the temperature was below freezing, the Fire Chief had instructed members to start the apparatus, which was parked outside on the apron. The Chief wanted the engines to be warm and the windshields to be free of ice or frost in the unlikely event something were to occur during the breakfast.

The sky was clear on the night of March 17. The temperature was 28°F and the wind was calm, thus no wind-chill. These conditions helped prevent hypothermia and prevented emergency responders from becoming overheated during the incident. Had it been colder, there would have been a problem due to the large number of victims and the potential for hypothermia. Victims were awaken from their sleep and were unable to find their shoes or coats due to the darkness and position of many of the rail cars. Colder temperatures, however, might have frozen the ground, which would have made access easier. Nevertheless, freezing temperatures did help keep road passable and prevented them becoming muddy due to the presence of accumulated snow and ice, and the fact that the roads were unpaved. If the event had occurred one week earlier, the results might have been different due to the amount of snow that had been on the ground in the area. The incident would have had a snow removal problem.

Amtrak’s California Zephyr, also known as the Number Five, had last stopped in Des Moines, Iowa and was traveling along a portion of track owned and operated by the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway (BNSF) when it derailed one and one-half miles west of Brooks and east of Nodaway. The Zephyr originated in Chicago and was destined for Emeryville, California, which is near Oakland. The train consisted of two locomotives and fifteen cars and its next scheduled stop was Omaha, some seventy miles to the west. The train was confirmed to have been traveling at fifty-two miles per hour on a rail section that is rated at eighty miles per hour. The slower speed was due to problems with the train’s whistle, which is used at crossings to warn motorists.

Rescuers were unable to immediately determine the number of people on train because the conductor had just begun the task of collecting tickets when the derailment occurred, which particularly made it difficult to account for the number of children on board. While the train had the potential to transport 519, the initial reports placed the occupant load at 210, 195 passengers and fifteen crewmembers. That number was later revised upward to 241 - 225 passengers and sixteen crewmembers.

The first law enforcement officer on the scene was a state trouper who approached the incident site from the west side. The officer placed the crew of the derailed engine in his car. Railway officials later took the crew to be tested for alcohol and drugs. Law enforcement agencies from throughout the area responded and were primarily used for traffic control. The time of day and the remoteness of location resulted in a very limited problem with spectators. The response by rescuers in their personal vehicles and that of nearby residents contributed significantly to the congestion at the site.

When the derailment occurred, a number of the cars came to rest perpendicular to the track. Two of the cars completely blocked the scene and essentially divided the incident into two sectors, east and west. Wreckage and debris was scattered over an area approximately 1/4 mile in length. Access was limited to a narrow road located 3/8th of a mile east of the wreckage and another road 1/4 mile to the west. Staging and triage areas were established on both sides of the site.

The derailment did not cause a fire and there were no hazardous materials involved. Both engines and a majority of the cars came of the track, however, with at least one being turned upside down and approximately four cars being turned on their side. The train traveled through fences as it left the track, but none of the affected fields contained livestock. Additionally, no utilities were disrupted by the derailment. There, was an old telegraph line along the track, which had been abandoned and it was quickly determined not to be a hazard.

The rail bed at the site of the incident had space for two parallel tracks, although only one set being used at time of crash and generally ran from northeast to southwest. The section is part of the BNSF’s mainline and carries approximately forty freight trains a day and some 103 million tons of freight annually. The primary product is coal being hauled east from Wyoming. The abandoned roadbed proved to be the only means to each the site. Ambulances and rescuers had to drive into the site, in single file and then back out with their patient before another vehicle could enter the site. This process was complicated by the presence of several trestles, which spanned small streams. The trestles were open between the crossties, thus making crossing on foot very dangerous.

Aerial view of the wreckage
Ninety-six people were injured and one person was killed in the derailment. No one was ejected as a result of the derailment, but access to the victims was limited by the position of the cars and the very narrow stairways on the double-decked cars. Two of the cars came to rest perpendicular to the track and essentially sliced the scene into two sectors. Passenger rail cars are very sturdy and have unbreakable windows. The doors began jammed as a result of the impact of the derailment.

As the emergency responders began to arrive, a scene eerily reminiscent of the movie The Field of Dreams greeted them. People began to walk toward them and their lights. The responders also reported an unusual sense of calm, which pervaded the incident scene. Many of the passengers directed rescuers to those with more severe injuries and often declined immediate transportation in order for family members to remain together.

The ninety-six people who were injured were transported to six area hospitals, primarily by ground ambulance. Two of the victims’ injuries were serious enough to warrant evacuation by helicopter. A third person was later flown out from the Corning Hospital. The first ambulance initially responded from the Adams County EMS agency and assumed command of the triage efforts. The supervisor and the County’s second EMS unit responded to the Corning hospital’s emergency room to assist with the influx of patients because of the small capacity of the hospital and the expected patient load. The supervisor helped coordinate the transportation effort and directed ambulances to area hospitals based upon the nature and severity of the injuries.

Due to the large number of injuries, ground ambulances were required to make multiple trips and they began to run out of backboards and c-collars. In many cases the used duct tape to secure patients to stretchers and to immobilize patients. Rescuers used ambulances as well as privately owned vehicles, many of them four-wheel drive pickup trucks and SUV’s, to transport the injured and non-injured alike to the staging areas one each side of the derailment site. At staging, the occupants of the train were triaged and were sorted for transport to a medical facility. If they were not injured, passengers were taken by school bus to the Community Center in Nodaway, which had been opened to shelter the non-injured.

To assist with the rescue effort, a load of linens and blankets taken to scene by a vendor of the Mercy Hospital in Corning because of the temperature and the large number of occupants on the train. The number of blankets onboard the ambulances and train, however, proved to be sufficient. The hospital had been notified of the incident fifteen minutes in advance of the receipt of the first patient, which allowed sufficient time to mobilize its staff and kitchen. All four of the local physicians and the entire off-duty nursing staff responded to the emergency room to assist with the influx of patients. . A total of 43 patients were taken to Mercy Hospital. Three patients subsequently transferred to metro hospitals and one remained hospitalized in Corning. The remainder were all treated and released.

At Iowa Methodist Medical Center in Des Moines, a 77-year-old female was hospitalized with chest injuries and a fractured wrist. At St. Joseph in Omaha: 54-yearold male and 50 year old female were hospitalized and a 47-year-old female was hospitalized with broken hip at the University of Nebraska Medical Center in Omaha.

As patients arrived and were treated, their names were faxed to the Dispatcher in order to keep track of everyone. The nature and severity of their injury and the location of their transport was noted by the Dispatcher as well.

The single fatality was a 69 year-old female from Colorado Springs that had traveled to Des Moines because her brother, a nursing home resident in Des Moines, had died on the previous Thursday. She was in the process of transporting his ashes to Colorado when the incident occurred. An autopsy was conducted by the state medical examiner and it was determined that she died at the scene from multiple blunt force trauma injuries. The medical examiner ruled that her death was accidental.

Approximately 200 emergency responders assisted at the scene of the incident. Twenty-One ground transportation ambulances, two helicopters, and an undetermined number of private vehicles were used to transport patients. The Adams County Emergency Management Coordinator, which is a voluntary position, served as the incident commander. A Command Post was set up on the Westside of the incident and the Corning Fire Chief directed operations from that site. The Taylor County Emergency Management Coordinator reported to the staging area on the west side of the incident and assisted as needed.

View of the wreckage Passengers and crewmembers that had not been injured were transported by school bus to the Nodaway Community Center where they were sheltered from the cold and fed. An EMS unit was place on standby at the Community Center to ensure no one was later discovered to have been injured or if there had been a medical emergency triggered by the delayed effects of the incident. The Emergency Management Coordinator from Union County went there to assist. As the incident progressed, Amtrak transferred them to hotels in Omaha where they received counseling and assistance from the Red Cross and the Salvation Army.
Approximately fourteen minutes into incident the media began to call the Adams County Sheriff’s Dispatcher. Phone calls from as far away as London and Brisbane, Australia were answered. Once the news hit the Associated Press newswire, the call volume greatly increased. One local media person reported that the local media representative got in early and the event was really over by the time the big guys got interested. Most of the large agencies arrived after daylight, but then it was all over except for the investigation and cleanup. Family members of the occupants of the train also began to call once the news of the derailment was released. A number of television stations responded to the area with their satellite trucks and helicopters. There was not need, however, to restrict air space.

The local emergency responders had not had any training on responding to or managing a train wreck and had very limited knowledge about train wrecks and the tactics and logistics necessary to manage such an event. Therefore, they relied upon the training that they had, which is the response to tornadoes that are common in the Midwest. Rescuers conducted both a primary and secondary search of the train and marked the cars as they went using the orange spray paint that is a part of their tornado response plan to mark buildings that have been searched in the event that a tornado hits and does serious damage.

By 07:00 hours on Saturday Morning, most of the passengers had been bused to Omaha hotels and by 09:00 hours only a few volunteers remained at the Community Center. The rail line was reopened to freight and passenger service at 01:45 hours on Monday March the 20th. The temperature and the nature of the rescue activities made rehab unnecessary according to local rescue officials. No injuries of emergency responders were reported during the incident, nor were there any injuries reported by the occupants of the train as a result of the rescue efforts.

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