East Bay Hills Fire (Oakland-Berkely, CA - October 1991) » The Restart

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 20th
Sunday morning, October 20, brought the classic Diablo wind conditions to the Oakland area. The weather was still calm on the flatlands as the Oakland Fire Department changed shifts, between 0700 and 0800 hours, but the winds were already picking up in the hills. The Battalion Chief who had conducted the final check of the fire area the previous evening noticed the weather conditions as soon as he arrived at his home in the hills that morning. He called the on-duty Assistant Chief (BC2) to make him aware of the situation.

The Assistant Chief, who had also worked the previous day’s fire, recognized the danger and directed two engine companies to check the bum area. Engines 19 and 24 met at the top of the hill, in the area of 7185 Marlborough Terrace, at 0850 hours. They noted a few hot spots, inside the fire line, under some pine trees on the north flank of the bum area and in the upper portion near Gwin Tank.

Engine 19 asked Oakland Fire Communications to have a unit from the East Bay Regional Parks District (EBRPD) Fire Department respond to pick up their hose, which had been left on the hillside overnight. Oakland Fire Communications contacted EBRPD and was advised that there would be no one available to respond until their day shift personnel reported for duty.

The Assistant Chief decided to survey the situation and, while en route, advised Oakland Fire Communications to activate Patrol 28 with overtime personnel. This unit would be assigned to provide a quick response capability in the hill area., due to the windy conditions. Arriving at the top of the hill, at 0913, he advised Oakland Fire Communications to again call EBRPD and request their assistance in overhauling several hot spots that were flaring-up on the hillside. At 0916 he requested an additional engine company and Engine 16 was dispatched.

The wind was continuing to cause flare-ups in the bum area and the Assistant Chief was concerned with the extreme fire risk conditions. He advised Oakland Fire Communications of the risk factor at 0926 and, at 0929, assumed command of the situation from Marlborough Terrace. At that time several small flare-ups were showing within the bum area.

At the same time, EBRPD was dispatching units to the scene, having received the message that their hose was in danger of burning if it was not soon picked up. The first EBRPD engine arrived at 0932 hours and advised the EBRPD Communications Center that the situation “seems to be OK” and that the other responding units could “come in Code 2” (without lights and siren).

The flare-ups were controlled by 0945 hours. The Assistant Chief advised Oakland Fire Communications that the situation was under control and that E24 would be in command of continuing overhaul. As he was leaving the scene, the Assistant Chief contacted Battalions 3 and 4 and directed each one to assign an engine company to patrol the hills, due to the hazardous weather conditions. Engines 27 and 4, from the flatland area of the City, were assigned to this duty. At approximately the same time, the EBRPD Fire Chief, who was not aware of the flare-ups in Temescal Canyon, contacted his Communications Center and advised them to increase the staffing at the EBRPD fire stations, due to the weather conditions.

At 0959 hours the Assistant Chief questioned the assignment of an engine company to a special assignment at the Training Academy on that particular morning, noting “we have the most critical fire conditions in five years.” The assignment was canceled to keep the engine company in service.

Additional EBRPD units and personnel arrived and assisted the Oakland personnel who were overhauling hotspots on the hillside. Most of the overhaul was conducted with hand tools to root out fire that had burrowed into the thick duff and roots. The hose lines that had been left on the hill were repositioned to cover the perimeter, as a precautionary measure.

The Oakland and EBRPD units were having difficulty coordinating their efforts, since each agency’s units were on their own radio channels. Passing messages via the dispatchers, then by telephone from one communications center to the other, proved to be a problem. The units from both agencies were directed to use the “White” (Mutual Aid) channel to communicate directly.

By 1029 the situation appeared to be well in hand and E24 advised that El9 and El6 would be returning to quartets, while E24 would stay on the scene with the EBRPD personnel. The EBRPD personnel were still working a hot spot on the west flank of the fire, near the bottom of the bum area, which was emitting a significant amount of smoke. At 1035 Oakland Fire Communications advised E24 that they had received a call from a citizen at 7290 Marlborough Terrace reporting a hot spot on the hill. Engine 24 replied that the EBRPD crews were working on that spot and had advised that they could handle it. An EBRPD unit was directed to pull into the driveway at 7151 Buckingham and to extend a line up the hill to cover this flare-up. Radio traffic indicates that the personnel were confident that they could handle the situation and that the flare-ups were all within the safe bum perimeter of the previous day’s fire.

At 1040 hours, Oakland Fire Communications transmitted a 1st Alarm for a reported grass fire on Campus Drive, in the hills approximately five miles south of Temescal Canyon. The first arriving unit was Engine 27, which had been assigned to patrol the hills, and the fire was handled by one company.

At 1041 hours, E24 left the scene, leaving El9 in command of the overhaul operation. Engine 16 was already en route back to quarters. The decision to have El9 stay at the scene, instead of E24, was made between the two company officers. At this time the wind was continuing to fan minor flare-ups, but there appeared to be sufficient personnel on the scene to handle the situation with El9 and the EBRPD crews.

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