Between 1040 and 1050 hours, the wind velocity increased and
several additional flare-ups were observed; the crews were kept busy
moving up and down the steep slope to cover them. The EBRPD officer
contacted his communications center, reporting numerous rekindles, and
requested another EBRPD engine company to respond “Code 3.” The
EBRPD helicopter, Eagle 5, was also requested to provide a better vantage
point to direct operations.
Between 1050 and 1057 hours the winds continued to increase
and caused more flare-ups. Engine 19 contacted Oakland Fire
Communications to report that one of the flare-ups was in a new location
and there was “pretty good smoke showing” from it. The Assistant Chief,
who had returned to downtown Oakland, ordered E24 to return to the
scene. The Lieutenant of El9 advised the Assistant Chief that the smoke
was coming from a previously unburned area on the flank of the previous
day’s fire, but the situation was still under control.
The radio traffic indicates that there was difficulty making radio
contact between the Oakland and EBRPD personnel on the hill at this
time. The Lieutenant of Engine 19 was concerned that some of the
EBRPD personnel could be in dangerous positions as several new flare-ups
occurred in rapid succession.
Very suddenly, the fire flared up in an unburned area on the lower
east flank of the bum area. Burning embers had been carried from one of
the hot spots into a patch of tinder dry brush. At 1058 hours, El9 called
for a “full box alarm” to respond to Gwin Tank. Oakland Fire Communications dispatched E24, E28, and BC2 to assist E19. Engine 4,
which was assigned to hill patrol, also responded.
One minute later, Engine 19 requested CDF assistance and, at 1102
hours, requested a 2nd Alarm and Police assistance for traffic and crowd
control. The 2nd Alarm units were directed to respond to 7140
Marlborough Terrace, at the top of the hill. At 1104 hours, the Assistant
Chief, who could see the smoke from several miles away, called for a 3rd
Alarm and also directed Oakland Fire Communications to request mutual
aid from CDF. He specified to advise CDF that this was “another fire in
the Threat Zone.” The Oakland area map presented previously is repeated
on the following page showing the location of the restart and its initial
spread.
The fire was spreading rapidly uphill, and the strong wind coming
over the ridge was pushing the flames out to both flanks at the same time.
(A television news crew, who were in the area following up on the previous
fire, videotaped the rapid growth of the new fire from a minor flare-up in a
growth of brush to a mass of flame, spewing flaming embers on new fuel
and igniting new outbreaks at a rapid pace.) The situation changed from
offensive to defensive almost instantaneously as the fire raged out of
control. Within the first few minutes, El9 reported that the fire was
crowning in the trees at the top of the hill, and a spot fire was reported in
the area of Norfolk and Marlborough.
The Assistant Chief drove through the Caldecott Tunnel, noting the
heavy smoke and flame on the hillside high above and to the left of the
tunnel entrance, and turned up Fish Ranch Road to come up the back side
of the hills. As he arrived at Gwin Tank, he could see that the fire was
already well beyond the size of the previous day’s fire and spreading into
heavier fuels. The first structure was becoming involved on Buckingham.
He assumed command of the incident and assigned Battalion 4 as “Division
A” to supervise operations from below on Buckingham Boulevard, while he
assessed the situation from the top of the hill. He requested a 4th Alarm
at 1115 hours.
Engine 24 had come in on the lower side of the fire and reported
that they thought they had the fire cut off to the west from 7140
Buckingham. Engine 19, with a vantage point above the fire, could see
that left flank of the fire had jumped, possibly from a flaming brand, and
started a new run uphill and to the west, above the houses on Buckingham.
This created an immediate threat to houses at the end of Westmoorland
Drive and at the top of the hill on Marlborough Terrace.
Engine 19 advised the Incident Commander that there were two
distinct fire fronts, moving laterally in both directions from the area of origin. The wind coming over the ridge was meeting the fire spreading up
the slope and splitting it into two flame fronts.
An off-duty Assistant Chief, who was in the area, had responded
and was at the bottom of the hill. Communicating with the on-duty
Assistant Chief, they decided to set up the Command Post Vehicle at the
Highway 24 off-ramp, in the same location as the previous day. The
off-duty chief became the Incident Commander, while the on-duty chief
became the Operations Officer.
Ladder 1, a tractor-trailer unit, was responding to Marlborough
Terrace on the 2nd Alarm, when the Assistant Chief saw the vehicle
coming up the hill via Hiller Road. He redirected Ll to meet the
Command Vehicle on Highway 24. The large truck took several minutes
to descend via Charing Cross Road to Tunnel Road, with their steep slopes
narrow switchbacks. By the time they reached the bottom of the hill, the
fire was spreading to the area they had just come through.
An assessment of the situation at this point indicates that the rapid
fire spread, combined with very limited access, was beyond the capability of
conventional firefighting forces. To reach the fire, companies had only a few
very steep and narrow roads, while the fire had the advantages of weather
conditions, terrain, and natural fuels. The wind coming over the end of the
canyon and down the slope was splitting the fire to both sides, pushing it
directly toward inhabited areas on both flanks. The force of the wind
was so strong that master streams were unable to reach the flames. It was
clear to the Operations Officer that rapid intervention with firefighting
aircraft was needed to have any hope of stopping the spread of this fire.
At 1119 hours, CDF Morgan Hill was dispatching its closest
available helitack unit, Copter 106, to Oakland. The CDF dispatcher had
received the initial mutual aid request from Oakland, but when he called
back to obtain additional details, the call was placed on hold for several minutes. Copter 106 normally has a 15 to 20 minutes flying time to the
fire scene; on this day the strong headwind almost doubled the flying time.
Next » Communication Problems
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