|
There are hundreds of lessons to be learned from this incident,
many of which are contained in the body of this report and in several other
reports that have been prepared on the incident. The lessons revolve
around specific themes:
Mitigation -- The risk of disastrous wildland-urban interface
fires has been recognized and emphasized by the fire service and other
organizations for many years. This incident is the ultimate experience,
to date, of those dire predictions coming true.
The factors that created the critical fire risk situation in the East
Bay Hills on October 20, 1991, exist in hundreds of other locations and,
when the same circumstances repeat themselves, there is every reason to
expect that another very similar fire will result.
In particular, in California, when the Santa Ana (or Diablo) wind is
blowing, and a fire occurs in a susceptible area, there is very little that any
current fire suppression forces or technologies can do to resist the spread
of the fire. The results will depend mainly on the fuel that is downwind
from the fire and the length of time that the wind continues to push the
fire in that direction.
An observation was made that most fire codes would have required
an area with these fire risk characteristics to be evacuated. It was
compared to a neighborhood with spilled gasoline flowing in the gutters.
This type of regulatory control has never been applied in an interface area
in the same way it is routinely applied to structures. The outcome of this
incident appears to demonstrate the validity of the concept.
Several of the risk factors that make an area susceptible to an
interface fire can be mitigated, to reduce the level of risk:
- Use of drought-tolerant and fire-resistant landscaping.
-
Fuel control measures including controlled bums, clearing
dead wood, cutting tall grass and brush, grazing to thin
vegetation in particular areas and similar measures.
-
Brush clearance areas around structures and fuel breaks in
strategic locations.
-
Use of fire resistant roof and exterior wall materials.
-
Adequate access roadways for emergency vehicles and exit
roadways for residents.
-
Water storage and distribution systems adequate for fire
protection purposes.
-
Development of exposure protection systems, incorporating
technologies such as Class A foam.
Disaster Response -- This incident was clearly beyond the capabilities
of normal fire suppression forces, and a realistic approach to similar
situations must be based on hazard mitigation and risk reduction. It is not
feasible to provide a fire suppression organization to master the situation
that occurred in Oakland. The fire departments in Oakland, Berkeley, and
all of the surrounding areas provided a valuable lesson to the fire service,
in demonstrating their courage, skills, and dedication. But they also
demonstrated the need for risk assessment and planning for disasters that
completely overwhelm regular emergency response systems. There are
many things than can be said and done to react to these lessons:
- There are recognizable fire risk situations (not necessarily
limited to wildland-urban interface environments) that are
clearly beyond the capabilities of fire suppression forces.
Hazard reduction strategies should be the primary approach
taken when these situations are recognized.
-
An urban conflagration resulting from a wildland interface
fire is a situation that has not received sufficient planning
attention.
-
It is unrealistic to expect normal emergency response systems,
that are based on routine demands to smoothly manage a
disaster situation; the test is how quickly and effectively a
disaster response system can be implemented.
-
It is impossible to manage a large scale disaster with
insufficient command personnel and inadequate command
and control systems. Fire departments should always anticipate “worst case” scenarios and develop plans and
procedures to address those situations.
-
Communications systems that are adequate for normal times
and situations may be easily overwhelmed in a disaster
situation.
-
In the aftermath of a disaster, every detail of response
operations is subject to review in minute detail. The
inadequacies are grossly magnified.
-
It is extremely difficult to evacuate a heavily populated
interface zone, particularly when the homes are enveloped in
rapid burning and easily ignitable fuels. When wind, terrain,
narrow roads, steep grades, and other factors combine to
accelerate fire spread and restrict passage, the risk to
residents can be extreme. Once a fire starts spreading
through the area, it may be too late to evacuate.
-
Firefighters will subject themselves to extreme levels of risk
and personal exertion in the face of a disastrous fire. It may
be necessary to order companies to evacuate for their own
safety, or to rest when the situation is still out of control.
-
When normal response resources are forced to retreat, it is
extremely difficult to regroup, reorganize, and return to
effective action. Command officers must recognize when
conditions are failing and decommit early enough from futile
operations in order to have time to regroup and reorganize
effectively.
-
Existing expectations for “jump potential” may need to be
reevaluated. The distance that the this fire jumped, from
Hiller Highlands over the freeway interchange and Lake
Temescal, was much farther than had been anticipated in
planning for a fire in the hills. The conditions for a long
“jump” were perfect and the fire spread rapidly into an
entirely new area.
-
It is not clear that even an early series of aerial attacks
could have controlled this fire; however, the need for rapid
notification and response of aircraft can be seen in the
analysis. The arrival of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to attack this fire was delayed by circumstances, communication
problems, and confusion.
-
It may have been feasible to protect some of the structures
with exterior sprinkler systems, if adequate water flows and
pressures had been available and the more severe exposures
to wildland fuels had been reduced. The intensity of the
exterior fire exposure was so severe that interior automatic
sprinkler systems had no value in protecting the structures
from ignition.
-
Compressed-air foam systems (CAFS) appear to be very
useful in applying a thick foamy covering to protect severely
exposed structures. There have been experiments with Class
A Foam agents, applied through automatic sprinklers or
deluge systems, or by handlines, as exposure protection
systems. Research is being conducted on mobile (truck
mounted) systems and fixed or portable CAFS systems for
homeowners.
|
Save to del.icio.us
