At 1153 hours, Copter 106 was the first CDF unit to reach the scene
but could not establish radio contact with the Oakland IC. Copter 106
made an aerial size-up of the situation and then dropped its hand crew
members to begin manual firefighting on the upper hillside near Grizzly
Peak, trying to keep the fire from crossing into Claremont Canyon. The
helicopter then began to operate as a water bomber. Shortly after the fire
was discovered west of Lake Temescal, Copter 106 redeployed itself to this
area, trying to stop the spread on this new front. Lake Temescal was used
to refill the helicopter’s water bucket.
The first CDF ground units arrived shortly after noon at the Grizzly
Peak side of the fire, where they made direct contact with Oakland
companies that were engaged along Marlborough Terrace and Grizzly Peak
Drive. The CDF Battalion Chief (BC1616) was unable to establish radio
contact with the Oakland Command Post or with Oakland Fire
Communications. Shortly after their arrival, the situation on Marlborough
Terrace became untenable and the CDF units backed out to make an
assessment of the situation.
Their location put them in the best position to recognize the threat
to Claremont Canyon, if the fire continued to spread over the hill and to
the north. Unable to make contact with Oakland, the BC1616 decided to
commit the CDF units to independent action on the north side of the fire.
They worked their way down Claremont Avenue to Alvarado Road and
then up to the Amito Road area, where they encountered structures
already on fire.
CDF operated independently to cover the Claremont Canyon
exposure and established its base at the intersection of Grizzly Peak
Boulevard and Fish Ranch Road. Most of the CDF ground resources were
committed on this flank of the fire for the remainder of the afternoon.
BC1616 coordinated CDF actions with Morgan Hill until a Unified
Command structure was established, around 1600 hours.
CDF was extremely short of resources due to the demands of
several simultaneous incidents, including the Franklin Canyon fire that was
drawing resources from both CDF and Contra Costa County fire
departments. The only two available CDF air tankers and a spotter
aircraft had been dispatched to Franklin Canyon at 1156 hours. All other
CDF air tankers in the area had been dispatched to other wildland fires in
Sonoma County.
The two air tankers that had been dispatched to the Franklin
Canyon fire had an ETA of 45 to 50 minutes from their bases at Fresno and Salinas. They were diverted to Oakland when it was determined that
the East Bay Hills situation was much more critical than the Franklin fire.
The spotter aircraft was in the area at 1250 hours and contacted Air
Traffic Control to clear the air space around the fire for tanker operations.
The two tankers made their first slurry drop at approximately 1300
hours. The tankers tried to drop their slurry on the flanks of the fire,
trying to limit the lateral spread, but their operations were restricted by the
terrain and the wind, as well as the thermal updrafts caused by the fire.
After dropping their loads the tankers had to fly to Santa Rosa, 45 miles
northwest of Oakland, to refill their tanks and refuel before returning to
the fire.
The need for additional helicopters and air tankers was recognized,
and CDF Morgan Hill initiated requests for aircraft from other parts of
California. One additional air tanker was dispatched at 1239 hours, and six
more were assigned during the afternoon.
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