Two basic tactical approaches were used. The structurally-oriented
strike teams used 1 l/2-, 1 3/4- and 2 l/2-inch handlines, as well as master
stream appliances where sufficient water was available from hydrants. The
wildland-oriented strike teams used l-inch attack lines, supplied by tank
water, and were much more mobile. While the mobility was important in
controlling the numerous spot fires that were ignited by brands and embers
ahead of the main fire front, the heavy streams were needed to have any
effect where the main body of the fire was creating the exposure. Both
tactical approaches were effective in different situations, but neither one
could stop the progress of the fire in the downwind direction.
A few homes were saved by homeowners who made determined
efforts to protect their properties. On Margarido Drive, a retired Battalion
Chief enlisted his off-duty firefighter son-in-law to keep the flames from
igniting his home. In another area, three homeowners banded together to
protect their homes as they were exposed in succession. Most of the
structures that survived were the products of determined efforts by
firefighters who identified locations they could defend and stayed until the
threat had passed, before moving on to another location. The few homes
that were left standing demonstrated the value of noncombustible roofing
materials and brush clearance around the structures.
Company officers reported that their efforts were most successful
when they could group several companies together and make a coordinated
effort to save a group of homes. They also reported the frustration of
fighting to save a home for an hour or more, only to see it bum when they
ran out of water or were simply defeated by the fire’s unyielding energy.
Firefighters on the front lines endured hours of frustration and
punishment. The 90° weather and the hot dry wind were enough to cause
heat exhaustion at a routine fire; this battle continued for hours without relief, in the face of a fire that drove heavy smoke, flaming brands, and
embers into the faces of the fire suppression forces. Handlines had to be
moved repeatedly to hit new outbreaks on rooftops and in vegetation.
Interior attacks were attempted to hit wood shingle roof fires from below.
Houses burst into flames and fire swept across streets all around them.
Time after time, the firefighters fought until they won or had to retreat,
then moved on to the next block and did it all over again.
One of the Alameda County Task Force Commanders reported that
his convoy was en route to an assigned staging location at Golden Gate
and Acacia in the Rockridge district, but had to take an indirect route due
to blocked roads and traffic congestion. At Proctor and Broadway Terrace
they were flagged down by a resident urgently requesting assistance to
evacuate a disabled relative from a nearby home. Before the rescue could
be completed, they found themselves fighting flaming brands and embers
that rained down on the trees and rooftops around them, igniting dozens of
fires within the block. Unable to contact the Command Post, they fought
to keep the flames from involving one house after another until they had to
pull back and retreat to the next block. The rescue was completed, but the
block was lost.
As the battle continued, they developed tactics that were successful
in protecting individual homes, where they could deploy ahead of the fire,
but the majority of the homes burned to the ground around them. Time
after time they pulled back to make another stand, first on Proctor, then on
Agnes, Florence, and Modoc. They saved one or two homes where they
could, but they were never able to stop the fire’s advance. It was hours
later before they discovered that their successive positions had been
directly on the head of the advancing fire.
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